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The purpose of this thesis is to address the question: "What accounts for Khmer Rouge 
viability?" One approach, which will be used in this thesis, is to analyze the Khmer Rouge 
through their "self-definitions"--located in their myths, rituals, and symbols—to better 
understand how they perceive themselves, their cause, and their future and how those 
perceptions can be used to defeat adversaries. 
This study focuses on insurgent activity as a battle of ideas using the Khmer Rouge as 
a case study. To analyze the application of this plane to insurgent viability, this study looked 
to the "symbolic dimension," a medium of political exchange that defines reality through 
symbolic means. To provide a linkage between symbols and viability, the symbolic actions of 
the Khmer Rouge are applied to five elements of insurgent viability: legitimacy, popular 
support, organization, external support, and defeating adversarial response. All five elements 
are covered from the origins of the insurgency in the 1950s, through their victory in 1975 and 
demise in 1979, concluding with their actions today. 
This thesis demonstrates that the Khmer Rouge insurgency relies on symbolic activity 
as one means of viability. Using ethnic discrimination myths and nationalist rituals, the 
insurgents swept to power in a rural based movement. However, fanatical beliefs in myths 
of common blood ties and racial purity drove the regime to destruction. To resurrect the 
movement, the Khmer Rouge play on the weakness of the present government utilizing 
democratic symbols as well as former racist themes to replace the malevolent image of their 
governing years with an image of their perception as heirs to rulership. 
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The purpose of this thesis is to address the question: "What accounts for Khmer 
Rouge viability?" One approach, which will be used in this thesis, is to analyze the Khmer 
Rouge through their "self-definitions"—located in their myths, rituals, and symbols—to better 
understand how they perceive themselves, their cause, and their future and how those 
perceptions can be used to defeat adversaries.1 
Organized in 1951, the Communist Party of Kampuchea won a striking victory in 
Cambodia. The communists, fighting under the title of "Khmer Rouge" ("Red Khmer"), an 
epithet given them by the reigning Cambodian monarch, seized the country by 1975. For 44 
months, Khmer Rouge authority in Cambodia became symbolized by the "killing fields"— 
execution areas complete with shallow graves for those designated enemies of the revolution. 
By 1979, the revolution was over. More than one million dead lay as testimony to the 
revolution's destructive power and failed policies. 
Today, fifteen years after their fall from power at the hands of invading Vietnamese 
forces, the Khmer Rouge continue to reign over almost a quarter of Cambodian territory. But 
the "killing fields" are becoming overgrown, concealed under fresh images sown by the 
insurgency to fit their new circumstances. Although responsible for committing national 
genocide, the insurgency continues to seek authority over the remaining population. By 
systematically undermining the newly elected Cambodian government, just as they 
methodically eliminated opponents of their regime years before, the Khmer Rouge remain a 
viable and deadly opponent. 
This study contends the symbolic activity of the Khmer Rouge lends viability to the 
movement because insurgency is a battle not only on the corporeal plane but the incorporeal 
plane as well. Political scientist J. Bowyer Bell likens the insurgent to a "dreamer," who 
"pursue[s] the armed struggle and shapes his world through perception into an ecosystem that 
'Roman Laba, The Roots of Solidarity: A Political Sociology of Poland's Working-Class 
Democratization, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 126. 
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allows the dream to persist, expand, contaminate the many, and drive the war."2 The 
ecosystem Bell suggests can be related to Murray Edelman's examination of symbolic actions. 
Edelman suggests that shared values allow insurgents to seek a difficult objective like control 
of the state. "Participants in a guerrilla movement normally share common values and 
cognitions respecting their cause to a high degree and can be counted on to use their faculties 
to realize their common objectives . . . ."3 By appealing to these "common values and 
cognitions," the resistance seeks to overcome limited material resources and win the battle 
of perceptions, thereby giving viability to their movement. Symbolic actions are the means 
to wage the battle of perceptions. 
The basis for symbolic actions would concentrate on the influence of politics, focusing 
not on "who gets what, when, and how,"4 but on "what they want, what they fear, what they 
regard as possible, and even who they are."5 Symbolic signalling is the very foundation of 
politics. "The medium of political exchange has always been symbolism;" explains sociologist 
David Kertzer, "it is an exchange that not only redistributes political rewards, but that also 
builds our political understandings. If symbols and rituals are used to build political reality, 
it is because, as humans, we can do it no other way."6 
To answer the question, "What accounts for Khmer Rouge viability?" the symbolic 
activity of the insurgency was analyzed from their origins in the 1950s, through their demise 
in 1979, to their actions today. Research focuses on the symbolic actions and language of 
the Khmer Rouge as published in FBIS, government documents, histories, journals, and 
newspapers as well as unpublished sources such as captured documents and defector 
2J. Bowyer Bell, "Revolutionary Insurgency: The Threat to This Generation—Waiting for the Fat Lady 
to Sing," (New York: International Analysis Center, n.d.), p. 4. 
3Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence. (Chicago: Markham 
Publishing Company, 1971), p. 140. 
4Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who gets What. When. How. (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1958). 
'Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), p. 20. 
6David I. Kertzer, Ritual. Politics, and Power. (New Haven: Yale University Press: 1988), p. 95. 
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interviews.7 
Following an introductory chapter, Chapter II discusses insurgency as symbolic action. 
Using authors versed in symbolic studies, this chapter provides the linkage of symbolic actions 
to insurgency. Symbolic activity will be related to five aspects of insurgency that are 
necessary for viability: legitimacy, popular support, organization, external support, and defeat 
of adversarial response. These five aspects of viability have relevance to any insurgency study 
and are analyzed through the symbolic actions of the Khmer Rouge in the following chapters. 
Chapter III looks for the sources of symbolic actions in the historical and cultural 
roots of Cambodia. The insurgency's adopted myths, rituals, and symbols will reflect the 
influence of a culture over two thousand years old and include the authoritarianism and 
brutality that underlay the country's history. 
Chapter IV analyzes the Khmer Rouge as insurgents attempting to seize Cambodia's 
state and society. It covers their origins during the 1950s to their victory in 1975. The 
chapter relates the application of ethnic discrimination myths, nationalist rituals, and symbolic 
alliances with the monarchy and the Vietnamese to gain victory. 
Chapter V analyzes the Khmer Rouge as rulers of Cambodia. After victory in 1975, 
the insurgency used a combination of brute force and symbols derived from ancient Khmer 
mythology and rituals of blood purity in an attempt to create a new nation.  This chapter 
'Eight translated documents, which were the secret agenda of the CPK, form the basis of this study 
during the 1975-1979 period as published in David P. Chandler, et al., eds., Pol Pot Plans the Future: 
Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976-1977. (New Haven: Yale University 
Southeast Asia Studies, 1988). Importantly, the editors note only a dozen or so Party documents are thought to 
have survived. From 1979 to the 1995, captured Khmer Rouge documents form the foundation of the 
discourse to include two unpublished sources graciously provided by Laura Summers. The first document is a 
21 page address probably by Pol Pot entitled: "What is the Virtue, the Quality, the Reality and the 
Responsibility of Democratic Kampuchea in the Past, Present, and Future?", obtained from a KR defector under 
military leader Ta Mok. The document is dated 2 December 1986 and according to Summers was translated 
on 29 February 1988 by the Central Intelligence Agency. The second document is a 48 page address to KR 
women cadre attributed to Pol Pot by context. The document is titled: "What is the Current Situation in 
Kampuchea? What Will It Be Like in the Future?". Translated by Steve Header, the document is dated 
December 1988. Defector interviews were provided by Steve Header and Lt. Colonel Ed Waller who 
conducted interviews with some 100 self-demobilized NADK combatants between July 1992 and August 1993 
as part of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. Clandestine radio broadcasts are published 
inFBIS. 
Xlll 
concludes with a discussion of the contribution of symbolic acts to the fall of the revolution 
in 1979. It demonstrates that the fixation on ritual purification ultimately encouraged the 
Vietnamese invasion and the Khmer Rouge fall from power. 
Chapter VI examines the Khmer Rouge as outlaws of Cambodia. Although 
repudiated by parliamentary measures, this chapter demonstrates how myths, rituals, and 
symbols used in the 1970s were reshaped to fit the realities of the 1990s through five 
important myths that promote a new public image, domestic popularity, enemy incursion, 
heirs to national resources, and invincibility. 
Chapter VII provides an epilogue of the future viability of the Khmer Rouge in 
relation to the state of Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge leadership understands insurgency is 
a fight of ideas. Myths, rituals, and symbols of the Khmer Rouge were a means not only of 
establishing and then reconstructing the insurgency, but provide a resource for continued 
viability in the future. 
In summary, this thesis demonstrates that the Khmer Rouge insurgency relies on 
symbolic activity as a means of viability. Using ethnic discrimination myths and nationalist 
rituals, the insurgents swept to power in a rural based movement. However, fanatical beliefs 
in myths of common blood ties and racial purity drove the regime to destruction. To resurrect 
the movement, the Khmer Rouge play on the weakness of the present government utilizing 
democratic symbols as well as former racist themes to replace the malevolent image of their 
governing years with an image of their perception of heirs to rulership. 
xiv 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Deep in the steaming forests of northwest Cambodia, 
statues of powerful deities sit muted beside temple ruins in 
the scorching Asian sun. These ruins are quiet now, no longer 
part of the daily rituals of the Khmer kingship when millions 
of suppliants padded through the stone temples that comprised 
the Angkor empire, an empire stretching 
westward to the South China Sea, encompassing 
southern Vietnam and the Mekong Delta; to the north 
over southern Laos . . . and touching China; to the 
east encompassing Thailand and parts of Burma; and 
to the southeast down to the isthmus of Kra, which 
connects Thailand and Malaysia.1 
Yet, despite national activity having moved south to the 
modern city of Phnom Penh, the complex of ruins at Angkor 
still has a disquieting influence on the nation of Cambodia. 
Angkor connects Khmer in a "psychological bond that joins a 
people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction 
of its members, from all other people in a most vital way."2 
The five towered image of Angkor Wat, although constructed in 
the 12th century, continues to grace the flag of not only the 
Elizabeth Becker, When The War Was Over: The Voices of 
Cambodia's Revolution and Its People. (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1986), p. 47. 
2Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for 
Understandingr (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1994), p. 92. 
modern nation of Cambodia, but that of the Khmer Rouge who 
conquered it.3 
A yellow representation of Angkor fluttered on a field of 
red as the national flag of the reigning Communist Party of 
Kampuchea (CPK) . Organized in 1951, the CPK won a striking 
victory in Cambodia fighting under the epithet "Khmer Rouge" 
("Red Khmer"), given them by the reigning Cambodian monarch.4 
The CPK seized a nation of over 7 million with an army of 
60,000 on 17 April 1975. For 44 months, Khmer Rouge authority 
in Cambodia became symbolized by the "killing fields"-- 
execution areas complete with shallow graves for those 
designated enemies of the revolution. By 1979, the revolution 
was over. More than one million dead lay as testimony to the 
revolution's destructive power and failed policies. 
Today, sixteen years after their fall from power at the 
hands of invading Vietnamese forces, the CPK, now renamed the 
Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), continue to reign over 
almost a quarter of Cambodian territory.  Significantly, the 
3So important was Angkor's place in the Khmer national 
consciousness, the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia banned its use as a party symbol during the May 
1993 elections in Cambodia.  Patrick Smyth and Michael 
Foley, "Pandemonium in the Land of Rumour," The Irish Times, 
June 12, 1993, p. 11. 
4The label "Khmer Rouge" was never used by the movement 
to describe itself according to Chandler. See David 
Chandler, Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol 
Pot, (Thailand: Silkview Press, 1993), fnt. 1, p. 207. 
"killing fields" are becoming overgrown, concealed under fresh 
images sown by the PDK to fit their new circumstances. 
Although responsible for committing national genocide when 
acting as the governing body of Cambodia, its image is now 
that of a contending "democratic" party which continues to 
seek greater authority. Its repudiation in national elections 
in 1993 and newly acquired status as an outlaw organization by 
decree of the national legislature in 1994, to say nothing of 
its continued existence over four decades raises many 
important questions: Who are the Khmer Rouge?; What are their 
objectives?; What obstacles concern them?; and What do they 
perceive the future to hold? This study will undertake to 
answer those questions to grapple with the main point of this 
study: What accounts for Khmer Rouge viability? 
A.   BATTLE OF PERCEPTIONS 
Insurgent activity is a battle not only on the corporeal 
plane but the incorporeal plane as well. Political scientist 
J. Bowyer Bell likens the insurgent to a "dreamer," who 
"pursue[s] the armed struggle and shapes his world through 
perception into an ecosystem that allows the dream to persist, 
expand, contaminate the many, and drive the war."5 The 
ecosystem Bell suggests can be related to the examination of 
5J. Bowyer Bell, "Revolutionary Insurgency: The Threat 
to This Generation--Waiting for the Fat Lady to Sing," (New 
York: International Analysis Center, n.d.), p. 4. 
symbolic actions in the political realm. Symbolic action is 
where insurgents give form to their political dreams, 
ideology, propaganda, and information. "[S]ymbols did not 
simply express political positions;" explained Hunt, 
they were the means by which people became aware of 
their positions. By making a political position 
manifest, they made adherence, opposition, and 
indifference possible. In this way they 
constituted a field of political struggle. 
Edelman suggests that shared political symbols and 
values allow insurgents to seek a difficult objective like 
control of the state. "Participants in a guerrilla movement 
normally share common values and cognitions respecting their 
cause to a high degree and can be counted on to use their 
faculties to realize their common objectives . . . . "7 By 
giving form to these "common values and cognitions" through 
symbolic actions, the resistance seeks to overcome limited 
material resources and win the battle of perceptions thereby 
giving viability to their movement. Thus, symbolic actions 
are the means to wage the battle of perceptions. 
The relevance of a symbolic study of the Khmer Rouge will 
Lynn Hunt, Politics. Culture, and Class in the French 
Revolution, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1984), p. 53. 
7Murray Edelman. Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass 
Arousal and Quiescence, (Chicago: Markham Publishing 
Company, 1971), p. 140. 
have applicability to insurgency studies in every part of the 
world. This study contends all insurgents use myth, ritual, 
and symbols to create a "psychological contagion" for their 
leaders, followers, and the population they seek to influence. 
A symbolic study will analyze the Khmer Rouge from the 
perspective of their "self-definitions,"8 how they perceive 
themselves, their cause, and their future and how that 
perception can be used to neutralize or defeat adversaries. 
B.   SYMBOLIC STUDIES 
The Khmer Rouge have been examined in many important 
contexts.9 However, this study will analyze the Khmer Rouge 
along the "symbolic dimension."10 Symbolic studies gained 
relevance with social scientists in the 1980s, "much as group 
theory prevailed during the 1950s, structural functionalism in 
the 1960s, and 'policy studies' in the 1970s," according to 
historian John Armstrong.11  However, a symbolic study, as 
bRoman Laba, The Roots of Solidarity: A Political 
Sociology of Poland's Working-Class Democratization, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991),  p. 126. 
9See select bibliography 
10See Chapter 2 for a fuller explanation of the 
methodology and definition of terms.  The term comes from 
Laba's study of Solidarity, p. 126. 
11
 John A. Armstrong, "Myth and History in the Evolution 
of Ukrainian Consciousness," in Peter J. Potichnyj, ed., 
Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter, (Edmonton: 
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992), p. 
125. 
Armstrong makes clear, "implies new ways of looking at 
familiar data rather than discovery of fresh bodies of 
evidence."u 
As a political and military organization, the basis for 
a symbolic study of the Khmer Rouge would concentrate on their 
use of politics, focusing not on "who gets what, when, and 
how,"13 but on "what they want, what they fear, what they 
regard as possible, and even who they are."14 Symbolic 
signalling is the heart of politics. "The medium of political 
exchange has always been symbolism;" explains sociologist 
David Kertzer, "it is an exchange that not only redistributes 
political rewards, but that also builds our political 
understandings. If symbols and rituals are used to build 
political reality, it is because, as humans, we can do it no 
other way. "15 
C.   METHODOLOGY 
In asking the question, "What accounts for Khmer Rouge 
viability?" five concepts lend themselves to any study of 
insurgent   viability:   legitimacy,   popular   support, 
12Armstrong, p. 137. 
13Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who gets What. When, 
Howr (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1958). 
14Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics, 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), p. 20. 
15David I. Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power,, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 95. 
organization, external support, and defeating adversarial 
response.10 This study will analyze the myths, rituals, and 
symbols of the Khmer Rouge and their application to the five 
concepts of viability from the origins of the insurgency in 
the 1950s, through their demise in 1979, to their actions 
today. This will provide the linkage between symbolic actions 
and insurgent viability. 
Because Cambodia can be characterized as an "oral 
civilization," the majority of discourse analyzed will take 
verbal form drawn from ancient eras, Buddhism, and the Khmer 
culture.17 According to one secret Party document, little art 
was promulgated during the Party's reign so as not to "disturb 
the productive forces raising production."18 However, by using 
the verbal discourse the Khmer Rouge communicate to their 
lbThese five concepts were adapted from a study of 
insurgency by Bard E. O'Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism: 
Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare, (Virginia: Brassey's, 
Inc, 1990) . 
17Ponchaud was a practicing priest in Cambodia for 10 
years.  He witnessed the victory of the KR in 1975 and is a 
keen observer of Cambodian culture.  He described Cambodia 
as an "oral civilization.  See Ponchaud, "Social Change in 
the Vortex of Revolution," in Karl D. Jackson, ed., Cambodia 
1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1989), p. 158, 159. 
18David P. Chandler, et al., eds., Pol Pot Plans the 
Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic 
Kampuchea, 1976-1977,    (New Haven: Yale University Southeast 
Asia Studies, 1988), p. 114. 
cadres through Party documents19 as well as the revolutionary- 
songs, folk tales, and speeches communicated to the 
population, it will become clear how symbolic actions served 
insurgent viability. 
Ultimately, the purpose of this study is to demonstrate 
that the Khmer Rouge insurgency relied on a melding of 
cultural values found in their mythology, ritual, and symbols 
to shape perceptions both inside and outside the organization 
19Eight translated documents, which were the secret 
agenda of the CPK, form the basis of this discourse during 
the 1975-1979 period as published in David P. Chandler, et 
al., eds., Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership 
Documents from Democratic Kampuchea. 1976-1977, (New Haven: 
Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1988). Importantly, 
the editors note only a dozen or so Party documents are 
thought to have survived.  Further citations will be 
referred to as Chandler, Pol Pot Plans, p.0. From 1979 to 
the 1995, captured Khmer Rouge documents form the foundation 
of the discourse to include two unpublished sources 
graciously provided by Laura Summers.  The first document is 
a 21 page address probably by Pol Pot entitled: "What is the 
Virtue, the Quality, the Reality and the Responsibility of 
Democratic Kampuchea in the Past, Present, and Future?", 
obtained from a KR defector under military leader Ta Mok. 
The document is dated 2 December 19 86 and according to 
Summers was translated on 29 February 1988 by the Central 
Intelligence Agency.  Future references to it are entitled, 
"Virtue."  The second document is a 48 page address to DK 
women cadre attributed to Pol Pot by context. The document 
is titled: "What is the Current Situation in Kampuchea? What 
Will It Be Like in the Future?".  Translated by Steve 
Header, the document is dated December 1988.  Future 
references to it are entitled "Current."  Defector 
interviews were provided by Steve Header and Lt. Colonel Ed 
Waller who conducted interviews with some 100 self- 
demobilized NADK combatants between July 1992 and August 
1993 as part of the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia.  Clandestine radio broadcasts are published in 
FBIS. 
as another means of accounting for their viability. 
Importantly, this same analysis has applicability to any 
insurgency due to these movements' limited material resources 
and dependence on symbolic signalling to battle the vast 
resources of the state. 
D.   CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Following an introductory chapter, Chapter II discusses 
insurgency as symbolic action. Using authors versed in 
symbolic studies, this chapter provides the linkage of 
symbolic actions to any insurgency. Symbolic activity will be 
related to five aspects of insurgency that are necessary for 
viability: legitimacy, popular support, organization, external 
support, and defeat of adversarial response. These five 
aspects of viability have relevance to any insurgency study 
and are analyzed through the symbolic actions of the Khmer 
Rouge in the following chapters. 
Chapter III looks for the sources of symbolic actions in 
the historical and cultural roots of Cambodia. The 
insurgency's adopted myths, rituals, and symbols will reflect 
the influence of a culture over two thousand years old and 
include the authoritarianism and brutality that underlay the 
country's history. 
Chapter IV analyzes the Khmer Rouge as insurgents 
attempting to seize Cambodia's state and society. It covers 
their origins during the 1950s to their victory in 1975.  The 
chapter relates the application of ethnic discrimination 
myths, nationalist rituals, and symbolic alliances with the 
monarchy and the Vietnamese to gain victory. 
Chapter V analyzes the Khmer Rouge as rulers of Cambodia. 
After victory in 1975, the insurgency used a combination of 
brute force and symbols derived from ancient Khmer mythology 
and rituals of blood purity in an attempt to create a new 
nation. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
contribution of symbolic acts to the fall of the revolution in 
1979. It demonstrates that the fixation on ritual 
purification ultimately encouraged the Vietnamese invasion and 
the Khmer Rouge fall from power. 
Chapter VI examines the Khmer Rouge as outlaws of 
Cambodia. Although repudiated by parliamentary measures, 
this chapter demonstrates how myths, rituals, and symbols used 
in the 1970s were reshaped to fit the realities of the 1990s 
through five important myths that promote a new public image, 
domestic popularity, enemy incursion, heirs to national 
resources, and invincibility. 
Chapter VII provides an epilogue of the future viability 
of the Khmer Rouge in relation to the state of Cambodia. The 
Khmer Rouge leadership understands insurgency is a fight of 
ideas. Myths, rituals, and symbols of the Khmer Rouge were 
a means not only of establishing and then reconstructing the 
insurgency, but provide a resource for continued viability in 
10 
the  future. 
11 
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II. INSURGENCY AS SYMBOLIC ACTION 
Insurgencies have one overriding goal: political control 
of the state. And like politicians dominating the prevailing 
government, the insurgent employs a host of political actions 
to gain that control. "Political actions," Murray Edelman 
explains, "chiefly arouse or satisfy people not by granting or 
withholding their stable substantive demands, but rather by 
changing the demands and the expectations."20 An essential 
means of changing expectations is by employing the power of 
myth, ritual, and symbolism to politics. Symbolic actions 
legitimate the ruling power and also foster "what people can 
be led to expect of the future."21 
In fact, the title of this chapter is borrowed from 
Murray Edelman's classic study, Politics as Symbolic Action. 
Published over twenty years ago, Edelman describes how 
"perceptions and misperceptions about political threats and 
issues are crucial in political behavior."22 Insurgents create 
and manipulate perceptions and misperceptions as part of their 
quest for political power. Manipulation of perceptions is 
also critical to viability since the insurgent is in a 
Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action; Mass 
Arousal and Quiescence, (Chicago: Markham Publishing 
Company, 1971), p. 7. 
21Edeiman, Politics as Symbolic Action, p. 8. 
22lbid., p. l. 
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position of weakness compared to the resources of the state. 
To overcome state power, insurgency employs symbolic actions 
to create a viable identity for its leadership and its 
followers.  Sociologist David Kertzer explains the process: 
Lacking the formal organization and the material 
resources that help perpetuate the rule of the 
elite, the politically deprived need a means of 
defining a new collectivity. This collectivity, 
created through rituals and symbols, not only 
provides people with an identity different from 
that encouraged by the elite, but also serves as a 
means to recruit others to their side. An 
insurgent force that lacks its own distinctive 
symbolism and rites is not likely to get very far.23 
Thus, creating an identity and manipulating expectations and 
perceptions become essential to gain control of the state or 
at the margin, retain viability. 
Importantly, symbolic actions create a psychological 
contagion that inspires leaders, infects followers, and 
demoralizes adversaries. The insurgent is attempting to 
influence states of mind and manipulate the population's 
perceptions of the insurgency through symbolic discourse. Not 
only are perceptions manipulated, symbolic discourse can 
supplement the insurgents' use of force as well as help 
incorporate force in the symbolic message. 
Sociologist Bruce Lincoln explains that society is held 
together as well as dissolved by force and "discourse," a 
23David I. Kertzer, Ritual. Politics, and Power. (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 181. 
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combination of myth and ritual.24 Lincoln describes discourse 
as "ideological persuasion" which can take not only verbal 
forms but "also the symbolic discourses of spectacle, gesture, 
costume, edifice, icon, musical performance, and the like . . 
. . to mystify the inevitable inequities of any social order."25 
"Together, discourse and force," Lincoln concludes, "are the 
chief means whereby social borders, hierarchies, institutional 
formations, and habituated patterns of behaviors are both 
maintained and modified."26 As Lincoln applied "discourse" to 
society, this study will apply it to insurgency. 
As Lincoln explained, ruling powers cannot rely on force 
alone. Force may protect established interests but does not 
ensure social stability. Lincoln points out that force, in 
all its forms "remains something of a stopgap measure: 
effective in the short run, unworkable over the long haul."27 
Society's elites employ discourse to promote social harmony 
and their own legitimacy thereby reducing the reliance on 
force. The insurgent, on the other hand, would use force and 
symbolic actions to "demystify, delegitimate, and deconstruct 
24Bruce Lincoln, Discourse and the Construction of 
Society: Comparative Studies of Mythf Ritual, and 
Classification, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 
p. 3. 
25Ibid., p. 4. 
26Ibid., p. 3. 
27Ibid., p. 4. 
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the established norms, institutions, and discourses that play 
a role in constructing their subordination."28  Insurgents 
thus, resort to symbolic forms not only as a necessary means 
to political power but as an essential tool for viability. 
A.   SYMBOLS DEFINED 
Lincoln described symbolic action as "discourse," both 
verbal and symbolic. Yet other definitions are useful. 
According to Kenneth Boulding, "A symbolic image is a kind of 
rough summation or index of a vast complexity of images or 
roles and structures."29 He explains they "summariz[e] an 
extremely complex network of alternatives and situations."30 
Mankind has "no direct means of transcribing sensations, 
emotions, or feelings except through the crowded channels of 
symbolic representation."31 Importantly, he reveals "human 
imagination can only bear a certain degree of complexity. 
When the complexity becomes intolerable, it retreats into 
symbolic images."32 
Kertzer looks at the essence of symbolic forms and finds 
28Ibid., p. 5. 
29Kenneth E. Boulding, The Image: Knowledge in Life and 
Society, (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1961), pp. 
109, 110. 
30Ibid., p. 110. 
31Ibid., p. 65. 
32 Ibid., p. 111. 
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three distinct properties: (1) "Condensation," the ability to 
unify a diverse variety of meanings; (2) "Multivocality, " the 
variety of meanings attached to the same symbol; and (3) 
"Ambiguity," the lack of precise meaning.33 Each property is 
essential for insurgent viability. "Condensation" overcomes 
the diversity of interests an insurgent body would face when 
confronting a united adversary. This would be especially 
important in societies where interests are split by ethnic, 
racial, religious, and village loyalties. As Edelman 
explains, "It is through their power to merge diverse 
perceptions and beliefs into a new and unified perspective 
that symbols affect what men want, what they do, and the 
identity they create for themselves."34 "Multivocality" allows 
different individual interests to see the same symbol but to 
see it in different ways, thereby protecting what is 
essentially important to individual identities. The 
uncertainty of "ambiguity" would ensure that a variety of 
interest groups see in the symbol what is most appealing to 
them. 
Effectively utilized, symbols exercise enormous influence 
over the imagination and can help defy material reality. As 
Kertzer reveals:  "People have the unsettling habit of 
"Kertzer, p. 11. 
34Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action, p. 6. 
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willingly, even gladly, dying for causes that oppose their 
material interests. . . . "iD In the face of an enemy with 
greater material strength, insurgent viability would hinge on 
that fact. 
Symbols interweave two other important vehicles for 
insurgent viability, mythology and ritual. Mythology as 
defined by Edelman is "a belief held in common by a large 
group of people that gives events and actions a particular 
meaning; it is typically socially cued rather than empirically 
based."36 Jerome Bruner describes myth as "liv[ing] on the 
feather line between fantasy and reality. It must be neither 
too good nor too bad to be true, nor must it be too true."37 
Myth is critical for insurgency because it simplifies a 
complex world, helps men accept strain and deprivation, 
promotes conformity to a certain idea, and furthers quiet 
acceptance to elites' views.38 An effective myth causes people 
to act, which could be embodied in notions of describing one 
side as "unjustly oppressed" and the other as "hateful."39 
35Kertzer, p. 8 
3bEdelman, Politics as Symbolic Action, p. 14. 
37Jerome S. Bruner, "Myth and Identity," in Henry A. 
Murray, ed., Myth and Mythmaking, (New York: George 
Braziller, Inc., I960), p. 279. 
3bEdelman, Politics as Symbolic Action, p. 157. 
39Roman Laba, The Roots of Solidarity: A Political 
Sociology of Poland's Working-Class Democratization, 
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Myth not only compels men to act, men will come to identify 
with it. "It is not simply society that patterns itself on 
the idealizing myths," Bruner explains, "but unconsciously it 
is the individual man as well who is able to structure his 
internal clamor of identities in terms of prevailing myth. 
Life then produces myth and finally imitates it."40 Most 
importantly, myth can be used by the insurgency to fit the 
circumstances of the moment because as Joseph Campbell makes 
clear: "There is no final system for the interpretation of 
myths, and there will never be any such thing."41 
Ritual has a more rigorous interpretation than myth 
according to Steven Lukes. He defines it as "rule-governed 
activity of a symbolic character which draws the attention of 
its participants to objects of thought and feeling which they 
hold to be of special significance."42 Kertzer echoes Lukes 
by defining ritual "as standardized, repetitive symbolic 
action. "43 
Ritual is valuable to insurgency for a number of reasons 
iPrinceton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 153. 
40 
41 
Bruner, pp. 282, 283. 
Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces. (New 
York: Bollinger Foundation, Inc., 1949), p. 381, 
42 Steven Lukes, Essays in Social Theory, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1977), 9. 54. 
43 Kertzer, p. 128 
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articulated by Kertzer: 
ritual fulfills important organizational needs, it 
helps provide legitimacy at the same time as it 
mystifies actual power relations, it facilitates 
popular solidarity even where consensus is 
conspicuously absent, and it leads people to 
conceive of their political universe in certain 
ways.44 
Since ritual is not just repetitive action but require symbols 
to give it its "psychological underpinnings,"45 insurgent 
symbols are not random slogans, signs, and images. The 
insurgent leadership must carefully chose its symbols to 
elicit the desired response from their following, which in 
many cases is to act in ways that lead to an insurgent's 
irrevocable ritual: death. 
B.   SYMBOLIC SOURCES 
Considering the gravity of symbolic action in insurgency, 
where do we look for its sources? "[C]ultural patterns, 
according to Clifford Geertz, are "extrinsic sources of 
information, " and are a good starting point to get some 
understanding of where insurgency would draw the necessary 
mythology, ritual, and symbols to give viability to the 
44 
45 
Ibid., p. 153 
Ibid., p. 10. 
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movement.4" But symbolic analysis must take into account that 
culture is not static. "Culture is a process, part of the 
historical flux," writes sociologist Sami Zubaida, "and 
cultural patterns are not fixed but reproduced at every 
generation in relation to different situations and 
conjunctures."4' Symbols will emulate this process and be 
reproduced by the insurgent to fit his circumstances. 
C.   APPLICABILITY TO INSURGENCY 
The challenge for the insurgent leadership is to find 
that moment from the past or image of the future that will 
best serve as inspiration and activator for society. 
Nationalist movements, for instance, will utilize symbols that 
glorify their perception of themselves. They will have a 
"quality of self-reference" according to Breuilly. 
Nationalists celebrate themselves rather than some 
transcendent reality, whether this be located in 
another world or in a future society, although the 
celebration also involves a concern with 
transformation of present reality.48 
Symbolic activity, or what Lincoln described as "discourse," 
46Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, (New 
York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1973), p. 92. 
47Sami Zubaida, Islam, The People and The State: Essays 
on Political Ideas and Movements in the Middle East. (New 
York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 1993), p. 123. 
48John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State. (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1994, p. 64. 
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communicate these individual beliefs and understandings to 
shape insurgents, their potential followers, as well as their 
adversary's perceptions. 
Symbolic activity can be applied to insurgent activity in 
five important ways: (1) to legitimate the leadership, (2) to 
broaden domestic popular support, (3) to promote 
organizational cohesion, (4) to elicit foreign external 
support, and (5) to defeat adversarial response. 
For purposes of this study, it is assumed that each of 
these five elements form a necessary condition of insurgent 
viability. The insurgency seeks to adapt symbolic activity to 
each of the five concepts to solidify their meaning. A weak 
cognition would entail a breakdown in insurgent viability. 
Accordingly, viability is defined as the ability of the 
insurgency to remain in continuous existence as an alternative 
governing structure. The relationship of symbolic activity to 
each of the five concepts is discussed below. 
D.   LEGITIMACY 
Legitimacy will be defined in this study as the 
establishment or adoption of the symbolic representation of 
rulership. For example, one symbolic representation of the 
right to rule is the possession of a royal bloodline. An 
insurgent, lacking the royal blood, would attempt to co-opt 
the ruler's bloodline to the movement through alliance. In 
doing so, he seeks legitimacy. 
22 
E.   POPULAR SUPPORT 
Having attained legitimacy, the insurgent will seek to 
reinforce the symbolic representation of the right to rule by 
achieving popular support. He attempts to "go about inventing 
political symbols that will express accurately the ideas and 
principles of the new order."49 New symbols require rituals 
to make the created political environment sacred to its 
following. The leadership will attempt to find symbols that 
give it a "semi-divine" status so that the following accepts 
the ruler as "beyond the realm of human caprice."50 
Another important way to broaden support is to reach into 
the past and find a unifying symbol for society. Social 
scientist Bruce Lincoln describes how tribal societies unite 
under a common ancestor and "the more remote a given ancestor, 
the larger will be the social group that is made up of his or 
her descendants."51 These ancestors must be "called into 
being" through "allusions, gestures, narratives, displays of 
emblematic objects or designs, and so forth."52 
Thus, broad public support is won by employing symbols 
49Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French 
Revolution, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1984), p. 54.  Hunt applies symbolic analysis to the French 
Revolution. 
50Kertzer, p. 38. 
51Lincoln,   Discourse,   p.   19. 
52 Ibid,   pp.   19,   20 
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that are not perceived to be culturally limiting to the target 
population. To adopt a narrowly perceived symbol would 
alienate ethnic groups or religious factions within the 
society, thereby limiting potential popular support for the 
insurgent cause. The insurgency may attempt to exclude 
certain groups to fuel popular hatreds, yet even these groups 
can be recruited initially and disposed of after power is won. 
Universal appeal can be made through iconographic media, 
such as monuments, posters, flags, and badges.53 Or they can 
offer culturally limited material such as dress and facial 
hair to establish group credibility with the local public.54 
Language communicates important images and can be a unifying 
factor. For instance, language that emphasizes the image of 
racial superiority holds powerful individual appeal despite 
its logical absurdity.55 
F.   ORGANIZATION 
Insurgent cohesion, like social cohesion depends on 
53Laba, p. 132 
54See Kaplan's study on the credibility dress and 
beards offered the Mujahidin in Afghanistan in Soldiers of 
God: With the Mujahidin in Afghanistan, (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1990) . 
55
 "The image of racial superiority ... is logically 
absurd," contends Kenneth Boulding. "It nevertheless 
exhibits deplorable persistence because, perhaps, it is able 
to repair the rather tattered value image of the individual 
holding it." See Boulding, p. 168. 
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conformity within the organization. Insurgencies employ the 
same notions formulated by Durkheim for societies: "It is by 
uttering the same cry, pronouncing the same word, or 
performing the same gesture in regard to some object that they 
become and feel themselves to be in unison."56 The means of 
building organizational solidarity are found in cultural 
ritual. As Kertzer makes clear, ritual is used "to nourish 
their image of common identity and mutual obligation."57 
Rituals of initiation and loyalty oaths are obvious examples 
of symbolic actions. "People can communicate their inner 
mental states only through the use of such symbols, and the 
way that they can best express their solidarity is by 
participating as a group in symbolic action," explains 
Kertzer.58 Recalling Lincoln's argument, another important 
organizing principle is by invoking ancient origins which can 
maximize potential recruits under the umbrella of shared 
ancestors. Because symbols mean different things to different 
individuals, the solidarity does not need consensus as Kertzer 
explains. "It is the very ambiguity of the symbols employed in 
ritual action that makes ritual useful in fostering solidarity 
56Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious 
Life, as quoted in Kertzer, p. 62. 
57Kertzer, p. 64. 
58Ibid., p. 62. 
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without consensus."59 
G.   EXTERNAL SUPPORT 
For the insurgent to exist on the battlefield 
consideration must be given to external support. The 
insurgency attempts to convince an external partner to support 
the insurgent cause. The insurgency must generate the 
perception that it will win in the end; in other words, create 
a self-fulfilling prophecy. Foreign assistance would attempt 
to propel this perception by realigning existing power 
relationships with external aid. 
The goal of the insurgent is to create a sense of joint 
action and alliance with the external partner according to 
Edelman.60 The insurgent elicits the supporting external power 
to lend support through "metaphoric definition," an attempt to 
have the external power see the insurgent as similar in 
"values and modes of behavior."" The end result the 
insurgency seeks is material support to follow perceived 
support. 
H.   DEFEATING ADVERSARIAL RESPONSE 
But just as external support is important to viability, 
so too the internal war of symbols that takes place between 
59Ibid., p. 69 
60 Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action, p. 39 
"ibid. 
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the insurgency and the government. Because the insurgent is 
weak in relation to the government, the insurgent must attempt 
to establish symbolic links to the population to garner 
support and legitimacy. The significance of that message 
comes in the interpretation, not in the act itself. The goal 
in the words of Kertzer is to "delegitimate the established 
political order and inspire popular solidarity around a new 
series of political symbols."62 Yet another important goal, 
Edelman explains, is to "immobilize large groups of people who 
might otherwise be expected to use their political resources 
in common for an instrumental objective."63 
Elections would be one way of "immobilizing" the 
insurgents' political resources. The government can use 
elections as a tool for influencing the populations' state of 
mind.  Lukes explains elections as a ritual process: 
Participation in elections can plausibly be 
interpreted as the symbolic affirmation of the 
voters' acceptance of the political system and of 
their role within it. The ritual of voting draws 
their attention to a particular model of 
'polities', of the nature of political conflict and 
the possibilities of political change. Moreover, 
it both results from and reinforces the belief, in 
which there is normally little truth, that 
elections give them an influence over government 
policy.64 
62Kertzer, p. 161. 
"Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action, p. 23. 
64Lukes, p. 72. 
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Political rituals, such as elections, are part of the 
"'mobilization of bias'--that 'set of predominant values, 
beliefs, rituals [sic] and constitutional procedures ("rules 
of the game") that operate systematically and consistently to 
the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of 
others'."05 Thus, elections can also be used by insurgents 
following their victory at the expense of the fallen 
government. 
If victory remains elusive, the insurgent attempts to 
create a myth of invincibility. If successful, the government 
is forced into a series of negotiations. For the insurgent, 
negotiations are a means of "legitimating and perpetuating the 
political paradigms" of the insurgency.66 Importantly, 
negotiations are supplemented by other forms of symbolic 
warfare against the government. This could include symbolic 
acts of terrorism, as well as propagating images to dehumanize 
and vilify their adversaries. By manipulating images, the 
insurgents have "prepared its members to kill the out-group."67 
I.   CONCLUSIONS 
Myth, rituals, and symbols communicate insurgent dreams 
65Ibid., pp. 72,73 
DIbid., p. 72. 
7Laba, p. 144. 
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and expectations as well as create a distinct psychological 
contagion for their audience. By manipulating notions of 
reality, symbolic actions can promote strength where there is 
weakness and provide unity where there is faction. Myth, 
ritual, and symbols thus become not metaphors of power, "they 
[are] the means and ends of power itself."68 
Symbolic actions are also an important part of 
understanding insurgent viability. In an attempt to 
understand how these symbols are translated into action, they 
can be applied to five distinct areas critical to insurgent 
viability: (1) to legitimate the insurgent leadership, (2) to 
broaden domestic popular support, (3) to promote 
organizational cohesion, (4) to elicit foreign external 
support, and (5) to defeat adversarial response. 
Each of these five themes will come out in the study of 
the Khmer Rouge insurgency. But most important, the Khmer 
Rouge success and failure in the use of symbolic activity will 
be critical to its viability. 
68Hunt, Politics, p. 54. 
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III. THE ROOTS: HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL SOURCES OF KHMER 
ROUGE SYMBOLIC ACTIONS 
The Khmer Rouge are woven into the fabric of Cambodia's 
rich historical and cultural past. To understand where the 
insurgency would draw their myths, rituals, and symbols 
requires an understanding of the inheritance bestowed on the 
insurgency by two thousand years of history. 
As writer Elizabeth Becker makes clear, "The touchstone 
of Cambodian history, of Cambodia's identity, is the temple 
complex at Angkor. 
Those massive stone wonders are to modern 
Cambodians what the Parthenon is to 
today's Greeks--architectural 
masterpieces and solid, visible reminders 
that Cambodia was once the premier state 
and culture of the region." 9 
Although the Khmer ruled from Angkor, the capital of the 
empire for 600 years (802 A.D. to 1432), the presence of the 
Khmer people in the area of modern Cambodia can be traced back 
to the 1st century A.D. when small remnants of Khmer existed 
on the borders of the empire of Funan which was centered in 
present day southern Vietnam.70 The Khmer overran Funan in the 
Elizabeth Becker, when The war Was Over; The voices 
of Cambodia's Revolution and Its People, (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1986), p. 46. 
70Russell Ross, ed., Cambodia: A Country Study, 
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), 1990, p. 
xxv. 
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6th century and created the polity of Chenla. Chandler 
explains the modern word Cambodia came from this period. 
"Chen-La was inhabited by Khmer, and the founder of the Khmer 
dynasty, according to legends, was Kambu Svayambhuva. 
'Kambuja'--hence the French 'Cambodge' and the English 
'Cambodia' is traceable to his name."71 
Chenla would be developed by a series of rulers into the 
Angkor empire, the strongest empire in Southeast Asia during 
its peak in the 13th century. Angkor would form the seat of 
the empire and Angkor Wat, its largest religious temple, would 
be its symbol of greatness. 
The walls of Angkor are carved with kings at war, dancers 
at play, and fierce Hindu gods who demand prostration from the 
earthly population that toiled for Angkor. Angkor was also 
the home of the gods, "a microcosm of the universe.72" A poem 
written in the Sanskrit language of the era described, "a city 
enclosed in immense walls like the mountains that girdle the 
great world."73 Angkor is the key to Khmer culture and pride; 
it cradled a civilization that believed in is racial 
superiority and majestic arts. The massive towers of Angkor 
Wat will grace every flag of modern Cambodia, including that 
71David P. Chandler, A History of Cambodia. (Westview 
Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1983), p. 7. 
72Becker, p. 48. 
73 Becker, p. 48 
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of the Khmer Rouge, and its ancient kings who reigned as 
"deva-raj" or "god-king" will influence every Cambodian notion 
of leadership to the modern day. 
India had exported the "god-king" concept to the Khmer, 
along with other beliefs to include Hindu philosophy, the 
Sanskrit language, and Theravada Buddhism. The Angkorean 
emperor Jayavarman VII (1181-1218) is a good example of how 
these Indian concepts became translated into political 
realities for the population of ancient Cambodia. Jayavarman 
VII accepted the tenants of Theravada Buddhism as did most of 
his empire, but obedience still fell to the king. Believing 
in the racial superiority of the Khmer over neighboring 
countries, Jayavarman devoted his reign to numerous wars of 
expansion. Additionally, he demanded levees of people and war 
slaves to build elaborate irrigation systems and prodigious 
construction projects like roads and temples. In conscripting 
thousands of Khmer to build an ethereal world, Jayavarman and 
the kings of Cambodia created a world of ritual and symbols 
which reinforced not only the obedience of the people, but 
brought glory to the king. 
A.   BRUTALITY FROM THE PAST 
Significantly, a current of brutality underlay this 
obedience. Kings mutilated brothers and decapitated rivals to 
prevent any secessionist plot. Justice was just as brutal in 
the Angkorean era.  Chou Ta-Kuan, a Chinese envoy to Angkor 
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wrote: "People accused of serious crimes were buried alive in 
ditches dug outside the capital's west gates. Lesser crimes 
were punished by cutting off toes, fingers, and arms."74 
Chandler quotes the same Chinese source to summarize the 
authoritarianism of the empire: "'even though it is a kingdom 
of barbarians,'" Chou Ta-Kuan wrote, "'these people certainly 
know what a ruler is.'"75 
B.   ANGKOR REDISCOVERED 
With successive kings demanding more resources for their 
personal glory, Angkor began a slow decline with the 
exhaustion of its people. Foreign armies from bordering Siam 
(Thailand) and Vietnam competed to carve up the weakened 
empire for the next 600 years. Angkor was abandoned as the 
capital moved south to benefit from increased trade with China 
as well as to consolidate territory. Yet Angkor's traditions 
of a "god king," a belief in cultural superiority, and a 
current of brutality survived through the passage of symbols 
and rituals with the help of the French. 
France stepped into Cambodian history in the 19th century 
to prevent the Khmer nation from being swallowed by another 
European power. Cambodia, exhausted from 600 years of border 
encroachment could do nothing to prevent a French protectorate 
74Becker, p. 84. 
75Chandler, History, p. 75 
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being established in 1863. France had hopes of tapping into 
China's vast trade and wanted to control Cambodia as a 
southern route to the Chinese interior, however, the Khmer 
fell increasing under French exploitation. The French allowed 
the Khmer to keep their king, but actual governance would be 
a French concern. Although Cambodian peasants revolted 
against foreign rule for two years in the Uprising of 1885, 
they received no support from the monarchy. The king did not 
want to lose his place symbolic place of power for fear that 
the French would replace him if he supported rebellion. 
Ironically, France not only ruled Cambodia but uncovered 
the rich historical past of the Khmer people. French scholars 
revealed the rituals and symbols of the numerous Angkorean 
temples discovered during their rule. Becker explains French 
efforts: 
During one century of painstaking labor, 
French archaeologists, historians, and 
linguists resurrected Cambodia's buried 
history and revived the Khmer sense of 
nationhood. Around Angkor the French 
rebuilt seventy-two stone temples, 
including Angkor Wat itself....76 
The temples of Angkor had been abandoned for 600 years, but 
the French scholarship effort revived the Khmer sense of 
national consciousness embodied in Angkor.  The Khmer spirit 
76Becker, p. 54. 
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had been beaten down by foreign invasion, but French efforts 
made them proud of their past and more intent on reclaiming 
their future. 
For the French, the future lay with the Vietnamese not 
the Khmer. The French felt the Vietnamese were the race to 
back. "The French had decided," Becker explains, "that the 
Vietnamese were the industrious race of the future and the 
Khmer a lazy doomed people grown decadent on Buddhism and the 
rule of their opulent monarchs."77 
C.   ETHNIC MAKEUP 
Cambodia was (and remains) essentially ethnically 
homogeneous being more than 90 percent Khmer. The majority of 
Khmer had little social mobility and worked in rice farming 
and civil service. The remaining population included Chinese, 
Cham (Islamic Khmer), Khmer Loeu (Highland Khmer that include 
Shan and Kula), Khmer Krom, and Vietnamese. The Chinese, the 
largest ethnic minority, usually work as moneylenders and in 
commerce. The Cham, who originated from Vietnam are an 
Islamic people (probably due to Malay contacts), and worked in 
trade and farming communities. The Khmer Loeu are highland 
tribes who lived in scattered villages and raise dry rice in 
the mountains of central and north Cambodia. The Khmer Krom 
lived in areas conquered by South Vietnam but later migrated 
77Becker, p. 52 
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to the Mekong Delta region of Cambodia.   The Vietnamese 
arrived with the French as middlemen and service workers. 
Animosity existed between the Vietnamese and Khmer due in 
part to the cultural and religious divide between them which 
manifested as continuous warfare between nations. The 
Vietnamese were influenced from China and took much of the 
Chinese cultural habits, whereas the Khmer looked to India for 
their cultural and religious past. Cambodian folk tales put 
this ancient hatred in perspective: 
According to ... legend, Vietnamese soldiers took 
three Cambodians captive long ago and buried them 
alive up to their necks with just their heads 
sticking out of the ground. Then the Vietnamese 
made a fire between the heads and set a kettle on 
top of the heads as cookstones ,78 
Despite these legends, Vietnamese communities continued 
to grow during the French occupation. Yet, the cultural 
divide between Vietnamese and Khmer did not close. Racial 
superiority myths continue to fuel animosity. According to 
Cambodian author Haing Ngor, 
78Haing Ngor, A Cambodian Odyssey, (New York: Warner 
Books, 1987) p. 39.  Whether this event actually happened or 
not can probably never be proved, but as political scientist 
Walker Connor makes clear, "it is not what is, but what 
people believe is that has behavioral consequences." See 
Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for 
Understanding. (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New 
Jersey, 1994), p. 75. 
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[a] t the bottom of our differences is 
race. 'Pure' Khmers have dark brown 
skins. Vietnamese and Thais have pale 
yellow skins. To most Asians, including 
our neighbors, the lighter the skin 
color, the higher the status. They look 
down on Cambodians for having darker 
skins than themselves. Cambodians, who 
are shy by nature, sometimes outwardly 
appear to accept a lower status while 
inwardly resenting it.79 
D.   CULTURAL TIES 
The French did nothing to close this divide between 
peoples but allowed the perceived differences to solidify. 
For the majority of Khmer this reinforced the traditional 
reliance on family ties and the village structure. Respect 
for authority and old age, deference to women, and attention 
to the tenets of Buddhism remained fundamental to the social 
fabric. Folk tales helped knit this fabric together. Like 
the legend of the cookstones, the tales are passed down in 
this oral culture from generation to generation. 
Cambodian children learn their culture 
through the telling of Khmer folk tales-- 
stories rich with ribald, often black 
humor, with a taste for sensuality and 
for great food. The world of these 
fables is peopled with all-powerful 
ministers of the king, greedy crocodiles, 
wise rabbits, and ordinary Cambodians who 
allow their violent passions to overrule 
79Ngor, p. 384 
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common sense.80 
Violent passions lay deep in the Khmer soul and often take the 
form of revenge according to Ngor: 
To outsiders, and often even to 
ourselves, Cambodians looked peaceful 
enough.... But inside, hidden from sight 
the entire time, was kum. Kum is a 
Cambodian word for a particularly 
Cambodian mentality of revenge--to be 
precise, a longstanding grudge leading to 
revenge much more damaging than the 
original injury. If I hit you with my 
fist and you wait five years and then 
shoot me in the back one dark night, that 
is Jcum. ... It is the infection that 
grows on our national soul.81 
Khmer society has one other legacy, "a minor tradition of 
torture,n8" explained Ngor. He does not relate where the 
tradition comes from but folk tales and ancient images of 
bodies buried to their heads outside the Angkor gates provide 
some clues. 
E.   FOREIGN INVASIONS 
Falling back on cultural ties, the majority of Khmer 
remained cooperative natives for their French masters. There 
would be a change in conquerors when the Japanese took control 
of Southeast Asia during World War II, but even then, Vichy 
80Becker, p. 82. 
°"Ngor, p. 9. Italics added. 
82Ibid., p. 25. 
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France was allowed to supervise the Cambodian population. In 
these circumstances, Thailand saw an opportunity in 1941 to 
gather territory from an impotent Cambodia and struck the 
northwest provinces. "In one stroke, Cambodia lost one-third 
of its territory and nearly half a million citizens."83 With 
each foreign incursion, the country became only more bitter 
and resentful of outsiders. The Khmer turned to the king in 
this time of weakness, the traditional symbol of strength and 
authority, but the monarchy remained impotent against the 
foreign incursions. It would be left to France, as a 
victorious ally in World War II, to regain the lost territory 
taken from Thailand while consolidating its rule in Cambodia. 
In an attempt at greater control, the French placed an 
eighteen-year-old prince on the Cambodian throne named Norodom 
Sihanouk. Yet, France misjudged the prince, and soon had to 
contend with Sihanouk as he sought and won Cambodian 
independence in 1953. 
F.   THE COUP 
By 1970, however, Sihanouk looked for new allies having 
been deposed in a coup by General Lon Nol. "I call on all my 
children," Sihanouk bellowed from exile in Peking, "both 
military and civilian, who cannot stand to remain under the 
traitor's [General Lon Nol] power, and who are courageous and 
'Becker, p. 59. 
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determined to liberate the fatherland, to fight our enemy."34 
One gathering who answered the monarch's call were a throng of 
rural peasants lead by disciplined cadres he named the "Khmer 
Rouge". 
G.   CONCLUSIONS 
The Khmer Rouge were not the first to bring authoritarian 
rule and brutality to Cambodia. In fact, for the last 2,000 
years, the historical and cultural roots of the country were 
emersed in anything but popular notions of democracy and 
individual justice. 
But foreign incursions had many important impacts. 
Incursions by the French did not heal the split between Khmer 
and Vietnamese cultures, but France did prevent Cambodia from 
further territorial losses to the Vietnamese and Thais. 
French scholarship efforts reawakened Cambodian nationalism 
with images of Cambodia's former greatness unearthed at 
complexes like Angkor Wat. Significantly, the imposition of 
French rule and other foreign encroachments also upset 
traditional notions of monarchy due to its impotence in the 
face of incursions. Into these resentments stepped 
insurgency. 
84Ngor, p. 47 
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IV. THE INSURGENTS: THE KHMER ROUGE FROM ORIGINS TO 1975 
Cambodia was ripe for insurgency as early as the 1940s. 
Serge Thion, a Cambodian scholar, explains the monarchy had 
already begun to suffer a loss of legitimacy under French 
rule. "The gradual loss of substance suffered by Khmer 
kingship under French rule," Thion explains, "is the obvious 
reason for the waning of cultural constraints which impeded 
the growth of a new concept of political change."85 
Traditionally, the patron-client system governed Cambodia and 
was ingrained in the population through their oral culture. 
Chandler explains, 
The rectitude of these intransitive, graded 
relationships has been drummed into everyone from 
birth. Cambodian proverbs and didactic literature 
are filled with references to the helplessness of 
the individual and to the importance of accepting 
power relationships as they are.86 
The absence of "intermediate structures" helped "predispose" 
the Cambodian people to those who wielded absolute power or 
85Serge Thion, "The Cambodian Idea of Revolution," in 
David P. Chandler and Ben Kiernan, eds., Revolution and Its 
Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight Essays, (New Haven: Yale 
University Southeast Asia Studies, 1983), p. 12. 
86Chandler as quoted by Thion, "The Cambodian Idea," 
p. 12. 
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sought to wield it.87 One group seeking that power were the 
Khmer Rouge. These insurgents relied on symbolic actions to 
maintain viability in opposition to the power of the state. 
Their symbolic discourse addressed five elements: legitimacy, 
popular support, organization, external support, and defeating 
adversarial response. Each of these concepts will be examined 
in turn to understand the Khmer Rouge bid for continued 
survival as insurgents in Cambodia. 
A.   LEGITIMACY 
Sihanouk had not acted alone in opposing the French 
colonial presence. Armed groups called the Khmer Issarak 
("Liberated Khmers") fought against the French with the aid of 
Thai backing or as fugitives fleeing French justice.88 
Organized in 1940, this movement grew throughout the 1940s 
until forced to Vietnam to escape French repression.89 In 
8
 Francois Ponchaud, "Social Change in the Vortex of 
Revolution," in Karl D. Jackson, ed., Cambodia 1975-1978: 
Rendezvous with Death, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1989), p. 152. 
88See Chandler, Brother Number Oner p. 24. The Issarak 
also used symbols from Cambodia's past to legitimate the 
movement.  One resistance tract explained, "'the Cambodian 
race, Cambodian blood, and Cambodian nationality are all the 
children of his majesty Jayavarman, the builder of Angkor 
Thorn and Angkor Wat.  Rise up, open your eyes, get back onto 
the proper path!'" Quoted from Chandler, The Tragedy of 
Cambodian History, p. 34. 
89See Serge Thion, "Chronology of Khmer Communism," in 
David P. Chandler and Ben Kiernan, eds., Revolution and Its 
Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight Essays, (New Haven: Yale 
University Southeast Asia Studies, 1983), p. 291. 
44 
Vietnam, some members of the Issarak joined forces with the 
Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) led by Ho Chi Minh. Out of 
the ICP would emerge the first Cambodian communist party, the 
Khmer People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP), created on 30 
September 1951.90 In 1960, the KPRP was reorganized as the 
Workers' Party of Kampuchea (WPK). By 1963, Pol Pot became 
its acting secretary. 
Pol Pot, the nom de guerre of the future leader of the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea, was born in 1928 in Kompong Thorn 
province in north central Cambodia with the given name Saloth 
Sar. Although the son of well-to-do farmers, Pol Pot, was in 
fact propelled to a position of privilege due to his family 
connections to the royal palace in Phnom Penh. Pol Pot would 
not only have the opportunity to visit the palace, but he 
would be introduced to the rudiments of Buddhism and the "high 
Khmer" language through the temple school. This instruction 
must have improved his awareness of the history behind Khmer 
symbols for state and religion. These same privileged 
connections would lead to a Paris scholarship where he and 
other future cadres, who included Ieng Sary, Son Sen, and 
Khieu Samphan would be exposed to French communist 
intellectuals.91 
90Ibid., p. 292. 
91A11 four of these future leaders studied in Paris in 
the 1950s. Chandler states Pol Pot became a member of the 
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From Marxist instructors, Pol Pot and his cadre, learned 
the importance of analyzing society and its classes to further 
the revolutionary struggle.9z Significantly, the "Khmer 
students' time in Paris coincided with the last years of 
Stalin's life and the apotheosis of the cult of personality 
surrounding him."93 This also was the point when France's 
communist party "was considered the most Stalinist party 
outside eastern Europe."94 Pol Pot would become a member of 
this party, spend a month as a volunteer worker for Tito's 
communist Yugoslavia, return to Cambodia in 1953, and "become 
one of the first French-trained Cambodian communists to join 
the Vietminh at the front in the war for independence against 
France. "95 
French Communist Party around 1952. See David Chandler, 
Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot, 
(Thailand: Silkview Press, Thailand, 1993), p. 28.  This 
period of scholarly interest by the Cambodian communists 
would indicate phase A of the Hroch model of national 
movements.  Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National 
Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social 
Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European 
Nations. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 25. 
92Ponchaud, "Social Change," p. 152. 
93David P. Chandler, Brother Number One: A Political 
Biography of Pol Pot, (Thailand: Silkview Press, 1993), p. 
27. 
94Ibid., p.27. 
^Elizabeth Becker, When The War Was Over: The Voices 
of Cambodia's Revolution and Its People. (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1986), p. 81. 
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Although exposed to foreign communist movements, Pol Pot 
had developed his own notions of communism. In 1952 he 
published his first known political work, "Monarchy or 
Democracy?" under the pseudonym "Original Khmer." In this 
diatribe Pol Pot outlined his hatred for the monarchy, held at 
this time by Norodom Sihanouk since 1941. Although dynastic 
rule was no stranger to Cambodia, according to the perceptions 
of Pol Pot the people are "'like animals, kept as soldiers . 
. . or slaves . . . made to work night and day to feed the 
king and his entourage . . . .'"96 Ironically, Pol Pot's own 
future period of power followed this same description. 
"ORIGINAL KHMER" 
Writing as "Original Khmer," Pol Pot was creating a 
foundation myth for himself that would legitimate his desire 
to overthrow the monarchy. Aware of monarchy's hold on 
Cambodia, Pol Pot sought to throw off colonialism first in 
Vietnam and then enlist Vietnam's aid to throw off monarchy in 
his own country. Chandler points out that, "Saloth Sar 
himself was assiduously pro-Vietnamese in all his activities 
before 1967 and retained Vietnamese confidence until the 
1970s."97 But writing under the pseudonym "Original Khmer," 
gives an early glimpse of his belief in ethnic mythology.  Pol 
96Chandler, Brother, pp. 39,40. 
97 Ibid., p. 64. 
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Pot, is defining the qualities that make up a true Khmer-- 
namely himself--one who would reject all past Cambodian 
history and culture to begin anew. 
The future leader of the Khmer Rouge had by 1966 
experiences in North Vietnam witnessing the tactics of a small 
country fighting a larger foreign power as well as experience 
in China during the mobilization of the masses in the Cultural 
Revolution.98 Both experiences play a part in his own 
revolutionary implementation. One result of his experiences 
was to change the WPK into the Communist Party of Kampuchea 
(CPK) in the early 1960s and direct its move from sanctuaries 
in Vietnam to northeast Cambodia. 
FOREST SPIRITS 
Moving the communist resistance to the forests of 
northeast Cambodia was an important factor in influencing the 
Khmer population through popular mythology and symbols. Dark, 
inaccessible forests were traditionally places where powerful 
spirits dwelled. By locating resistance leadership here, the 
communists: 
were conforming to heroic stereotypes in Hindu and 
Buddhist mythology--stereotypes embedded in 
Cambodian popular thought--whereby bandits, exiled 
princes, and religious ascetics stored up arcane 
wisdom, merit, and martial skills while living 
isolated in the forests, only to emerge later as 
98Ibid., p. 64 
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invulnerable leaders." 
Pol Pot and his communist following used the forests to 
organize covertly from government authorities, and probably- 
refined ideas to motivate poor tribal minorities living in 
remote communities to enlist in his planned revolution.100 
Controlling the countryside was key to Pol Pot's grab for 
power. As he later remarked, "'in order to take the whole 
place, it is necessary first to seize the whole 
countryside. ' "101 
B.   POPULAR SUPPORT 
Yet the late 1950s and early 1960s were the wilderness 
years for the communists. They themselves perceived them as 
a time of lost identity. As a later CPK broadcast in 1976 
related: "In this period, we lost all sense of national soul 
and identity."102 CPK leaders had returned to Cambodia with a 
"ibid., p. 80. 
100The period marks the beginning of patriotic agitation 
or Phase B of the Hroch model of national movements for Pol 
Pot's cadre. See Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of 
National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the 
Social Composition of  Patriotic Groups among the Smaller 
European Nations,    (London: Cambridge University Press, 
1985), p. 25. 
101Nayan Chanda, "Making Money, " Far Eastern Economic 
Review, vol 156, iss 5, February 4, 1993, p. 24. 
102David Chandler, "Seeing Red: Perceptions of Cambodian 
History in Democratic Kampuchea," in David P. Chandler and 
Ben Kiernan, eds., Revolution and Its Aftermath in 
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foreign education, yet were blocked from participation in 
government due to the strength of the state. 
Repudiated in national elections in 1955,10J the communist 
leaders of the CPK formed their plans without popular support 
as well.  In Pol Pot's words: 
The people were unable to elect progressive figures 
[communist political candidates] because the power- 
holding class had guns, weapons, laws and courts, 
as well as other institutions with which to oppress 
the people.104 
A NEW BIRTH DATE 
In an attempt to cover this period of communist 
illegitimacy, a foundation myth for the CPK was created by Pol 
Pot. The communists had to eliminate notions that there were 
other popular forces who had resisted the colonial powers in 
the 1940s and 50s. The Khmer Serei (Free Khmer) who had 
opposed Sihanouk's grab for power were condemned by Pol Pot as 
creations of a "Japanese fascist clique and the American CIA 
Kampuchea: Eight Essays, (New Haven: Yale University 
Southeast Asia Studies, 1983), p. 41. 
103A 1976 document in the CPK journal Tung Padevat 
emphasized the same notion: "We know that popular opinion 
throughout the country supported [radical candidates] by 99 
percent but state power lay in enemy hands....  The lesson 
of 1955 was that we lack the means to win an election.  Only 
by fighting a revolution could we defeat the enemy." 
Chandler, "Seeing Red," p. 41.  This same lesson appears to 
have been perceived in the 1993 elections. 




 The Vietnamese who had assisted, trained, and 
fought for the CPK were removed from Khmer Rouge history by- 
changing the birth of the party. "Set the birth of the Party 
at 1960 instead;" reads a secret party document, "so that we 
are not close to others--make a clean break."106 
"LEADERLESS PEASANTS" 
The members of the CPK were also shrouded in myth. The 
CPK were not Vietnamese trained cadres but "anonymous, 
leaderless peasant masses which . . . fought long and 
courageously against the French."107 According to Pol Pot 
these "leaderless peasants" had no taint of Vietnamese 
influence nor were they backed by any fascist regime. But as 
Chandler makes clear: "There is no evidence that such a 
movement ever existed . . . . "108 
"MISERABLE" MINORITIES 
Yet Pol Pot needed followers because his was but one of 
three communist groups operating inside Cambodia during the 
1960s. Two other factions challenged his future leadership of 
105Ibid., p. 39 
106Taken from a secret 1976 Central Committee document. 
See David P. Chandler, et al., eds., Pol Pot Plans the 
Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic 
Kampuchea, 1976-19 77r (New Haven: Yale University Southeast 
Asia Studies, 1988), p. 4. 
107Chandler /"Seeing Red," p. 40. 
108Ibid., p. 40. 
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the communist revolution: a faction dedicated to Vietnamese 
socialism from the old Indochinese Communist Party operating 
in the eastern provinces between the Mekong river and Vietnam; 
and another faction with a strong Maoist loyalty operating in 
the south and southwest between the Elephant and Cardamom 
mountains.l0y 
Consigned to the forests of northeast Cambodia, the CPK 
looked to the indigenous forest population for support. 
Revolutionary appeals to the majority of peasants who worked 
in the south would have been rejected. These peasants "shied 
away from any involvement in a complete overturning of their 
world (and cosmic) order."110 The Khmer Rouge looked instead to 
the minority populations for man power: the Khmer Loeu, Shan 
and Kula, as well as Thai. According to Pol Pot, minorities 
formed the basis of his support. "'My backing base was in the 
regions of the national minorities, that is the Northeast 
region. I knew perfectly these national minorities. They 
were very miserable . . . .'"U1  He further explained, they 
109Kathleen Gough, "The Situation in Kampuchea, " 
Contemporary-Marxism,   6, Spring, 1983, p. 210. 
110Thion, "The Cambodian Idea," p. 23.  Just as Hroch 
explained in Phase B, "the agitation of the patriots sooner 
or later influenced a growing number of members of the 
oppressed nationality."  Hroch, p. 23. 
mKenneth Quinn, "Explaining the Terror," in Karl D. 
Jackson, ed., Cambodia 1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 236. 
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were "'completely illiterate people who did not have even the 
slightest idea of cities, automobiles and Parliament [but who] 
dared to fight under the guidance of The Party . . . . ' "112 
The CPK cadre probably emphasized the policies of 
discrimination displayed by the present government and the 
minority population's important role in the future regime. 
The CPK could also emphasize the myths of racial 
discrimination the minority populations perceived coming from 
the more urban south. Sociologist Frank Smith confirms the 
discrimination myths that separate the Cambodian dark skinned 
rural population from the light skinned urban population. 
Dark skin has long been associated in Cambodia with 
poverty and manual labor, light skin color with 
prosperity and the cities.... By association, dark 
skin is also seen as indicative of a low moral 
character, since economic prosperity is in many 
ways indicative of a higher degree of stored 
Buddhist merit....U3 
Ponchaud felt the cadre exploited an area where Buddhism was 
not a strongly held belief which helped recruitment.114 
112Ibid., p. 236. 
113Smith, Frank, "Interpretive Accounts of the Khmer 
Rouge Years: Personal Experience in Cambodian Peasant World 
View," Center for Southeast Asian Studies, No. 18, Madison: 
University of Wisconsin, 1989, p. 29.  Smith interviewed 
numerous Cambodian peasants who had dealt with the KR. One 
described the insurgents as "'black bastards.'" p. 29. 
Another said, "'... those people just came out of the 
forest; they couldn't read; they had no manners; they were 
just like animals.'" p. 30. 
114 Ponchaud, "Social Change," p. 171. 
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The Khmer Rouge recruited the Khmer Cham, an Islamic 
minority, whose religion sanctioned fighting ferociously in a 
just cause.115 Cadres manipulated and inspired Cham notions of 
future revenge against their Buddhist oppressors.116 The Cham 
"hoped the communists would win and reverse the longstanding 
policies of benign discrimination practiced by the central 
authorities in Phnom Penh. . . .,,11/ 
CHEMA  VS.   FUNAN 
Additionally, Ponchaud explains the Khmer Rouge played up 
the historic tensions between two ancient empires that 
preceded the Angkor period: the Chenla region, the middle area 
of Cambodia along the Mekong, against the region of Funan, 
found in the southern delta. Communicating myths of Sambaur's 
greatness as the capital of the ancient Chenla empire, Pol Pot 
and his cadre recruited heavily in provinces that had 
traditions of rebellion against their historic enemies in the 
south.118 
115The Cham had migrated from the former kingdom of 
Champa on the Vietnamese coast to escape the encroachment of 
Vietnamese settlers in the 16th century.  See David Hawk, 
"The Photographic Record," in Karl D. Jackson, ed., Cambodia 
1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1989), p. 212. 
115Francois Ponchaud, Cambodia Year Zero, (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Wilson, 1977), p. 132. 
117Becker, p. 262. 
118Ponchaud, "Social Change," p. 159, 160. The author 
notes the state's repression of peasants in this region 
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THE   "NEGLECTED" 
Despite all these symbolic actions for support, the 
majority of the population was not won over to the insurgency. 
Sihanouk, who resided in Khmer Rouge camps after his fall in 
the 1970 coup, summed up the Khmer Rouge popular support as: 
"Poor peasants, mountain people, the inhabitants of forest 
regions, and the most remote villages, those most 'neglected' 
by the old regime . . . . "119 Although a minority movement, 
the Khmer Rouge recognized the importance of organization in 
a fractured nation. 
C.   ORGANIZATION 
ORGANIZING RITES OF PASSAGE 
Appeals to the marginal elements of society resulted in 
"trusted bodyguards, messengers, and party members."120 To 
organize these recruits into an effective insurgency required 
rituals of membership or rites of passage. The young were 
favored recruits, easy to train and with the least stake in 
society. Sihanouk noted that twelve-year-old youth were taken 
in and taught rituals of violence. The monarch watched the 
young "'constantly take pleasure in tormenting animals . . . 
during the Samlaut rebellion in 1966 and uprisings in 1968- 
69 fueled recruitment. 
119Quinn, "Explaining," p. 237. 
120Chandler, Brother, p. 80. 
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'  He further describes how the rituals became ingrained 
notions of behavior: 
Torture games became their principal training tool. 
Young recruits began 'hardening their hearts and 
minds' by killing dogs, cats and other edible 
animals with clubs or bayonets. Even after their 
April 17, 1975 victory, the Khmer Rouge kept in 
practice with a game consisting of throwing animals 
into 'the fires of hell,' since they had no human 
victims handy.122 
One revolutionary song lent credence to this viewpoint. 
Entitled, "The Beauty of Kampuchea," the second and third 
stanzas glorify the children's butchery of enemies: 
Pity our friends who shoulder arms. Thorns pierce 
their feet; they do not complain; this is an 
accomplishment of Khmer children struggling until 
blood flows out to cover the ground. 
They sacrifice themselves without regret, they 
chase the Lon Nol bandits, with swords and knives 
hacking at them, killing them, until the Lon Nol 
bandits are destroyed.123 
121 Quinn, "Explaining," p. 237. 
122Quinn, "Explaining," p. 238.  Sihanouk felt the youth 
were addicted to violence. He explained KR on the Vietnamese 
border "'would rape a Vietnamese woman, then ram a stake or 
bayonet into her vagina.  Pregnant women were cut open, 
their unborn babies yanked out and slapped against the dying 
mother's face.  The Yotheas [youth] also enjoyed cutting the 
breasts off well endowed Vietnamese women.  Vietnamese 
fisherman who fell into the hands of the Khmer Rouge were 
decapitated.'"  Quinn, "Explaining," p. 238. 
123Translated by David Chandler in Ben Kiernan and 
Chanthou Boua, Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea,, 1942- 
1981. (London: Zed Press, 1982), p. 327. 
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ORGANIZING RITUALS FOR  THE LIBERATED 
Rituals in the liberated areas organized the population. 
Life constituted a rigid work schedule with early rising and 
hard labor. All efforts of the population served the military- 
campaigns against the government, even food production. One 
song proclaimed: 
This is the sowing season: we toss corn and beans 
in front of us. We strive to work, so as to supply 
the army, holding on and struggling at the front. 
Individualism, which could disrupt organization, was 
removed by establishing collective rituals in liberated areas. 
Not only would collectives form the economic base, they 
purified any taints in class background. Pol Pot made the 
collective's role in the movement clear in a secret speech in 
1976: 
We will follow the collectivistic path to 
socialism. If we do this, imperialism can't enter 
our country. If we are individualists, imperialism 
could enter easily. Thus, eating will be 
collectivized, and also clothing, welfare, and 
houses will be divided up on a collective basis.124 
The collective reinforced the ritual of autarky. "Every 
region, every district, if not every village, had to be self- 
sufficient," as Thion describes the 1970 situation, "not only 
in  food,  but  in  other  commodities,  such  as  cotton, 
124Chandler, Pol Pot Plans, p. 156. 
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handicrafts, and so on." 125 Trade was also limited to prevent 
the "seeds of capitalism" from corrupting the peasants' 
morality. '~b 
Another important ritual came in moving the people to the 
forest. The cadres burned villages so there would be nothing 
to return to. Moving the population to forest areas also 
helped "regenerate" the population according to Ponchaud, 
"plunging them back into a universe from which they should 
have never strayed."127 
By eliminating resisters in the forest, a ritual followed 
consistently after victory, the Khmer Rouge also conformed to 
ancient folktales which helped justify the liberators' brutal 
methods. Ponchaud explains how murder in the forests 
conformed to these ancient stories: 
In the folktales, the act of murder ... is not 
conceived as an evil and uniquely reprehensible 
act: it assumed a revelatory function, either in 
the sense that it was a prelude to a rebirth, or in 
that it triggered acts of salvation, exemplifying 
the divine or Buddhistic cosmic order.... 
BLACK CLOTHES 
Although many inhabitants fled liberated areas to zones 
125Thion, "The Cambodian Idea," p. 24 
126Ibid., p. 24. 
127Ponchaud, "Social Change," p. 161. 
128Ibid., p. 161. 
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controlled by the government,129 others were convinced greater 
opportunities lay in the future and accepted the organizing 
rituals demanded by the Khmer Rouge.130 One important symbol 
of acceptance must have been wearing black clothes. Black 
peasant clothing came to symbolize the virtues of the peasant. 
"Among all persons in society," Quinn explains, the peasants, 
"alone were believed to least embody the most exaggerated 
aspects of individualism--ambition, achievement, wealth, and 
avarice. "131 
ORGANIZING THE MIND 
By glorifying the myth of the peasants and minority 
populations through organizing rituals and black clothing, the 
Khmer Rouge attempted to win minds to the organization. In 
1972, Ieng Sary, the future Foreign Minister of Democratic 
Kampuchea, could rightly conclude: "Man is the determining 
factor in the victory, and his political conscience is the 
''More than 30,000 went to government areas in February 
19 74 according to Carney.  See Timothy Carney, "The 
Unexpected Victory", Karl D. Jackson, ed., Cambodia 1975- 
1978: Rendezvous with Death, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1989. 
p. 30. 
130Ponchaud, Cambodia, p. 21. 
'"''Kenneth M. Quinn, "The Pattern and Scope of 
Violence,"  in Karl D. Jackson, ed., Cambodia 1975-1978: 
Rendezvous with Death, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1989), p. 194. 
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decisive weapon. "132 
Psychological rituals thus became an important means of 
controlling the political conscience as Thion explains: 
Because class consciousness could not be considered 
to be the main source of revolutionary dynamics, 
the need to create such consciousness was soon 
embodied in a set of ethical rules, which were 
based on two main principles: the rectification of 
the self and the integration and subordination of 
the individual to the collective unit. The 
implementation resulted in a system of intense 
psychological pressures on collective meetings, 
where individuals had to tell their life-stories 
again and again in order to criticize their own bad 
'trends' and to relinquish any control over their 
own behavior." 
By reinforcing these psychological rituals through labor and 
the fear of execution, Thion concludes that the KR were able 
to "complete the psychological isolation of the individual, 
making him suspicious of everyone, totally identified with, 
and dependent upon his group and its leaders."133 
ORGANIZING   "ANGKA" 
To organize the CPK in the time afforded by Vietnamese 
fighting, Pol Pot had many revolutionary models.  Since the 
Soviet/Chinese Communist bloc had been split in the 1950s, Pol 
Pot appears to have leaned to the Chinese model that 
"championed the dictatorship of the masses--meaning the 
132
 Ponchaud, Cambodia, p. 108. 
133Thion, "The Cambodian," p. 29 
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peasants instead of the dictatorship of the proletariat."134 
Chandler feels "Mao Zedong's notions of autonomous revolution, 
voluntarism, and continuous class struggle . . . freed him 
[Pol Pot] from the domination of the Vietnamese and provided 
a model for Cambodia's transformation."135 This transformation 
would see "the elimination of exploitive social classes and 
the old social order, along with the collectivization and 
communalization of agriculture," whereby all of these changes 
"were supposed to unleash the productive power of the 
peasantry. "13b 
Depending on the mass peasant population to be the 
"productive power" would also fit Cambodia's current 
situation. Cambodia had a population of approximately 7 
million people and was considered one of the poorest countries 
in the world.137 Over 90 percent of the population was ethnic 
Khmer and worked as peasant labor in rice farming. 
Importantly, for the CPK, the peasant population viewed Phnom 
134Lek Hor Tan, "Cambodia's Total Revolution," Index On 
Censorship, 8, 1, January-February, 1979, p. 5. 
135 Chandler, Brother, p.6. 
136David R. Hawk, "International Human Rights Law and 
Democratic Kampuchea," The Cambodian Agony, ed. by David A. 
Ablin and Marlowe Hood, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 
Inc., 1987), p. 138. 
1J7Mya Than, "Rehabilitation and Economic Reconstruction 
in Cambodia," Contemporary Southeast Asia. 14, 3, December 
1992, p. 270. 
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Penh and other provincial capitals as "symbols of 
oppression."138 These cities were viewed as places from which 
former colonizers like Vietnam or France abused the Khmer, 
where an aristocratic minority dominated the poor, and where 
Chinese and Vietnamese minorities controlled the private money 
sectors. In these circumstances, recruitment increased with 
peasants who would not object to the revolution's abolition of 
cities and private wealth since few Cambodians drew benefits 
from them.139 
Having little urban infrastructure to draw upon, it must 
have been clear to Pol Pot that he had no workers to lead a 
Marxist-style revolution so they were supplanted by a mythical 
workers' vanguard.  A 1977 document bears this out: 
Concretely, we did not rely on the forces of the 
workers. The workers were the over [cover?] 
vanguard, but in concrete fact they did not become 
the vanguard. In concrete fact there were only the 
peasants. 14° 
The Party justified this myth by explaining, "we did not copy 
anyone," thus emphasizing the uniqueness of the Khmer 
revolution.141 
138Tan,   p.   5. 
139Ibid.,   p.   5. 
140 Chandler,   Pol   Pot  Plans,   p.   219 
141Ibid.,   p.   219. 
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In fact, the Party was and remained the vanguard. As Pol 
Pot's exclaimed: "The Party is the decisive factor."142 The 
Party had two distinct advantages compared to other Khmer 
institutions--secrecy and discipline. The Party remained a 
secret from its formation in 1951 until revealed publicly in 
1977, well after the April victory. Even the Party Secretary 
was unknown to the world, as Pol Pot enjoyed hiding his high 
status.143 The Party was organized as a collective leadership 
called "Angka" (the organization). Although the Party 
leadership may have promoted a myth of equality, Pol Pot 
became "Brother Number One" which calls to mind Kertzer's 
admonition: "Through rites of egalitarian interaction the 
leader can symbolically express his adherence to the 
democratic ideal at the same time his powers belie it."144 
Discipline required by "Angka" remained total. A breach 
of discipline meant execution which would be refined 
throughout the Party's history.145 Yet the Party did not 
neglect the importance of Asia's tradition of family ties that 
142Ibid., p. 161. 
143Chandler, Brother, p. 103. 
144David I. Kertzer, Ritual, Politicsr and Power, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 56. 
145Despite their discipline, communist cadre trained by 
the Vietnamese were eliminated since 1973.  See Karl D. 
Jackson, "The Ideology of Total Revolution," in Karl D. 
Jackson, ed., Cambodia 1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 45. 
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connected leaders through marriage and kinship.146 The party 
may have broken up the traditional families of the liberated 
areas but tightened the organization's leadership through 
blood ties, as common blood would become increasingly 
important as the revolution progressed. 
ORGANIZING UNDER THE MYTH OF ANGKOR 
Nor did the party ignore its connection to the glorious 
Khmer empire at Angkor. Social scientist Bruce Lincoln 
describes how societies unite under a common ancestor and 
"the more remote a given ancestor, the larger will be the 
social group that is made up of his or her descendants."147 
These ancestors must be "called into being" through 
"allusions, gestures, narratives, displays of emblematic 
objects or designs, and so forth."148 Pol Pot not only 
utilized remote ancestry in recalling Angkor, he invoked it 
for its mobilizing effect after the revolution had come to 
power.  "If our people were capable of building Angkor," said 
145Pol Pot's wife is the sister of his foreign minister, 
Ieng Sary.  Son Sen is related to Pol Pot and became his 
minister of defense.  Son Sen's wife became the minister of 
culture and education.  Jackson, Karl D.f "Intellectual 
Origins of the Khmer Rouge," in Karl D. Jackson, ed., 
Cambodia 1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press,  p. 242. 
147Bruce Lincoln, Discourse and the Construction of 
Society: Comparative Studies of Myth. Ritual, and 
Classification, (New York: Oxford University Press, 19 89), 
p. 19. 
14( Ibid., pp. 19,20 
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Pol Pot, "we can do anything."149 Chandler explains, 
[t]he kings [of Angkor] themselves are never 
mentioned by name, and while their motives are 
derided, and the 'slavery' of the ordinary people 
is bemoaned, Angkor's place in the DK 
historiography is a model of exemplary behavior, a 
reminder of Cambodia's grandeur. 
The CPK encouraged the idea that Angkor's past glory 
would soon become a present reality. Angkor Wat was the most 
important symbol they could use. Pol Pot encouraged the idea 
of past glory and gave the symbol of Angkor "concrete 
expression" which offered the regime not only a symbol from 
popular mythology but a means of "transmitt[ing] the most 
important facts about the movement to its adherents. . . . "151 
That is why the Khmer Rouge put a modern representation of the 
three towers of Angkor Wat on the national flag of Democratic 
Kampuchea. 
One can picture the sweating communist cadres emerging 
from the malarial infested forests with the symbol of Angkor 
Wat emblazoned on a red banner. Calling the people out of 
their huts to the village wat, a small Buddhist temple often 
used by the monks or village elders to pass along important 
149Chandler, Brother, p. 13. 
150Chandler, "Seeing Red," p. 35. 
151Laba, Roman, The Roots of Solidarity: A Political 
Sociology of Poland's Working-Class Democratization, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 126. 
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news, the cadres would explain how the banner they carried had 
a yellow, three-towered structure in the middle which 
symbolized "national tradition and the people of Kampuchea, 
who are defending and building the country to make it ever 
more glorious."15^ The cadres explained how the red background 
symbolized "the revolutionary movement, the resolute and 
valiant struggle of the people of Kampuchea for the 
liberation, defense, and construction of the nation."153 The 
Khmer Rouge appealed to the population's pride and future 
place in the new nation. As Connor noted, nationalistic 
appeals were the means to gain the support of the masses, 
"despite the philosophical incompatibility between communism 
and nationalism. . . . "154 The Party's manipulation of images 
offered something for everyone. 
Senior and mid levels drew from the anti-French 
dissidence that the Vietminh had nourished. Others 
had joined the movement during the Sihanouk years, 
some reacting to the prince's personal rule and 
corruption of Khmer society or to individual 
injustices. Others were educated in leftist 
ideology by teachers or close relatives. After 
19 70, an influx of peasants and even of pro- 
Sihanouk city dwellers entered the party's united- 
152Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea, taken from 
Ponchaud, Cambodia, p. 204. 
153Ibid. 
154Connor, p. 199. 
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front structure.155 
Importantly, this "was the first time in Cambodia's history 
that the rural people were being asked to play a significant 
role in a social movement, and the effect was profound."156 
D.   EXTERNAL SUPPORT 
ALLIANCE WITH THE KING 
Just as the Khmer Rouge strengthened the internal 
organization, they called for temporary alliances to 
strengthen the external organization as well. Sihanouk, in an 
attempt to win back power established the Royal Government of 
National Union of Kampuchea (RGNUK) in May 1970. Although 
Sihanouk led the union, CPK cadre Khieu Samphan became vice- 
premier. With Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia threatened 
by the government troops of Lon Nol, the Khmer Rouge were 
given time to organize as the Vietnamese bore the brunt of the 
fighting. Additionally, they used an important symbol of 
external legitimacy--they allied with the monarch. By 
aligning the movement with Sihanouk after the 1970 coup, the 
Khmer Rouge claimed the national symbol of monarchy with a 
heritage going back to the Angkorean era. 
ALLIANCE WITH THE VIETNAMESE 
155Timothy Carney, "The Organization of Power, " in Karl 
D. Jackson, ed., Cambodia 1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 95. 
15b Becker, p. 151. 
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Khmer had fought beside their communist brothers in the 
east since the early Issarak movement joined the Indochinese 
Communist Party in the 1940s. According to Chandler, Pol Pot 
never diminished this Vietnamese connection. "The Vietnamese 
were certainly resented later on, and their guidance spurned," 
Chandler explains, "but before the late 1960s and probably not 
before 19 72-19 73 the Cambodian Communist Party never adopted 
an independent line."157 The success of the symbolic discourse 
of the Khmer Rouge can be measured in one important respect: 
"a full-fledged military alliance with the Vietnamese" by 
1970.158 
E.   DEFEATING ADVERSARIAL RESPONSE 
AMERICAN YOUTH 
Reliance on the symbolic power of the king and the 
military power of the Vietnamese only grew as the Americans 
and their material resources entered the war in 19 69.' To 
rally support against American efforts, the Khmer Rouge used 
an important symbol: American youth. The Party called on 
"'progressive American youth,1" in their broadcasts, "to fight 
against imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism, and all 
157Chandler, Brother, p. 62. 
158Ibid., p. 90. 
"■'US bombing began secretly on 18 March 1969 and ended 
on 15 August 1973. Ground forces augmented the bombing from 
1 May to 30 June 1970.  See Carney, "The Unexpected 
Victory," p. 30. 
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reactionary forces."lfeu 
FEARS  OF  VIETNAMESE HEGEMONY 
With American withdrawal from the Vietnam war in 1973, 
the Vietnamese called for a halt in fighting until Hanoi's 
revolution was won. The Khmer Rouge rejected Hanoi's request 
prompted by the Paris Peace. Suspicious of the Vietnamese, 
skirmishes broke out between Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese units 
as Hanoi tried to remove their equipment from Cambodia.161 
Pol Pot communicated to his cadre the historic hegemony 
of Vietnam in their actions to stop his revolution. He feared 
the Vietnamese would capture Saigon and then turn on a 
weakened Cambodia. By promoting fears of the Vietnamese, Pol 
Pot gave his revolution no respite; Lon Nol' s forces were 
collapsing as the Americans withdrew and the Khmer Rouge 
insurgency would fill the vacuum. 
F.   CONCLUSIONS 
With the loss of cultural constraints on obedience to 
monarchy following the fall of colonialism, the Khmer Rouge 
were given an opportunity to enter the patron-client 
relationship in Cambodia. Symbolic actions formed an 
important aspect of this entrance. 
As "Original Khmer, " Pol Pot attempted to legitimate not 
!b0Carney, "The Organization of Power," p. 91. 
lbiChandler, Brother, p. 100, 
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only himself but the resistance to monarchy. This foundation 
myth was augmented by forest myths to help legitimate his 
movement, the Communist Party of Kampuchea, over the other 
forces fighting for power. 
Without a popular majority, the CPK relied instead on 
minority populations and other "neglected" peoples of Cambodia 
to form the base of the movement, all the while playing on the 
discrimination myths and historic grievances of those divested 
of power. 
Organization rituals and rites of passage promoted 
through violent symbolic acts and songs molded the insurgent's 
minds and helped further their military efforts against the 
governing regime. Importantly, the liberated population 
underwent rituals aimed at strengthening the organization by 
eliminating individualism and promoting only collective 
efforts. By manipulating cultural symbols and ethnic 
grievances, the CPK established an organization that offered 
something for everyone. 
Although filling the ranks furthered the Khmer Rouge 
cause, external support was still required to defeat the 
established government. Despite Pol Pot's rejection of 
monarchy, the Khmer Rouge used the important symbol of 
kingship that traced its lineage to the Angkorean era in 
aligning with Sihanouk. And by evoking a formal symbolic 
alliance with the Vietnamese, the CPK could gather strength 
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for its final victory. 
Defeating the government response, however, required not 
only the symbolic support of the king and Vietnamese, but as 
American power entered the war, the Khmer Rouge called on the 
symbol of American youth itself to give momentum to their 
insurgency. As the insurgency came closer to victory, fears 
of the Vietnamese were invoked to defeat the perceived 
adversary in the east. 
Symbolic activity in all five areas proved vital to not 
only maintaining insurgent viability, but by 1975, were an 
important factor in the insurgent forces of Pol Pot 
transitioning from insurgents of Cambodia to its rulers. 
71 
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V. THE RULERS: THE KHMER ROUGE FROM 1975 TO 1979 
Democratic Kampuchea was born on April 17, 1975 when 
Phnom Penh surrendered to the Khmer Rouge.'0" The revolution 
led by Pol Pot claimed to be uniquely Khmer, drawing on no 
foreign inspiration. Ieng Sary, Pol Pot's chief lieutenant, 
and the Communist Party of Kampuchea's (CPK) future Minister 
of Foreign Affairs proclaimed: "The Khmer revolution has no 
precedent. What we are trying to do has never been done 
before in history."103 Yet, the Khmer Rouge did embrace many 
of the same revolutionary rituals of communist movements in 
the Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam. 
Despite the proclaimed uniqueness of the revolution, it 
is best described as a nationalist revolution, with an 
important corollary: a common blood theme based on the myth of 
Khmer racial superiority over all other people and for that 
matter, all other communist movements. For Pol Pot, this was 
not only a revolution fought as he explained, "'in conformity 
with the genuine nature of the working class, ' " but to 
"'ensure the perenniality of the Kampuchean race.'"164  It 
1S2Saigon fell to the Vietnamese 13 days later. 
1DjHurst Hannum, "International Law and Cambodian 
Genocide: The Sounds of Silence," (Human Rights Quarterly, 
11, 1, February 1989), p. 85. 
164Elizabeth Becker, When the War Was Over; The Voices 
of Cambodia's Revolution and its People. (New York: Simon 
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would be his same perception of racial superiority that 
ultimately toppled the regime when he applied it against his 
communist brothers to the east, Vietnam. 
As the new rulers of Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge utilized 
symbolic actions in an attempt to legitimate their rule, win 
popular support,  organize a nation,  encourage external 
support, and defeat adversaries. 
A.   LEGITIMACY 
THE MYTH OF SELF-RELIANCE 
Pol Pot conveniently forgot all Vietnamese help in 
attaining victory and perpetuated a new myth of self-reliance. 
He told the country, "Only the Cambodian nation, Cambodian 
people, Cambodian revolutionary army, and the Kampuchean 
Communist Party have managed to liberate their own country and 
people completely, definitively and clearly."165 Buoyed by 
their confident commander, Khmer Rouge forces even occupied 
islands claimed by Vietnam in an attempt to prove their 
superiority.lb6 
The CPK became increasingly captured in the myth of self- 
reliance that they helped create.  For them, victory was 
and Schuster, 1986), p. 256. 
:
*
5Ibid., p. 44. 
'"David Chandler, Brother Number One: A Political 
Biography of Pol Pot. (Thailand: Silkview Press, 1993), p. 
111. 
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accomplished without the external assistance of Vietnamese and 
other communist countries or the vacuum created by the abrupt 
departure of American aid and the Lo Lon Nol government.'0 
Even Sihanouk was retired."0' The Party explained, 
We must understand the true nature and results of 
our revolution. When we won the victory over the 
U.S. imperialists, did we have any planes?... We 
were victorious over the U.S. imperialists ... 
leaders of imperialists in the world. Did we have 
any planes then? No, and we had neither naval 
vessels nor armored vehicles.... This army had no 
planes, tanks, or artillery pieces and was short of 
ammunition; however, our fight was crowned with 
169 
success. 
This would not be the first myth that blinded the leadership 
of the CPK. Myth not only had the power to create perception 
but could encourage misperception as well. 
lö7
"Even though Lon Nol' s best fighting units were 
destroyed between 1970 and 1972 in battles with North 
Vietnamese regulars, official Kampuchean accounts refuse to 
acknowledge Vietnamese assistance and insist that 
international assistance was 'only supplementary.'" See Karl 
D. Jackson, "The Ideology of Total Revolution," in Karl D. 
Jackson, ed., Cambodia 1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 40. 
158Cadre documents stated: "Sihanouk's position is ripe 
now.  He has run out of wind.  He cannot go any further 
forward. Therefore we have decided to retire him, according 
to the wishes of others." David P. Chandler, et al., eds., 
Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Documents 
from Democratic Kampuchea. 1976-1977. (New Haven: Yale 
University Southeast Asia Studies, 1988), pp. 6-7. 
l69FBIS as quoted in Jackson, "The Ideology," p. 40. 
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B.   POPULAR SUPPORT 
KHMER ROUGE PERCEPTIONS OF POPULAR  SUPPORT 
As was done in all past occupations of territory, the 
Khmer Rouge carried out their ritual of emptying populated 
areas into the forests and countryside, to include Phnom 
Penh and all other provincial cities.  "A new Cambodia would 
therefore start from zero in an empty city."170 
With a force of 60,000 largely illiterate peasants, Pol 
Pot now ruled a country of over 7 million.171 Those who had 
not taken part in the revolution were "new people," enemies 
not to be trusted.  Although the revolution was intended to 
destroy classes, three political classes developed, those 
with full rights (the party), candidates (those working for 
the party) and depositees ("last on distribution lists, 
first on execution lists").'72  Creating classes appears to 
be a contradiction to notions of Marxist-Leninist thought 
but the "Khmer Rouge never translated a single text of Marx, 
-^Chandler, Brother, p. 108. 
''Karl D. Jackson, "The Khmer Rouge in Context," in 
Karl D. Jackson, ed., Cambodia 1975-1978: Rendezvous with 
Death. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 9 
Tan cites KR strength at 70,000. See Lek Hor Tan, 
"Cambodia's Total Revolution," Index on Censorship. 8, 1, 
January-February, 1979, p. 4. 
2May Ebihara, "Revolution and Reformulations in 
Kampuchean Village Culture," The Cambodian Agony, ed. by 
David A Ablin and Marlowe Hood, (Armonk, New York: M. E. 
Sharpe, Inc., 1987), p. 25. 
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Lenin, or Mao."" 3 Like classes, both man and society would 
be recreated through revolutionary means to obtain popular 
support. As one Party document explained, "technology is not 
the decisive factor; the determining factors of a revolution 
are politics, revolutionary people, and revolutionary 
methods."" *  Perceptions of each held important rites for 
the population. 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE POLITICAL  STATE 
Khmer Rouge politics emphasized stripping Cambodians 
toiling in. the year zero of all notions of their former 
identification of the state.  The cadre explained to the 
population that their former lives in the old state gave the 
illusion of prosperity.  As one document explained: 
"Formerly, in the old society, it was as if there was 
plenty; there was sufficiency.  But the country was 
enslaved, indebted to others."175 The CPK turned provinces 
whose names held centuries of historic tradition into zones 
whose names were now based on the directions of a compass. 
Basic institutions of the country were dismantled or erased 
including notions of "the family, village, and wat," because 
173Marlowe Hood and David A. Ablin, "The Path to 
Cambodia's Present," The Cambodian Agony. (Armonk, New York: 
M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1987), p. xxxvi. 
'""Chandler, Pol Pot Plans, p. 48. 
'•^Ibid., p. 225. 
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each of these institutions "would have competed with the 
state for people's loyalties and labor."'0  "The important 
aim," a 1976 Central Committee document relates, "is to 
replace one state with another."1 
PERCEPTIONS OF WINNING  THE PEOPLE 
In creating revolutionary people, the Khmer Rouge 
attempted to replace the individual consciousness of the 
Khmer they controlled.  "We must create the resources and 
character to leap forward," explains one Party document.178 
The Party did not see the need to wait to build this new 
character over time, as they believed the Chinese, Korean, 
and Vietnamese communist regimes were forced to do. The 
Party could explain, "We have leaped over the neo-colonial, 
semi-feudalist society of the American imperialist, the 
feudalists and capitalists of every nation, and have 
achieved a socialist society straight away."179 All because 
in the Khmer Rouge perception of the world: "we have a 
different character from them."180 
PERCEPTIONS OF METHOD FOR POPULAR  SUPPORT 
176Ebihara, p. 23. 
177Chandler, Pol Pot Plans, p. 6, 
173Ibid., p. 45. 
'""ibid., pp. 45,46, 
iecIbid., p. 46. 
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Rituals in the form of regimes were established to 
ensure the new man they sought.  The CPK Four Year Plan 
established: "The People's Eating Regime;" "The Working and 
Resting Regime;" and "the regime for studying culture, 
science and technology to nurture politics and 
consciousness."131 Revolutionary man needed only "Three rest 
days per month.  One rest day in every ten."182 But, leisure 
time was not forgotten. "According to our observations," Pol 
Pot explained to cadre in 1976, "working without any rest at 
all is bad for the health."183 Pol Pot's view of the people's 
work could be summarized in the stanza of one revolutionary 
song: 
the workers are happy in their hearts, working 
night and mornings, with no fear of getting tired. 
A new man required a new educational ritual.  Education 
would be instilled through the collective where "there are 
no examinations and no certificates."184 The collective would 
destroy individualism and in its place build revolutionary 
consciousness.  In the CPK view, solely obtaining political 
consciousness would overcome all obstacles.  Even a lack of 
181 Ibid., pp. Ill, 112. 
182Ibid., p. 112. 
"'"ibid., p. 158. 
184Ibid., p. 114. 
79 
aviation training required only a new consciousness for the 
potential pilot. One Party document explained to cadres: 
"Formerly to be a pilot required a high school education-- 
twelve to fourteen years.  Nowadays, it's clear that 
political consciousness is the decisive factor."*83 
A new cultural ritual accompanied political 
consciousness.  The old culture had to be destroyed.  The 
Party explained cadre must continue attempts to "abolish, 
uproot, and disperse the cultural, literary, and artistic 
remnants of the imperialists, colonialists, and all the 
other oppressor classes."180 The new culture required the 
cadre to: 
Continue to strengthen and expand the building of 
revolutionary culture, literature and art of the 
worker-peasant class in accordance with the 
Party's proletarian standpoint. . . .  Especially 
the strengthening and expanding of songs and poems 
that reflect good models in the period of 
political/armed struggle in the revolutionary war 
for national and people's liberation, in the 
period of national-democratic revolution, and 
songs that describe good models in the period of 
socialist revolution and the building of 
n •     187 socialism. 
The ritual means to implement the educational and cultural 
instruction was supplemented by a four part process in the 
"""Ibid., p. 160 
186Ibid., p. 113 
l87Ibid. 
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Four Year Plan: 
A. Radio Broadcasting: organize general listening 
sessions using loud speakers for all important 
places and mobile work brigades. 
B. Films: of the revolutionary movement's present 
and past, especially the present.  Organize many 
groups to produce many films to show to the people 
in general. 
C. Art: Step-by-step (a little is enough) in order 
not to disturb the productive forces raising 
production. 
D. Newspapers: pictorial magazines, political 
magazines and general knowledge.188 
Revolutionary methods entailed the replacement being 
done quickly, probably to encourage the revolutionary 
consciousness that underlay the Party's psychological hold 
on cadre and society. "We want to build socialism quickly," 
one 1979 document reveals, "we want our country to change 
quickly, we want our people to be glorious quickly."189 The 
accelerated pace of change may also have been due to the 
perceived weakness of the CPK position vis-a-vis the vast 
population they attempted to control.190 External enemies 
were also feared, "[b]ecause enemies attack and torment us," 
188Ibid., p.  114. 
189Ibid., p. 10. 
1900ne 1979 document relates that the Party had 4,000 
people throughout the country.  See Chandler, Pol Pot Plans, 
p. 24.  Chandler says that the Party membership in 1970 was 
only 1500 in footnote p. 322. 
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the Party believed.  "From the east and west they persist in 
pounding and worrying us. . . .,,i9' 
Significantly, there is a looming sense of increased 
paranoia after the obtained victory that carries through to 
the regime's downfall.  In March 1976 the Central Committee 
gave authority to "'smash'" enemies both inside and outside 
the Party.'92 By 1979, the Party is emphasizing "continuous 
non-stop struggle between revolution and counter- 
revolution."19'  The Party not only wanted the struggle to 
continue, the very myth of struggle was to be encouraged. 
"We must nurture this standpoint," one document demanded, 
"that there will be enemies in ten years, twenty years, 
thirty years into the future."194 
Revolutionary politics, people, and methods had five 
ultimate goals in the Four Year Plan of 1976: 
1. Independence, mastery, self-reliance, and 
control over one's own destiny 
2. Revolutionary patriotism and revolutionary 
pride in one's nation, revolution, people, and 
Party. 
3. Complete faith in one's Party, revolution, 
collective worker-peasant people, and 
191Chandler, Pol Pot Plans, p. 126 
192Ibid., p. 3. 
193Ibid., p. 15. 
194 Ibid. 
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revolutionary armed forces. 
4. Spring up the great revolutionary movement of 
the masses with the speed of a Super Great Leap 
(Forward). 
5. Always save up, improve, and think up new ideas 
to win the fight and spring forward bravely.  Use 
little capital, which is the nation's important 
natural resource, but produce numerous good 
quality results. 
As important as these goals were to the success of the 
Party, Pol Pot reminded his cadres that ideas were the most 
important facet of the revolution.  "[W]hat is important 
about the Plan is not the numbers," the Party's leader 
explained, "but the ideology behind it . . . ."19S 
C.   ORGANIZATION 
Communist symbols and rituals reinforced the Party's 
perceptions of the new revolutionary politics, man, and 
method.  New myths would be crafted for notions of the 
state, economy, religion, and the individual Khmer. 
ORGANIZING  THE STATE 
The secret documents of the CPK leadership suggest many 
symbols to transform the state.  A "Hero's Monument" would 
be built to symbolize the "the national struggle" and "the 
class struggle" as well as the struggle against the 
3Ibid., p. 121. 
83 
"aggression of American imperialists." "° New Holidays were 
proclaimed to commemorate historical events: Independence 
(17 April 19 75); births of the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
(17 January 1968) and the Constitution (5 January 1976); 
defeats inflicted on the enemy to include the defeat of the 
American air war (15 August 1973), the defeat of  the Nixon 
Doctrine to make Khmers fight Khmers (1 April 1975) and the 
defeat of the American Imperialists' war of aggression (12 
April 19 75); as well as the creation of new organizations 
like the Democratic Youth (5 February 1970), the Women's 
Organization (10 July 1961), the Trade Union (1 November 
1955) and the Peasant Co-operative (20 May 1973) .197 
Newly established elections provided important 
legitimizing myths to the outside world. " [T]he world has 
seen that the political situation in our country is good," 
in the words of one document, "for we have been able to 
« 198 prepare such good elections." 
Useful traditional symbols of the state remained intact 
or were transformed to serve the revolution. A foreign 
journalist traveling in Cambodia noted that the old symbols 
196Ibid., p. 4. There is no evidence that the Monument 
got built. 
197Ibid., pp. 4,5.  See the complete list of new 
holidays in text. 
lytf Ibid., p. 6. 
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of authority embodied in the temples of Angkor were not only- 
spared but dutifully maintained.'"" Reaching into the ancient 
past of Angkor, the Khmer Rouge gave Cambodians a new god-- 
"Angka"--an  omnipresent force that would guide and oversee 
every Cambodian's action.  Ponchaud likened "Angka"  to "the 
kings of Angkor Wat, who were divinities incarnate ... to 
which the people are to devote themselves body and soul."200 
ORGANIZING  THE ECONOMY 
The CPK structured the economy to look like the new 
national emblem of Democratic Kampuchea: an emblem that 
consisted of a network of dikes and canals with a' 
representative factory.201 The economy was released from any 
'"journalist Dragoslav Rancic noted that religious 
shrines were attacked but the Angkor Wat complex was 
maintained as a "national shrine." See Kenneth M. Quinn, 
"The Pattern and Scope of Violence," in Karl D. JACKSON, 
ed., Cambodia 19 75-19 78: Rendezvous with Death. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 191. Vickery confirms 
this reverence for Angkor.  He stated, "The ancient temples 
of Angkor were also undamaged, and their intact state is 
directly contrary to stories current in KID [Khao I Dang 
(KID) refugee camp] in 1980.  In particular, I was told by 
refugees that on the so-called 'Giants' Causeway,' the main 
entry to the walled city of Angkor, all the dozens of images 
had been decapitated.  In fact there is no change from its 
prewar condition; and as we can see from an unnoticed remark 
by one of the child artists in 1980, there was some effort 
by DK authorities to prevent deterioration of the Angkor 
edifices." Michael Vickery, Cambodia: 1975-1982, (Boston: 
South End Press, 1984), p. 187,188. 
200Francois Ponchaud, Cambodia Year Zero, (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Wilson, 1977, p. 88. 
201Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea, taken from 
Ponchaud, Cambodia, p. 204. 
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reliance on foreign influences, money was abolished, and the 
state turned into an agricultural collective.  Districts 
were pushed to increase production because  "average yields 
in the 1960s had hovered around one ton per hectare," noted 
a 19 79 confidential report."'2 Those collectives that met the 
required goal of three hectares were rewarded with visual 
symbols.  A 1976 Central Committee document stated: "Choose 
as models, districts which have increased production to 
three tons per hectare so that they can fly the flag of the 
'Great Leap Forward'."203 The red flags would symbolize not 
only those who had achieved the Party's goals, but served to 
draw attention to those that had not. 
According to the Party: "We stand [rely] on agriculture 
in order to expand other fields; industries, factories, 
metals, oil, etc.  The basic key is agriculture.  Self 
reliance means capital from agriculture."204 The revolution 
owed many of these economic ideas to Khieu Samphan.  Khieu 
had been among the Cambodians educated in Paris in the 19 50s 
and earned a Ph.D. with a paper on The Economy of Cambodia 
and its Problems of Industrialization.205 Advocating 
202 Chandler. Pol Pot Plans, p. 9. 
203Ibid., p. 3. Chandler notes a photograph of the flags 
over DK worksites in his "Democratic Kampuchea is Moving 
Forward, Phnom Penh, August 1977, p. 198. This same symbol 
was used in China during their Great Leap Forward. 
204 Ibid., p. 30, 
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economic isolation from the international economy, Khieu had 
written that "over 80 per cent of city dwellers were 
unproductive and only served the elite.""'"0  He wanted all 
people transferred to agriculture to expand the economic 
base in preparation for industrialization. 
To support agriculture, the people were ordered to dig 
a massive system of canals, dikes, and reservoirs.  Just as 
the Angkor period mobilized the population in large 
hydraulic projects, the revolution called for an equally 
demanding effort.  Revolutionary songs proclaimed: 
We raise embankments, and these form a network, 
like spider-webs, everywhere.  We dig canals, 
small and large, long and short, bringing water 
and loam to pour on to our fields.207 
As a result of implementing Khieu Samphan's arguments 
in hundreds of canals and collectives around Cambodia, 
thousands starved due to inefficient production methods 
based on slave labor.  Canals simply collapsed when the 
monsoons destroyed fragile projects built without any 
205Obviously the revolution made an exception for Khieu 
in its proclamation: "a diploma can't get anything to eat." 
The slogan comes from Tan, p. 3.  Other revolutionary 
slogans are collected in a French document by Henri Locard, 
The Slogans of Angkar. Phnom Penh: Phnom Penh University, 
1994. 
"
06Tan, p. 3. 
-
07Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua, Peasants and Politics 
in Kampuchea. 1942-1981. (London: Zed Press, 1982), p. 326. 
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thought to hydraulic engineering."" 
Collectivization and group projects were rituals to 
replace society's traditional notions of individualism."09 
Collectives broke individual loyalties adverse to the 
revolution, while mass relocations to work them severed 
children from parents, parents from relatives, and all 
Cambodians from their familiar kinship based on the village. 
Revolutionary songs recited by the collective promoted what 
became a myth of solidarity: 
0 solidarity group, you are a new kind of family, 
special, beautiful and unique.  Our happiness is 
enormous, and we struggle to expand and solidify 
it, even more.ii0 
ORGANIZING RELIGION 
To further solidarity, the Constitution of Democratic 
Kampuchea gave religion symbolic freedom.  Article 20 
declared: "Every citizen of Kampuchea has the right to 
::8Refugees stated not one canal held up in the rainy 
season of 1976. See Charles H. Twining, "The Economy," in 
Karl D. Jackson, ed., Cambodia 1975-1978: Rendezvous with 
Death. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 
130. 
209As Gerhard Simon points out in his study of Soviet 
policy in the Ukraine: "The purpose of collectivization was 
to undermine the economic foundations of clan and tribal 
loyalty."  Gerhard Simon, Nationalism and Policy Toward the 
Nationalities in the Soviet Union: From Totalitarian 
Dictatorship to Post-Stalinist Society. (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1991), p. 98. 
210 Kiernan, Peasants, p. 327. 
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worship according to any religion," but this fact was 
manipulated by another ritual. The Constitution prohibited 
"all reactionary religions that are detrimental to 
Democratic Kampuchea and the Kampuchean people. . . . "21: 
Buddhism, with its historic links to the Khmer had to be 
erased.  According to Ponchaud, the word for "race" and 
"religion" were the same in Cambodia, in other words, Khmer 
meant Buddhism.212  In attempting to purify the race, the 
Khmer Rouge had to remove religion from its associations 
with Khmer. 
The Khmer Rouge understood the challenge religion might 
someday offer the revolution. Hannum explained, "Buddhism in 
Cambodia embodied and transmitted culture, and many 
Cambodians speak of Buddhism as the 'soul' or 'core' of 
Khmer culture and civilization."213 Buddhism could trace its 
lineage to the Angkor empire when the god-kings of Angkor 
defended its tenants from foreign invaders like the Thais or 
Vietnamese.  Historically, Buddhist monks also defended the 
land from foreign domination as demonstrated in their 
rebellion against the French colonizers in the 19th century. 
The Khmer Rouge Constitution allowed the facade of religion 
^Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea, taken from 
Ponchaud, Cambodia, p. 205. 
-
12Ponchaud, Cambodia, p. 126. 
213Hannum,   p.   87. 
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but denied its practice since religion endangered 
revolutionary authority.  Thus, a methodical annihilation of 
the symbols of Buddhism followed that saw the destruction of 
almost 3,000 pagodas, the defacement of sacred statues and 
the torch put to written religious scripture.214 Although 
60,000 monks practiced before the revolution, only 1,000 
would live to return to their work.215 
Importantly, Ponchaud points out the CPK adopted 
Buddhist rituals to supplement their own control of society. 
The asceticism of the monkhood would be echoed in the 
abandonment of the family unit by the working population. 
Rituals of internal purification were the highest goals of 
Buddhism and the same purification rites that rejected 
individual concerns and desires were to be pressed on the 
revolutionary society.216 The Khmer who followed the Party's 
path would obtain Buddhist peace and tranquility.  One 
stanza in a revolutionary song confirmed that fact: 
The Khmer are happy now, no longer feeling tired, 
214, 4Becker, p. 265. In Chandler, Pol Pot Plans has cadre 
demand a "Christian Cathedral" be demolished. The document 
explains: "The method must be such that this does not affect 
other buildings." p. 4. 
215 Hannum,   p.   88 
21c 5Francois Ponchaud, "Social Change in the Vortex of 
Revolution," in Karl D. Jackson, ed., Cambodia 1975-1978; 
Rendezvous with Death. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1989), pp. 174, 175. 
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striving to clear the road to peace.  All the 
Khmer children are happy, for the revolution 
guides Khmer and Khmer towards solidarity.21' 
ORGANIZING  THE INDIVIDUAL 
With religion removed, the Khmer Rouge filled the 
vacuum in the Khmer soul with new revolutionary images that 
embodied their communist ideas in the guise of traditional 
Khmer symbols.  All people were dressed in black to 
symbolize the peasant.  Dress with color was eliminated due 
to its correlation with the corruption of the West.  Short 
hair was maintained to symbolize that worn in the 
countryside. The regime associated long hair with moral 
depravity and laziness.218 The revolution emphasized the link 
with the peasant through songs as well: 
The rain falls in pisakh [April-May].  There's a 
cool breeze.  Dear friends, the rain falls now and 
then.  We hear roosters crowing everywhere, and 
our brothers the peasants join together to 
increase production.219 
As an oral civilization, the regime also transformed 
the Khmer language because its present structure reinforced 
what the revolution sought to destroy.  Before the 
revolution, Cambodia had been a hierarchical society, and 
"
17Kiernan, Peasants, p. 328. 
'
18Ponchaud, "Social Change," p. 157, 
219 Kieman, Peasants, p. 328 
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the Khmer language reflected this hierarchy: 
For example, instead of names and personal 
pronouns as modes of direct address, appellations 
were used which emphasized the ties of blood, age, 
social rank, whether one was a member of the royal 
family or the Buddhist clergy, the quality of the 
person speaking and of the person spoken to.  The 
language was imbued with rank, class, place in the 
society, and it reinforced respect for these 
values . "20 
Power was also granted to the "'smooth talker,'" in a 
civilization where "silence was an absolute rule for 
subordinates."^1 
The Party now promoted a new hierarchy and ritually 
communicated it over loudspeakers in the rice fields, 
through the written words of the party organ "Padevat" 
(Revolution) ,12Z  or over the public radio station. Soldiers 
and citizens of the regime daily repeated ritual offerings 
to "Angka"   in oral form: 
1. Thou shalt love, honor, and serve the people of 
the laborers and peasants. 
2. Thou shalt serve the people wherever thou 
goest, with all thy heart and with all thy mind. 
3. Thou shalt respect the people without injury to 
their interests, without touching their goods or 
plantations,  forbidding thyself to steal so much 
220Tan, p. 6. 
221Ponchaud,   "Social  Change,"  p.   158. 
222Tan,   p.   9. 
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as one pepper, and taking care never to utter a 
single offensive word against them. 
4. Thou shalt beg the people's pardon if thou hast 
committed some error respecting them.  If thou 
hast injured the interests of the people, to the 
people shalt thou make reparation. 
5. Thou shalt observe the rules of the people, 
when speaking, sleeping, walking, standing, or 
seated, in amusement or in laughter. 
6. Thou shalt do nothing improper respecting 
women. 
7. In food and drink thou shalt take nothing but 
revolutionary products. 
8. Thou shalt never gamble in any way. 
9. Thou shalt not touch the people's money.  Thou 
shalt never put out they hand to touch so much as 
one tin of rice or pill of medicine belonging to 
the collective goods of the state or the ministry. 
10.Thou shalt behave with great meekness toward 
the laboring people and peasants, and the entire 
population.  Toward the enemy, however, the 
American imperialists and their lackeys, thou 
shalt feed they hatred with force and vigilance. 
11.Thou shalt continually join in the people's 
production and love thy work. 
12.Against any foe and against every obstacle thou 
shalt struggle with determination and courage, 
ready to make every sacrifice including thy life 
for the people, the laborers and peasants, for the 
revolution and for the Angkar, without hesitation 
and without respite.223 
Just as the Khmer language was transformed, the CPK 
223Ponchaud, Cambodia, pp. 117,118.  The author explains 
he heard this recitation daily from KR soldiers outside the 
French embassy after the 1975 victory.  Refugees escaping KR 
zones in 1973 knew them as well. p. 117. 
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transformed Cambodian culture.   Traditionally, Khmer 
culture moved through two vehicles: high culture, practiced 
for the royal coterie in the form of intricate dance and 
music which also served to transmit centuries of Buddhist 
thought; and folk culture, which was utilized by the masses 
to transmit ideas of love, revenge, and feckless pleasures 
through folk tales."4 
Probably believing that dance and folk tales bare "'the 
imprints of a nation's soul,'"225 the Khmer Rouge could not 
allow the religious themes to be promulgated in dance, nor 
could they tolerate the unpuritanical nature of folk tales, 
so they replaced both vehicles with dance that had Chinese 
warlike rhythms226 and oral patriotic discourse to glorify 
and mythicize the revolutionary struggle. 
One secret party document emphasized revolutionary 
songs and poems in the new culture.  It called for 
"[e]specially the strengthening and expanding of songs and 
poems that reflect good models .... "227 Revolutionary 
songs used existing folk-tunes but rather than being sung by 
individuals, these songs were sung in unison, praising the 
224Tan, p. 5. 
225As quoted by Anatol Lieven, The Baltic. Revolution. 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 113. 
:
--Ponchaud, Cambodia, p. 125. 
2:7Chandler,   Pol   Pot  Plans,   p.   113. 
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rituals of the group.-"" 
Songs from the revolution assisted the destruction of 
the old culture.  One song, entitled "Cultural Group," 
brings out the struggle between old and new culture with the 
eventual triumph of the new revolutionary culture: 
We press our palms together, and bow our heads, 
respecting all of you, our friends, who have come 
together for this evening meeting. 
We come tonight to show our talents, and our 
popular, revolutionary culture--to entertain you, 
our young friends. 
In the cause of cultural struggle, and in the name 
of the beautiful art of the ancient Khmer, please 
correct and improve our performance.  Please help 
us to root out corrupt and rotten culture. 
If what we do is right or wrong, please, friends, 
correct and refine the detail helping us, 
constructively, to fit in with old traditions, and 
to achieve a revolutionary culture.229 
Revolutionary songs also emphasized rites of passage. 
Those who fought before the April 1975 victory became what 
James Billington describes as a "forest fraternity:"230 
We took the jungle as our home, 
223The explanation of songs was taken from Chandler. 
See Kiernan, Peasants. pp. 326-328. 
:29Kiernan, Peasants, pp. 327, 328. 
230James H. Billington, Fire in the Minds of Men: 
Origins of the Revolutionary Faith. (New York: Basic Books, 
Inc., Publishers, 1980), p. 130. 
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Sunlight never reached us: 
Only mosquitoes and land 
leeches, 
Weak with malaria, we are tree vines, 
All bones and white, but our 
hearts are bright red."3" 
The regime did not tolerate traditional myths and 
symbols transmitted by religion, language or culture, 
because these might rekindle forgotten values of the people 
and threaten the revolution's authority. By replacing 
language and culture with new symbols, the revolution 
continued to dismantle Cambodian society and most 
importantly the individual Khmer notion of himself. 
SANCTIFYING ORGANIZATION THROUGH BLOOD MYTH 
Pol Pot's goal was to "be the best in the world, the 
best in Cambodian history, the best communists .... "232 
Yet, in order to be the "best" communists the Khmer Rouge 
had to purify the country of everything that was not Khmer 
as the revolution defined Khmer.  Implicit in this 
purification of Cambodia was the necessity to purify the 
people: to create a new nation based on the myth of Khmer 
racial superiority.  Ponchaud remarked on the purification 
aspects of the revolution. 
;31John Barron and Paul Anthony, Murder of a Gentile 
Land: The Untold Story of Communist Genocide in Cambodia, 
(New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1977), p. 209. 
-"Becker, p. 45. 
96 
The new revolutionary culture aims to be 
absolutely, exclusively national, purged of all 
foreign impurities--even ones that are centuries 
old.  How far back are the Khmers supposed to go, 
one wonders, to recover their true identity?""3 
Just as political scientist Walker Connor asserts the 
importance of the "myth of common descent," for binding 
peoples into nations, the notion of pure Khmer blood would 
give the revolution a powerful cognitive bond between the 
people and the regime.234 
Purity of blood was based on a myth supplied by the 
revolution, not fact.  "The Cambodian people," Becker points 
out, are a mixture of racial stocks--largely, the earliest 
Negroid, Australoid, Malay, and northern Mongoloid racial 
families and including the later wave of migrations by 
Europeans, Chinese,  and Vietnamese."235 
The revolution created a national myth in an attempt to 
solidify a new nation and a loyal following, based no longer 
on the traditional Cambodian hierarchy. The nation would be 
based instead on a common kinship traced through a pure, 
revolutionary bloodline.  Although other revolutionary songs 
233Ponchaud, Cambodia, p. 6. 
-
34Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for 
Understanding, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1994), p. 75. 
:35 Becker, p. 253. 
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demonstrate the importance of Khmer blood, the National Anthem 
of Democratic Kampuchea, "The Glorious Seventeenth of April," 
best illustrates the fixation on blood: 
Bright red Blood which covers towns and plains 
Sublime Blood of workers and peasants, 
Sublime Blood of revolutionary men and women 
fighters! 
The Blood changing into unrelenting hatred 
And resolute struggle, 
On April 17th, under the Flag of the Revolution 
Frees from Slavery!236 
Connor explained "political leaders . . . have been mindful of 
the common blood component of ethnonational psychology and 
have not hesitated to appeal to it when seeking popular 
support."237 Pol Pot emphasized the essential bond of blood in 
the anthem and the revolution in his thoughts reported over 
the BBC on 5 October 1977: 
Our national anthem was not composed by a poet. 
Its essence is the blood of our entire people, of 
those who fell for centuries past. This blood call 
has been incorporated into the national anthem. 
Each sentence, each word shows the nature of our 
people's struggle. This blood has been turned into 
class and national indignation. This led us to the 
great victory on 17 April 1975 and still calls for 
us to defend the people's state power, protect the 
fatherland and build a prosperous and glorious 
:,6Becker, p. 219. 
:37Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for 
Understanding, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New 
Jersey, 1994), p. 202. 
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Cambodia at a great-leap-forward pace."'8 
"Blood" became the fuel for a new engine of the revolution: 
"national  indignation."  Blood themes would also become 
increasingly  prevalent  as  external  support  failed  to 
materialize. 
D.   EXTERNAL SUPPORT 
A   "LIGHT"   TO INSPIRE OTHERS 
Pol Pot must have felt not only superior to his former 
Vietnamese ally, as his successful revolution proved, but 
equally sure he could set an example for the rest of the world 
as a kind of guiding light. As one song exclaimed: 
The new nation of Kampuchea is a glittering, 
glowing, sparkling kind of light. We strive to 
work harder and harder, to expand and complete the 
revolution.239 
RITUALS FOR  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
The "light" was encouraged to shine within the 
international community. Despite public claims of autarky and 
lack of external assistance, the confidential documents reveal 
a concern for developing international relations to prevent 
Democratic Kampuchea's isolation. The Four Year Plan 
developed in 1976 exclaims: 
:38Tan, p. 8. 
j39Kiernan, Peasants, p. 327. 
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We must have international friends to help and 
support us, especially in the field of politics and 
consciousness, to prevent outside enemies from 
being able to isolate and suppress us.-4" 
As Party Secretary, Pol Pot personally explained to his cadres 
the importance of external support in August 1976. He summed 
up the four main points of the Four Year Plan as: the Party, 
the workers and peasants, defense, and "many loyal friends 
throughout the world."241 By December 1976, a document 
probably read by Pol Pot for top cadres saw a concern for 
foreign relations again emphasized: 
We have expanded our friendship with a number of 
Marxist-Leninist parties.... We can [also] make 
friends in countries where there are no allied 
Parties.... We have also extended relations to a 
number of capitalist countries, showing them that 
our revolution is not isolated. In political 
terms, this shows that we have considerable power 
outside our country.242 
Although public discourse emphasized self-reliance,  the 
240Chandler, Pol Pot Plans, pp. 41,42.  One 
international friend convinced of KR sincerity was US 
Representative Tom Hayden.  In 1975, after contact with 
their representatives, Hayden testified to the KR's desire 
for "amnesty and reconciliation" as they consolidated power. 
See The Vietnam Cambodian Emergency, 1975, Part Two, 
Hearings Before the Committee on International Relations and 
Its Special Subcommittee on Investigations, House of 
Representatives, 94th Congress, First Session, March-April, 
1975. p. 520. 
241Chandler, Pnl Pnt Plans, p. 161. 
242Ibid., pp. 208,209. 
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Party's  private fears at becoming isolated are evident. 
External alliances were sought and perceived to be found. 
So certain that the revolution was an inspiration to 
others and had external support, less restraint was placed on 
aggressive international posturing. Successful border raids 
in 1977 only bolstered the Party's perceptions. Raids into 
Vietnam were full scale massacres where thousands of civilians 
were killed and hundreds of thousands were driven from their 
villages.243 Intoxicated with success and sure of the viability 
of the revolution, Pol Pot publicly proclaimed for the first 
time his country was communist in 1977. 
E.   DEFEATING ADVERSARIAL RESPONSE 
PROMOTING FEARS THROUGH THE BLACK BOOK 
But his was a communism fueled by racial hatred as 
characterized by the Livre Noir or Black Book, published by 
the regime in 1978. This French language document of 112 
pages explained the "'facts and proofs of Vietnamese acts of 
aggression and annexation against Kampuchea.'"2U The document 
asserted, "Democratic Kampuchea seeks to maintain goodwill 
243Stan Sesser, "Report from Cambodia," The New Yorker. 
68, May 18, 1992, p.46.  Kiernan writes part of the 3rd 
Brigade under the nominal command of Son Sen massacred 
almost 3 00 civilians on the night of 24 September 1977 
during these raids. See Kiernan, "Wild Chickens," p. 172. 
-
44Milton Osborne, Aggression and Annexation: 
Kampuchea's Condemnation of Vietnam. (Canberra, Australia: 
The Strategic and Defence Studies Center, 1979), p. 1. 
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with all nations." 
But Vietnam which has always had the aim of 
annexing and swallowing Kampuchea and of 
exterminating the Kampuchean race by means of its 
sinister strategy for an 'Indochinese Federation' 
has carried out the most perfidious activities for 
dozens of years to gain its objective."45 
The Black Book explained there were "fundamental 
contradictions between the Kampuchean and the Vietnamese 
revolutions," so for Pol Pot negotiation with Vietnam must 
have been out of the question. This is not to overlook the 
importance of outside influences on the Khmer Rouge as well. 
Pol Pot could have been encouraged by the Chinese to punish 
the Vietnamese. China would desire to see Vietnam humbled, 
since the Vietnamese had sought solidarity with the Soviets. 
In sum, Pol Pot would encourage fears of the Vietnamese to 
defeat his adversary through the Slack Book. 
DISPOSABLE POPULATION 
Another means of defeating adversaries was with a 
disposable population. Despite the revolution promoting the 
myth of classless society, Pol Pot's public discourse reflects 
Vietnam would be overcome, by the lowest classes. As he 
proudly proclaimed on the 10th Anniversary (17 January 1978) 
of the Founding of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea: "'We 
are not worried that the source of our army would become 
°0sborne, Aggression, p. 3 
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exhausted for the people of the lowest classes are very 
numerous.'""4'"' Pol Pot mobilized 19 of his 23 divisions-- 
95,000 men--on the frontier with Vietnam in December 1978."4 
That same month three Khmer Rouge divisions plunged into 
Vietnam to take the village of Tay Ninh.248 Pol Pot had taken 
the important step in November 1978 of asking the Chinese for 
"volunteers," but the "Chinese counseled self-reliance and 
increased their material assistance."249 
RITUALS OF PURIFICATION 
Pol Pot never lost faith in self-reliance. Yet, to 
achieve this on a national level required the country be 
ritually purified as he defined Khmer. All challenges to his 
regime therefore became "enemies" of the revolution. Shedding 
this blood would liberate the nation he sought to create. As 
one song proclaimed: 
Glittering red blood blankets the earth--blood 
given up to liberate the people: blood of workers, 
peasants and intellectuals; blood of young men, 
Buddhist monks and girls.250 
-
4oBen Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power: A History of 
Communism in Kampuchea. 1930-1975, (London: Verso, 1985), p. 
420. 
247Gough, Kathleen, "The Situation in Kampuchea, " 
Contemporary-Marxism. 6, Spring, 1983, p. 217. 
:43Gough, "Situation," p. 217. 
249Chandler,   Brother,   p.   161. 
:5CKiernan,   Peasants,   p.   326. 
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According to Pol Pot's estimates on 28 September 1977, over 
Phnom Penh radio, only "one or two per cent of the population 
[classified] as enemies of the state."""' Yet out of a 
population of 7 million Khmer and other minorities, one study- 
cites at least 2 million were killed through policies 
perpetrated by the regime."^ Enemies had become critical for 
the revolution. "The existence of enemies was necessary for 
class warfare," Chandler explained. "Contradictions among the 
people impelled the party forward. To maintain momentum, 
instability was essential."253 
THE  "KING OF DEATH" 
Pol Pot not only propelled the party forward with his 
search for enemies, he had the power of the "King of Death," 
a  mythological  figure  in  folk  tales  that  essentially 
controlled life and death.254 He could be likened to a fierce 
251Tan, p. 9. 
"^Hannum, p. 94. 
253Chandler, Brother, p. 157. 
254
"In Cambodian folk religion one of the main 
mythological figures is known as the King of Death.  He is 
judge, the one who assigns souls to heaven or hell, and he 
knows all about everyone's good and bad deeds.  Nothing is 
hidden from him.  The souls he sends to hell become pret, 
spirits of the damned, the victims of gory and everlasting 
tortures brought upon them by their own misdeeds." Haing 
Ngor, A Cambodian Odyssey, (New York: Warner Books, 1987), 
pp. 240, 241. 
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god depicted on a "bas-relief at Angkor Wat" as writer 
Kathleen Gough saw it, "meting out punishments to the wicked." 
The scenes include several reproduced by Pol Pot: 
throwing people to crocodiles, tearing them limb 
from limb, burning them alive, disemboweling them, 
and drowning them upside down in vats."" 
Pol Pot's brutality came to resemble the justice outside the 
gates of Angkor, passed down through decades of precedent in 
the Cambodian penal system whereby "political criminals or 
'traitors' and their whole families are executed together."256 
Not to be overlooked in examining Pol Pot's justification for 
enemies was the logic of the revolutionary theory that people 
were not accused of treason because they were thought to be 
traitors, they were accused of treason because they were 
marked for liquidation.257 
SYMBOLIC WARFARE 
The revolution characterized enemies of the revolution 
as sub-human forms who came to be "symbolically dehumanized 
and vilified."258   Peoples names were given the prefix 
"contemptible" or "wicked;" women were called "she-animals,•" 
255, 
256 
Gough, "Situation," p. 218 
Tan, p. 9. 
2:i7Hannum, p. 89. 
:5flRoman Laba, The Roots of Solidarity: A Political 
Sociology of Poland's Working-Class Democratization. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 144. 
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and the word used for death was not for people who die but the 
word that described an animal's death."' Symbolically 
defeating an adversary follows closely with the description of 
slaves in the Angkor period where the toiling masses were 
called "'dog,' 'cat,' 'detestable,' and 'stinking.'"2"0 In the 
Angkor era, dissent was not possible under the "god-kings" nor 
did the Cambodians dissent under their Khmer Rouge yoke. 
Historically, the Khmer tradition was to follow the absolute 
authority of their rulers. There were no accounts of uprising 
among the Khmer despite the untold suffering of their kind.261 
Revolutionary songs helped justify in the Khmer mind the 
necessity of defeating adversaries by echoing this search for 
enemies of the revolution: 
Intertwined, as one, our anger shoots out at the 
imperialists--the Americans, and their reactionary 
lackies, killing them until they disappear. 262 
DEFEATING  THE   "NEAR TA" 
The CPK had to defeat not only human enemies but the 
"Neak Ta, " (ancient spiritual beings) who were omnipresent in 
259Hannum, p. 89. 
260Becker, p. 84. 
261Ibid., p. 263. Death may have been ameliorated by the 
doctrines of Buddhism which preached the doctrine of 
reincarnation. 
262Kiernan, Peasants. p. 328. 
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the peasant world view. Ponchaud provides an insightful 
reason for dominating this incorporeal world through new 
rituals. 
[T]he revolutionaries had to confront the invisible 
masters who before them, at least in the minds of 
the peasants, governed over the welfare of the 
villages. In their will towards a total control 
over fate and creation of man by man, they had to 
suppress the 'ancestors.' It is probably in light 
of this that one should view the relentless shifts 
of population since 1975. Beyond economic 
necessity, these constant shifts destroyed the 
religious environment surrounding peasant life, 
thus breaking the vital link between villagers and 
celestial powers, and obviating all spiritual 
references connected to the soil."63 
Ponchaud explains peasants who spoke of "Neak Ta" would elicit 
from the Khmer Rouge responses like: "'Where is he, I'm going 
to shoot him.'" Yet when Khmer Rouge trucks broke down after 
ancient statues were moved or cadre became sick after 
urinating on a pagoda, the domination of "Angka" may have been 
far from complete--even members of the Khmer Rouge would 
secretly make offerings.264 
DESTROYING MINORITIES 
Another force perceived to be opposed to Khmer Rouge 
authority were the minorities.  The races who had migrated to 
Zbi Ponchaud, "Social Change," pp. 167, 168, 
:S4- Ibid., p. 169.  The author relates the Issaraks 
fighting the French did not alienate the people by 
attempting to destroy the Neak Ta, they simply created new 
ancient beings that served their cause, p. 169. 
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Cambodia did not share the same historic traditions of the 
Khmer but were given a clear choice: accept the Khmer Rouge 
revolutionary dictums and become part of the new nation or be 
"kamtech," a word that is literally translated "smashed to 
bits."~or The regime decreed that all minorities would only 
speak Khmer and that the minority populations no longer 
existed."00 
When the revolution claimed victory in 1975, the Khmer 
Rouge had divided the 7 million people of Cambodia into "old" 
and "new" people. Approximately 4.5 to 5 million "old" people 
had lived in the Khmer Rouge occupied areas and were 
accustomed to collectivization and the loss of their ethnic 
distinctions. The 3.5 million "new" people were forced to 
adopt the leveling of society and become slaves of the state. 
By 1977, however, the distinction between "new" and "old" was 
disappearing and all non-Khmer were being targeted for 
physical annihilation.267 
Minority populations like the Cham (numbering 500,000 to 
700,000 in the 1970s), who had helped the revolution with the 
expectation that their belief in Islam would be tolerated 
-
65Hannum, p. 89 
266This would not be unlike Stalin's attempt to 
dismantle the Soviet policy of nation-building 
(korenizatsiia) in an attempt to promote Russian nationalism 
over the ethnic minorities.  Simon, p. 13. 
26
^Gough, "Situation," pp. 211, 212. 
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under the new regime were now considered a "specialized 
religion" and targeted for destruction. The regime published 
a decree to emphasize the symbolic defeat of minorities: 
There is one Kampuchean revolution. In Kampuchea 
there is one nation, and one language, the Khmer 
language. From now on the various nationalities 
[listed according to province] do not exist any- 
longer in Kampuchea. Therefore [Cham] individuals 
must change their names. The Cham mentality [Cham 
nationality, the Cham language, Cham costume, Cham 
habits, Cham religion] are abolished. Those who do 
not abide by this order will reap all conse- 
quences .:b3 
The Cham minority, who believed in one God and the 
tenants of Islam, had traditionally lived apart from the Khmer 
as their special dietary laws and faith required. Now the 
Khmer Rouge forced Cham to violate their religious custom and 
eat pork at gunpoint and witness the destruction of their 
faith. Cham families were broken up and their villages 
burned.  But the Cham fought back.269 Islam justified fighting 
:ä8David R. Hawk, "International Human Rights Law and 
Democratic Kampuchea," The Cambodian Agony, ed. by David A. 
Ablin and Marlowe Hood, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 
Inc., 1987), pp. 127, 128. 
269Ponchaud tells a sad story of a Cham father who meets 
with his two sons who have joined the Khmer Rouge.  The 
father was told of their efforts for the revolution to 
include killing Khmers and eating pork.  They asked their 
father to join the revolution but the father did not answer, 
he just killed his sons with a cleaver.  The villagers were 
taken back but the father explained: "'they are enemies of 
our people and our religion and so I killed them.'" 
Emboldened by the father's actions, the village killed all 
the Khmer Rouge living in their community, only to be 
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for the faith so the Khmer Rouge were quick to extinguish this 
reactionary minority. "[F]ully one half or even more did not 
survive Khmer Rouge rule.""3 
Other minorities who had also helped the regime come to 
power were also purified or purged. Ethnic minorities like 
the Shan or Kula and other Khmer Loeu populations "were 
forbidden to wear distinctive dress ... or speak even a 
phrase of any non-Khmer language, on pain of death."271 
Cambodia's minority Chinese were not allowed to speak 
their native language or practice their native culture. 
Ironically, the regime was assisted by over 4/000 Chinese 
technicians from mainland China.272 Any attempts by the 
Cambodian Chinese to communicate their persecution to their 
mainland kin were stopped by the Khmer Rouge escorts or 
resulted in their being turned in to the regime by their 
Chinese brothers.273 It is estimated that roughly half of the 
surrounded the next day by Khmer Rouge troops who killed 
everyone in the village.  Ponchaud, Cambodiar p. 133. 
270Hannum, p. 87. Hawk notes Cham were symbolically 
buried upside down away from Mecca as part of the symbolic 
warfare waged against the Moslem minority. See David Hawk, 
"The Photographic Record," in Karl D. Jackson, ed., Cambodia 
19 75-1978: Rendezvous with Death. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1989), p. 213. 
2nGough, "Situation," p. 212. 
272Chandler,   Brother,   p.   HO. 
273Becker,   p.   255. 
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urban Chinese died during the revolution." 4 
Ethnic Thais were also executed without compunction. 
Becker notes their destruction: 
The swift purge of the Thai was so unexpected it 
caught the ethnic Thai members of the Khmer Rouge 
by surprise. As many as one-third of the ethnic 
Thai community in Koh Kong [a province on the Gulf 
of Siam] were killed.^ 
Khmer Rouge treatment of minorities has many parallels to 
the Soviet treatment of the Ukraine and the north Caucasus 
minorities during the period 1928 to 1933. However, the 
parallels do not stop with the destruction of ethnic minori- 
ties. Like Stalin, Pol Pot began a ritual purge of his own 
party cadre that beckoned a direct comparison to the Soviet 
show trials of the 1930s; where the Party "destroyed its own 
elites.,,<;76 
DEFEATING  THE  "MICROBES" 
Party discourse communicated through songs proclaimed 
success: 
0 solidarity group, working in unison, happy and 
self-assured! Dry-season rice, wet-season rice, 
light and heavy varieties of rice: our husbandry is 
274Hawk, "International," p. 129 
-^Becker, pp. 260,261. 
"Simon, p. 155. 
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successful everywhere." 
Songs reinforced plenty: 
We are overjoyed to be increasing the output of 
village and district. Our economy has made great 
steps forward, now we have surpluses to put into 
granaries and to supply the revolution.^8 
The economic facts proved otherwise.279 The policies of 
collectivization and economic restructuring resulted in the 
collapse of the national economy and increasing famine. 
Documents from the Party demonstrate increasing concern that 
some were questioning the collectivist agenda. When the 
problem of feed grains for animals came up for example, one 
document explained: "At first glance it seems as if the 
socialist system is inferior to the private (one)."280 A later 
secret address, probably by Pol Pot, explained the real reason 
for the death of draft animals: "Enemies within and enemies 
27
 Kiernan, Peasants. p. 327. 
:78Ibid., p. 328. 
279The party called for a Four Year Plan to produce 
three tons of rice per hectare, which entailed more than 
doubling the current yields.  For the plan see Chandler, £ol 
Pot Plans, p. 37.  For a discussion of the KR economy see 
Charles Twining's essay on "The Economy." Twining says 
Radio Phnom Penh reported: "'Enemy running dogs of all 
colors planted within our cooperatives sabotaged the 3-ton- 
per-hectare target.'" Twining, "The Economy," p.145. 
280Chandler, Pol Pot Plans, p. 22. 
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without have stepped up their activities."231 
Pol Pot was convinced there was, in his words, a "sick- 
ness" in the party.'3" "Microbes," Pol Pot announced, were at 
work wrecking his policies and weakening the revolutionary- 
faith. "'We cannot locate it precisely, ' " Pol Pot told his 
followers: 
The illness must emerge to be examined. Because the 
heat of the people's revolution and the heat of the 
democratic revolution were insufficient ... we 
search for the microbes within the party without 
success. They are buried. As our socialist revo- 
lution advances, however, seeping more strongly 
into every corner of the Party, the army and among 
the people, we can locate the ugly microbes. They 
will be pushed out by the true nature of socialist 
revolution. We are encouraged to expel treacherous 
elements that pose problems to the Party and to our 
revolution. If we wait any longer, the microbes can 
do real damage.283 
In the search for enemies Pol Pot explained to his cadre the 
costs of purification were small. "Don't be afraid to lose 
one or two people of bad background," the Party Secretary 
exhorted.284 
To "push out" the "microbes" each of the country's 127 
-
81Ibid., p. 187. 
:9:Ibid., p. 183. 
:83Ibid. 
284Ibid., p. 185, 186, 
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districts had one or more execution centers established."3" 
The regime tortured and killed those suspected of damaging the 
revolution, then buried the bodies in pits containing from 40 
to 10 0 victims. "Sb For more important cadre, a special 
torture-interrogation center was established in a Phnom Penh 
schoolhouse called Tuol Sleng or S.21. Over 4,000 confessions 
exist, along with photographs of most of the center's 20,000 
victims. d? Guards were given detailed interrogation instruc- 
tions in a 42-page manual that tersely explained: "When 
torturing it is necessary to examine their [the prisoner's] 
state of health first, and the whip. Don't be bloodthirsty 
that you cause the death quickly. You won't get the needed 
information. "288 
DEFEATING UNPOPULARITY 
Despite the perception of enemies in the Party, Pol Pot 
continued to believe the people supported his initiatives. He 
explained, "We have shortcomings. But even in these difficult 
aspects, the people remain supportive of the Party's line and 
act accordingly."289  The Party Secretary chose to defeat 
285Gough, "Situation," p. 213. 
28SIbid., p. 213. 
28
"Chandler,   Brother,   p.   129. 
-'
rfHannum,   p.   13 0. 
:89Chandler,   Pol  Pot  Plans,   p.   205 
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adversaries who undermined this popularity. "There are still 
a number of people escaping to Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos,"2'0 
he explained to his cadres, but they would be overcome through 
informers. "The task of preparing to defend ourselves 
secretly and efficiently against them is not yet complete," 
Pol Pot announced. 
The methods of defense must be secret. This is a 
different task from defending our territory. 
Technically, the fight must be swift and success- 
ful . Those who defend us must be truly adept. 
They should have practice in observing. They must 
observe everything, but so those being observed are 
unaware of it.291 
Pol Pot was destroying not only the country of Cambodia but 
his own communist regime. An "Angka" official summarized the 
policy: "to rebuild our new democratic Cambodia, one million 
men is enough."292 
ATTEMPTING TO DEFEAT THE VIETNAMESE 
Just as the Angkor period saw the "god-kings" exhaust 
their empire with the exploitation of the people and the 
country's resources, Pol Pot was following the same historical 
precedent only at an accelerated rate. What took 600 years 
for the Angkor kings to exhaust, Pol Pot would do in forty- 
290Ibid., p. 209. 
291Ibid., p. 211. 
292T Barron, p. 197, 
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four months. And just as these policies of the Angkor empire 
led to foreign occupation, so would the policies of Pol Pot. 
Angkor had been captured by the Thai in 1353.293 The 
Vietnamese followed with an annexation of much of Cambodia in 
the 19th century, not to mention ninety years of French 
occupation beginning in 1863. But racial animosity seems to 
run highest between the Khmer and her neighbor to the east, 
Vietnam. 
The border between Cambodia and Vietnam is one of 
the greatest cultural divides of Asia. It marks 
the frontiers of Asia's two great cultures, China 
and India.... Their common border ... has been^the 
scene of more battles than any other in Asia, "" 294 
Khmer memories were long, and a pervading myth to come out of 
the Vietnamese occupation in the mid-1800s was the ancient 
story of the quashing of a Cambodian rebellion when Khmer 
soldiers were buried to provide their heads as cookstones for 
Vietnamese pots. The period of annexation from 1841 to 1845 
saw the Vietnamese introduce their dress, religion, and 
culture in an attempt to "eliminate Cambodia's distinctive 
identity."295 
293Ross, p. 12. 
:94Becker, p. 337. 
:95Milton Osborne, Before Kampuchea: Preludes to 
Tragedy. (Winchester, Mass: Allen & Unwin, Inc., 1979), p. 
166. 
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Whether Pol Pot felt the hatred of wounded historical 
pride or the intense racial superiority of the Khmer race, or 
a combination of both, he could accommodate the Vietnamese in 
Cambodia no longer. Cambodian Vietnamese had been allowed to 
return to Vietnam since 1975. In 1977 he evidently began to 
reevaluate his policy of accommodation and directed his 
"regional cadre to round up ethnic Vietnamese and turn them 
over to state security."296 Pol Pot directed the Khmer Rouge 
eastern zones on the Vietnamese border be purged with greater 
intensity to root out communists with "'Cambodian bodies and 
Vietnamese minds.'"297 
Relations between the Khmer Rouge and Vietnam communists 
had never been easy as evidenced by the opposing goals each 
side espoused in 1973 during the Paris Peace talks. Even 
after the communist victory in April 1975, the Khmer Rouge 
attacked and occupied several Vietnamese islands in the Gulf 
of Thailand, apparently unhappy with the border lines drawn 
during the French colonial period as well as their interest in 
the oil reserves located offshore. Although Vietnam retali- 
ated and took a Cambodian island, the Vietnamese appeared to 
resist a full confrontation.298  But the Khmer Rouge kept up 
""Chandler, Brother, p. 141, 
:?
^Ibid., p. 168. 
"
8Ibid., p. 111. 
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their cross border violations throughout 1975-1976. 
The Khmer Rouge misperceived not only the support the 
Chinese would lend their cause, but their own myth of invinci- 
bility. With the collaboration of Khmer Rouge who had left 
Pol Pot's regime for fear of being purged, the Vietnamese 
answered the Cambodian invasion with their own. Fourteen 
divisions to include air support plunged into Cambodia on 24 
December 1978 and captured Phnom Penh on 7 January 1979. 
Within the invasion force flew a familiar symbol, a red flag 
with the five yellow towers of Angkor Wat.299 
The Khmer Rouge were no match for the highly disciplined 
and materially superior Vietnamese army.   An exhausted 
Cambodia once again fell to foreign incursion as the Khmer 
Rouge melted into the forests from which they came. 
F.   CONCLUSIONS 
Fanatical beliefs in purity of blood and race drove Pol 
Pot and the Khmer Rouge to destruction by the Vietnamese. 
Although their revolutionary communism had elements of foreign 
exposure, Cambodian communism was not essentially Marxist - 
Leninist nor Maoist, but nationalist, based on a common blood 
myth. 
The Khmer Rouge utilized myth, ritual, and- symbols to 
299Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War after the War, 
(New York: Collier Books, 1986), p. 340.  Chanda notes the 
same style of flag was used by the Khmer Issarak in the 
1950s. 
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legitimize their leadership, recruit rural support, organize 
the Party, elicit external support, and defeat adversaries. 
Yet, the insurgents never inspired a mass national movement, 
but relied increasingly on coercion. The Khmer Rouge attempt 
to create a new nation brought only disaster to the CPK and 
the people it ostensibly served. In the end, the insurgency 
filled a political vacuum and then destroyed it. 
The Party's mythology based on superiority of race, 
culture, and history not only dominated the thoughts of the 
Khmer Rouge but led to a reign of terror and genocide that 
decimated not only the people the revolution was supposed to 
save, but based to some degree on ancient hatreds, led 
inexorably to a war and defeat by Vietnam. In fact, the 
revolution could only be fueled by finding a new enemy or 
hatred to propel the revolution forward, be it the Khmer 
people, the minority populations, the party elite, or the 
Vietnamese. 
By manipulating as well as replacing Khmer religion, 
language, and culture with new revolutionary myths, rituals, 
and symbols the Khmer Rouge were able to dominate the ethnic 
Khmer as well as the minority populations who initially 
flocked to the revolutionary cause. Befitting an oral 
culture, symbolic discourse took the form of revolutionary 
language and songs and was further broadened by adapting 
Khmer notions of ancient eras, Buddhism, and traditional 
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culture. Thus empowered, the insurgency remained viable from 
its fragile origins in the 1950s to its final victory in 1975. 
Myths however had a two-edged quality, in one respect they 
hardened the revolutionary faith in ultimate mastery over any 
obstacle and the obtainability of self-reliance. Yet on the 
other hand, these myths and symbols clouded the failures of 
the regime in 1979, to include the lack of full popular 
support, economic catastrophe, reliable external support, and 
the enemies envisioned by its leadership. 
Max Lerner, writing of Hitler's manipulation of symbols 
while leading the Third Reich, observed: "'The power of these 
symbols is enormous. Men possess thoughts, but symbols 
possess men. ' "300 Pol Pot and his cadre may have in fact been 
possessed by the very symbols and myths they helped create. 
Ultimately, Pol Pot embodied the one symbol that has always 
terrified Khmer society, the "King of Death." And under the 
king's mantle as "Original Khmer," Pol Pot not only made 
Cambodia anew through destruction but his own revolution as 
well. 
,00David I. Kertzer, Bii-.ual. Politics, and Power, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 5. 
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VI. THE OUTLAWS: THE KHMER ROUGE FROM 1979 TO 1995 
After falling from power in 1979, the Khmer Rouge are 
attempting to reconstruct the movement with new myths, 
rituals, and symbols in the battle of perceptions. In 1995, 
celebrating the 2 0th anniversary of their revolutionary 
victory, the Khmer Rouge clandestine radio emphasized the 
importance of mind over matter in the 1975 victory: 
April 17, 1975 was a serious day for the United 
States which lost the war in Cambodia for the first 
time then.... Why did the United States lose?.... 
The modern weapons of America ... could not defeat 
Cambodia's wish. Winning or losing is based on 
wish,   not on modern weapons.301 
The broadcast reflects the training of Pol Pot and his 
leadership who emphasize to cadres the struggle is not only a 
battle on the material plane but a battle of ideas as well. 
"Through our leadership," Pol Pot explained, "we must bring up 
our cadres and all our ranks to a clear understanding of this 
war of ideology, determination, and politics so that they will 
301Italics added.  The broadcast continued, "This should 
be a lesson for the Clinton administration, the American 
people and their allies who have joined hands with the 
current government and Yuon [Vietnamese] communists to 
invade Cambodian territory a second time." The Vietnamese 
invasion and later pullout was described as "another symbol 
showing that the war equipment or modern weapons cannot win 
over the Cambodian people's wish." See Chea Sotheacheath, 
"Khmer Rouge Send Warning to US President," The Cambodia 
Daily. 19 April 1995, n.p. 
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not be careless about this matter.""'- The Khmer Rouge promote 
five myths to enhance viability and give the ideological 
battlefield, expressed by Pol Pot, "'concrete expression. ' "i0j 
The five myths are: 1) the myth of new public image; 2) the 
myth of popularity; 3) the myth of enemy incursion; 4) the 
myth of heirdom to the country's resources; and 5) the myth of 
invincibility. Each myth will be placed within the five 
elements of viability this study has utilized. By utilizing 
the verbal discourse of the insurgency as expressed in 
captured documents, interviews with defectors, and clandestine 
radio broadcasts, the viability offered by these myths becomes 
increasingly evident.304 
'^Unpublished document from the KR leadership entitled, 
"What is the Virtue, the Quality, the Reality and the 
Responsibility of Democratic Kampuchea in the Past, Present, 
and Future?", dated 2 December 1986, p. 10.  The document is 
attributed to Pol Pot by context. 
30JQuoted from Roman Laba, The Roots of Solidarity: A 
Political Sociology of Poland's Working-Class 
Democratization. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1991), p. 126. 
JC4Captured Khmer Rouge documents include two 
unpublished sources graciously provided by Laura Summers. 
The first document is a 21 page address probably by Pol Pot 
entitled: "What is the Virtue, the Quality, the Reality and 
the Responsibility of Democratic Kampuchea in the Past, 
Present, and Future?", obtained from a KR defector under 
military leader Ta Mok.  The document is dated 2 December 
1986 and was translated on 29 February 1988 by the Central 
Intelligence Agency.  Future references to it are entitled, 
"Virtue."  The second document is a 48 page address to DK 
women cadre attributed to Pol Pot by context. The document 
is titled: "What is the Current Situation in Kampuchea? What 
Will It Be Like in the Future?".  Translated by Steve 
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A.   LEGITIMACY 
THE MYTH OF NEW PUBLIC IMAGE 
The 1975 to 1979 period of Khmer Rouge authority became 
symbolized by "Angka," an image derived from the Angkorean era 
myths that gave legitimacy and authority to the "organiza- 
tion." By the 1990s, with the dissolution of communism, fresh 
symbols were needed to fit the insurgents1 new realities. 
INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY 
To repair their malevolent image in the international 
community, the CPK publicly retired top cadres, created a new 
party, and adopted new political rituals. In 19*85, Pol Pot 
publicly retired, followed the next year by the retirement of 
the second highest civilian and top military leader, Nuon Chea 
and Ta Mok.305 The organization they led, the Communist Party 
of Kampuchea, became the Party of Democratic Kampuchea 
Header, the document is dated December 1988.  Future 
references to it are entitled "Current."  Defector 
interviews were provided by Steve Header and Lt. Colonel Ed 
Waller who conducted interviews with some 100 self- 
demobilized NADK combatants between July 1992 and August 
1993 as part of the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia.  Clandestine radio broadcasts are published in 
FBIS. 
305Christophe Peschoux, The "New" Khmsr Rouge: 
Reconstruction of the Movement and Reconouest of the 
Villages (1979-1990). unpublished English manuscript of 
French book of same title published by Paris: L'Harmattan, 
1992, pp. 32,33. 
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(PDK) 
But according to a deserting cadre the hierarchy of the 
Khmer Rouge has changed in form but not content: 
the party has been dissolved but the hierarchical 
structure remains, I mean the real hierarchy, the 
secret one. But this could not be revealed outside 
because of what happened in the past. Thus they 
created a new hierarchy for official use. But if 
they regain power, the real hierarchy will reappear 
because it is where the real power is. It will 
reappear slowly or all at once. In the official 
hierarchy Khieu Samphan is number one and Son Sen 
number two as NADK commander-in-chief, followed by 
Mok, Ieng sary, [sic] etc. As for the real hierar- 
chy, it is led, in order, by Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, 
Ieng Sary, Ta Mok, Ta Pauk, Ta Bit.307 
As for the rituals of this hierarchy, the PDK assert they 
have forsaken their communist ideology and adopted a new 
political understanding. Pluralist democracy is embraced and 
was carefully explained to cadres in 1986: 
Being in possession of people in the villages and 
then having more and more committees to lead the 
villages, the people will be selecting their repre- 
sentatives to go into parliament, what's known as 
the legislative organ, which means the organ that 
makes the laws of the state. If we have a number 
of popular representatives in parliament we will 
inevitably have some representatives in the govern- 
ment or in certain major ministries. Having popu- 
lar representatives belonging to us in the state 
organs of the villages and subdistricts, where our 
prospects are reasonably large, will result in our 
J06The PDK had been created in December 1981 in an 
attempt to distance itself from the Pol Pot led CPK regime. 
307 Peschoux, p. 35 
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having persons and a voice in parliament....308 
DOMESTIC LEGITIMACY 
The embrace of the parliamentary style required the PDK to 
garner domestic legitimacy, as people were seen to be the 
"guarantee of victories both now and in the future."'09 The 
PDK reasoned, "[o]nly by being in possession of popular 
strength will we have our forces inside state jobs in the 
villages and subdistricts, in parliament and in the government 
and the ministries."310 The document points out that Cambodia 
has 8,000 villages, and that the PDK controls 2,0.00 already.311 
One 1993 estimate confirmed the number of villages held, but 
put the PDK in direct control of only 5 percent of the 
population, "less than 200,000 civilians nearly all of whom 
are engaged in subsistence farming."312 It was not, however, 
inconceivable for the remainder of the villages to be won: "We 
allocate them out and distribute ourselves so that we are all 
30SCurrent, p. 17. The need for parliamentary 
preparation may have ended with the boycott of the 1993 
national elections. 
309Ibid., p. 14. 
310Ibid., p. 17. 
311Ibid., p. 18. 
312Zachary Abuza, "The Khmer Rouge Quest for Economic 
Independence," Asian Survey. October 1993, vol xxxiii, no 
10,  p. 1019. 
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over the villages, and then go all out refashioning them.""j 
"Refashioning" meant recruiting cadres who understood the 
rituals of the local population but who could teach the new 
rituals of the Party. PDK women cadres addressed in a 1986 
document were told to seek those who could integrate them- 
selves and take on the roles of the indigenous villagers. 
The fact is that those of our women who originate 
from peasant sources and who are now resising [sic] 
side-by-side with our people are already identical 
and virtually identifical [sic] to the people by 
habit and custom, in their speech and all their 
ways of relating.314 
The PDK's obstacle was to train those selected in the rituals 
of the Party before their infiltration. 
The only problem remaining is in the area of train- 
ing and nurturing these friends of ours so that 
they understand the methods and the procedure by 
which popular strength-building work is carried out 
... understand the organizational line ... under- 
standing training and testing . . . understand how to 
select of [sic] nuclei to perform the function of 
acting as new cadre among the people ,...315 
B.   POPULAR SUPPORT 
THE MYTH OF POPULARITY 
Building and maintaining popular support is now better 
3UCurrent, p. 18, 
314Ibid., p. 22. 
n5Ibid., p. 22. 
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understood as a key to the viability of the movement. The 
revolutionary regime had misperceived the cowed acquiescence 
of the population during the 1975-1979 period as popular 
support. But as political scientist Jan Kubik makes clear, 
"the lack of visible forms of protest and the apparent 
passivity of the populace can by no means be interpreted as an 
expression of support for, even less as granting legitimacy 
to, the ruling elite or regime."316 The Khmer Rouge are intent 
on spreading a myth of popularity. 
POPULAR SUPPORT THROUGH LAND 
To retain popular support, the PDK have attempted to use 
the symbols of capitalism and materialism. One important 
symbol is private ownership of land. Eschewing the socialist 
communes of the revolutionary regime, the PDK now advise 
cadres to distribute liberated land to the people. Cadres are 
asked the rhetorical question: "So, if we distribute land to 
the people to work in such a manner will they be happy?" The 
question is answered in kind: "They will be joyously pleased 
because Democratic Kampuchea is providing for their inter- 
ests."317 Land would be given to the people "without andy 
[sic] strings attached" while additional land could be rented 
316Jan Kubik, The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols 
of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State 
Socialism in Poland. (University Park: The Pennsylvania 




 Current, p. 30. 
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from the government "from which they would allocate half of 
the produce to the State. "Jl" Cadres are reminded the land is 
not to be sold by peasants interested in cash for a "spending 
spree." 
Do whatever you can to make the people understand 
that this land was obtained through not a little 
bit of life and death struggle by our people, who 
joined with our National Army in the fight to seize 
it back from the contemptible Yuon [Vietnamese] 
aggressor enemy. This land is therefore never to 
be sold. This land must be preserved and protected 
eternally to promote their lives.319 
Encouraging the perception of abundance to the impoverished 
remains the foundation of the plan. Only then could desertion 
from PDK areas stop. "The distribution and disbursement of 
land to landless people," cadres are informed, "will certainly 
make them cheer and please them, and they will stay with us 
and constitute our strategic strength."3"0 
POPULAR  SUPPORT THROUGH CAPITALISM 
Having abolished money during their former reign, the PDK 
found another symbol to make PDK villages cheer: reestablished 
personal capital.  Villagers are encouraged to establish 
personal savings accounts in PDK banks.  "In the days to come 
318 Ibid., p. 32 
J19- Ibid.', pp. 36, 37.  Yuon is the pejorative Khmer word 
for Vietnamese. 
,:oIbid., p. 36. 
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we will be setting up savings banks in various locations," 
cadres were informed."1" Personal savings allow individuals to 
not only make a living but cadres were informed banks provide 
both a "secure" place for an investment and "earn annual 
interest.":'~~ 
POPULAR SUPPORT THROUGH MATERIALISM 
Individual desires will also be fulfilled through the 
material symbols of the West. Cadres were informed not to be 
duped by "superficials" such as whether or not a village had 
"motorcycles, automobiles, radios, televisions, tape recorders 
or other alluring externals."323 Instead, cadres were to focus 
on "whether the people have work to do, are employed, whether 
they have land, water and plants in cultivation . . . . "324 
However, the leadership did point out the benefits of materi- 
alism will come: "As for automobiles, motorcycles, radios, 
televisions and all those other things, they will certainly be 
obtained gradually precisely as the result of such an expan- 
sion and development of the family economy."325 
POPULAR SUPPORT THROUGH WOMEN 
321 Ibid.,   p.   42 
322Ibid. 
-
:3Ibid.,   p.   44. 
324
 Ibid. 
-12 5 Ibid. 
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The development of the "family economy," the leadership 
explained, goes to an important symbol in Khmer society: 
women. 
In the course of every kind of economically produc- 
tive activity, as in various other ways of earning 
a living, women play an extremely crucial role, as 
important or more important than that of men, 
particularly in planting things and raising animals 
around the home, which are among the most lucrative 
sources of family income as well as a daily one. 
It is therefore imperative to figure out how to 
conduct a systematic reshaping of our female cadre 
economically and in livelihood terms.326 
This address to the "Association of Patriotic Kampuchean 
Women" makes them the basis of the future PDK. Recognizing 
that men are the minority in a country decimated by decades of 
continuous fighting, the women cadres were told, "nation-wide 
female strength constitutes 60 percent of the whole popula- 
tion, while at the same time our Women's Association already 
has more than 20,000 members." 
Women were to build cadres' [by implication, men's] faith 
in the people, sorely lacking in the revolutionary regime when 
"new" people were perceived to be impure for not having joined 
before April 17, 1975. 
326Ibid., p. 48. Women cadres were told to select five 
to ten "friends" from among the Association in each "battle 
theatre" to become responsible for economic matters, p. 48. 
327Ibid., p. 22. 
130 
It is thus nothing extraordinary that they still 
don't have the same faith in the people as they 
would in their own flesh and blood. Their faith in 
the people is significant still only as sentiment, 
as something in their souls; it's still not a 
practical reality in terms of their actual work."28 
Women instead must encourage cadres "not to abandon or be 
distant from the people and do nothing whatsoever that 
adversely affects the people."329 After the disastrous forty- 
four month reign, the PDK now better understood, "[t]he people 
are precisely the back-up base of our rank and file and our 
nation. "330 
C.   ORGANIZATION 
THE MYTH OF ENEMY INCURSION 
Relying now on the people demonstrates that the PDK 
learned an important lesson in the failure of their revolu- 
tion. However, the revolution's demise was still blamed on 
others by encouraging the myth of enemy incursion. Cadres 
were informed enemies would never be able to stop the forces 
of Democratic Kampuchea a second time. Members were informed: 
"We do not allow the contemptible Vietnamese enemies, aggres- 
sors, expansionists, and mega-murderers or any group of 
328Ibid. 
329Ibid., p. 47. 
330Ibid. 
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swindlers to cheat us again."'" The PDK uphold the myth 
through discourse that proclaims the nation is defended only 
by their continued organizational vigilance against enemies, 
specifically, Vietnamese.  The PDK explain, 
[i]t simply doesn't occur to them [the nation of 
Cambodia] that the Yuon are on Kampuchea's doorstep 
and are always standing by, waiting for an opportu- 
nity, the opening when Kampuchea is left without 
the strength with which to defend itself, and then 
to come back as they please to control Kampuchea, 
without the least bit of regard for international 
n     3 32 law. 
ORGANIZED AS  THE   "HARDCORE" 
Promoting fears of Vietnamese dominance adds a nationalist and 
racist theme readily accepted by many Khmer. The PDK emphasize 
to cadres that if the Party were not there to defend the 
nation the "race will inevitably disappear, and there would be 
a second Kampuchea Kraom. "333 
Fears of enemy incursion serve to unify the organization 
of the PDK. Members see themselves as the "hardcore of the 
nation and the people."334 Without a strong union of loyal 
cadre, PDK areas would take on the appearance of Laos, a 
331. 
332 
Virtue, pp. 12,13 
Current, p. 7. 
'
33Ibid. , p. 23.  Kampuchea Kraom is the southeastern 
territory presently held by Vietnam that was once Cambodian 
land. 
334 Ibid., p. 28. 
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country swallowed by the Vietnamese to form part of the 
"Indochinese Federation." 
The problem of Laos now is like that of a frog 
being swallowed by a snake. The legs and body have 
already been swallowed, leaving only nose, mouth 
and eyes of the head merely to be put on display 
for others to see.335 
Although defending against the domination of Vietnam, the PDK 
remain suspicious of any organized forces, even those opposed 
to the Vietnamese presence. 
ORGANIZED TO DEFEAT ALLIES 
After the 1979 invasion of Cambodia, the Vietnamese 
installed a government led by former Khmer Rouge defectors 
known as the Revolutionary People's Party of Kampuchea (RPPK). 
Opposed to this foreign imposed government were the Coalition 
Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) headed by Norodom 
Sihanouk.336 The PDK joined the CGDK in 1982 and fought as 
nominal allies during the 10-year war against Vietnamese 
occupation from 1979 to 1989.337 
335Ibid., p. 23 
336The CGDK was made up of the Khmer People's National 
Liberation Front (KPNLF) and the National United Front for 
an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia 
(FUNCINPEC).  Khieu Samphan became the Vice President in 
charge of Foreign Affairs. 
337An important aspect of this alliance is the PDK 
received aid from China and the West to oppose the 
Vietnamese installed government, probably saving it from 
extinction after their catastrophic defeat in 1979. 
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During this fight against the Vietnamese, PDK cadres were 
encouraged never to forget, their allies would seek to destroy 
them once the Vietnamese government was defeated. 
Regardless of which of the three others we are 
talking about, they will be wanting to exterminate 
us. They are trying to exterminate us now, and in 
the days to come they will still be trying to 
exterminate us. ~<3° 
ORGANIZED  TO DEFEAT  "ENVY" 
In the PDK's perception, they were persecuted because of 
the envy of others. Never in Cambodia's history had an 
organization been as selfless in its fight against colonialism 
and external threats. 
We can say that during the history of Cambodia for 
over 2,000 yeras, [sic] the virtue, quality, true 
character and value of Democratic Kampuchea are the 
best.... But this is also what the enemies, far or 
near, and the exploiting group, inside and outside 
the country, hate most. That is why they have to 
oppose us at all costs, they try over and over to 
defame us, to turn us away, to step on us, to crush 
us until we, our name, our forces, and this history 
no longer exist in Cambodia. They do not want this 
famous history to be able to spread to the world.339 
Envy has thus become a vehicle for organizing the jealous 
defenders of the nation. 
338Current, p. 18 
339Virtue, p. 20. 
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D.   EXTERNAL SUPPORT 
THE MYTH OF HEIRDOM TO  THE COUNTRY •S RESOURCES 
As defenders of the nation, another important myth to 
foster is the PDK's reverence for the nation's resources; the 
image of protectors of Cambodia's sacred soil. The temples of 
Angkor Wat were dutifully maintained during the revolutionary 
period. The revolutionary regime had also emphasized the ties 
between the Party and the land through oral discourse as well. 
One Revolutionary song entitled, "The Beauty of Kampuchea," 
sung during their ruling years emphasized that link in its 
first stanza: 
0 beautiful, beloved Kampuchea, our destiny has 
joined us together, uniting our forces so as not to 
disagree.340 
In 1993 the ancient temple of Preah Vihear was seized in a 
highly symbolic act to prevent its corruption by the Thai and 
Cambodian government.341 In 1995, the Khmer Rouge along the 
Lao-Khmer border disrupted illegal timber operations by 
burning a saw mill owned by a Cambodian who worked with Laos 
businessmen to cut down Cambodian forests.342   However, 
340Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua, Peasants and Politics 
in Kampuchea. 1942-1981. p. 327. 
J41The temple sits on the Thai-Cambodian border. 
342See Hoke Mosely, "Timber Ban Heats Up Border Issue 
with Laos, Phnom Penh Post. April 21 - May 4, 1995, n.p. 
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economic realities belie this myth. The 20 percent of 
Cambodia under insurgent control supplements the lack of 
external support.343 
The Party's priorities for resource management were laid 
out clearly for cadres in four points: 
1. The land, forests, fish and whatever else is 
possessed in our liberated and semi-liberated zones 
must be apportioned for distribution to the people 
in accordance with the concrete situation of each 
location. This apportionment must also be premised 
on democratic centralism among those responsible 
for each battle theater. 
2. Once land is in possession, it is necessary to 
think about housing and water. 
3. Once there is land and water, it is imperative 
immediately to put attention to engaging in produc- 
tion. 
4. Production must be divided by categories, and 
aim at producing whatever quickly provides an 
immediate yield.3 4 
The PDK exploit resources to ensure the survival of the 
organization, both the population under its control as well as 
the need to generate capital for the shadow state. What the 
Party termed "geo-economics" emphasized that cadres recognize 
the riches in each locality and "visualise utilising [sic] the 
riches" to help the people make a living and the state fight 
34JAnon, "A Smile on the Face of the Tiger, " The 
Economist. August 28, 1993, p. 13. 
344Current, p. 39.  Italics added. 
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its enemies.'" 
Control of this territory lends viability. Despite the 
West's perception, Cambodia is not a resource rich land. 
Four-fifths of society toils at rice farming in soil that is 
mostly sandy and plagued by irregular rains.34b Controlling 
arable land is critical because Cambodia produces less than it 
needs to feed its population properly.34 
ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION FOR  SUPPORT 
The Khmer Rouge not only cultivate their controlled areas 
for food, they practice a ritual of environmental degradation. 
Spoiling the environment is financially lucrative and is an 
essential aspect of maintaining external support. The PDK 
relies on cash purchases created from strip mining the gems 
around the Cardamom mountains and logging concessions in the 
northwest provinces of Cambodia to provide subsistence to the 
population and external finances for the state. Funds are put 
345Ibid., p. 30. 
346Anon, "Not a Grain of Truth, " The Economist. January 
11, 1992, p. 4. 
347The Khmer Rouge not only control potential farm lands 
but are responsible for much of the present lack of food. 
The Khmer Rouge managed a devastating famine while 
implementing the reforms of collectivization during their 
reign.  By introducing "communist" rice, a symbolic seed 
variety which could not survive in flooded dikes, thousands 
starved. Killing the agronomists during this period, who 
could have taught proper farming techniques, did nothing to 
alleviate the problem.  Anon, "Not a Grain of Truth, " TJie. 
Economist. January 11, 1992, p. 4. 
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into overseas bank accounts after being funneled through 
Thailand.'4* A Thai National Intelligence Agency report quoted 
in Far Eastern Economic Review estimated that the Khmer Rouge 
business deals with Thailand have earned Baht 2.7 billion so 
far ($106 million) and earn Baht 300 million ($250,000) 
monthly in combined forest and gem sales.  When cash is not 
needed, loggers pay "in kind," to include "'motor vehicles, 
radios and communications equipment,  mobile telephones, 
generators, [and] quinine. . . . ' "349 Significantly, these gem 
and forest lands are border areas with Thailand, (the Thai- 
Cambodian border is 725 kilometers long) so that the raw 
resources can be sold and transported directly out of Cambodia 
without government interference. 
Khmer Rouge mining and forest concessions to Thailand 
probably began as early as 1979, after the insurgents occupied 
border areas to escape the advancing Vietnamese. All conces- 
sions should have ended after the Khmer Rouge signed the Paris 
Peace Accords in 1991. Ieng Sary, Pol Pot's Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, explained the contradiction: "'After the 
agreement was signed, our Chinese friends stopped all assis- 
tance. ...  So we had to sell some trees to the Thais to 
348Philip Shenon, "Now It's the Jungle That the Khmer 
Rouge Decimates," The New York Times. February 7, 1993, p. 
4. 
349Ken Stier, "Log Rolling, " Far East Economic Review. 
Vol 156, Iss 3, January 21, 1993, p. 15. 
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meet the immediate needs of the people.'"JDC 
This Khmer Rouge cadre has loosely defined "some trees." 
"Satellite imagery shows that nearly 5 million acres of 
forest, including more than one-fifth of the nation's tropical 
hardwood growth, have been destroyed . . . ."3S1 The PDK 
exploit the fact that Thailand was forced to look to Cambodia 
for forest products because the Thais have chopped down most 
of their trees as well.^ 
3aCStier, "Log Rolling," pp. 15,16. 
,5lShenon, "Now Its the Jungle that the Khmer Rouge 
Decimates," p. 4.  Logging has become so destructive to the 
country that on 29 April 1995 the government of Cambodia 
banned the export of all sawed timber. See Anon, "Cambodia 
Bans Exports of Sawed Timber," The New York Times. April 30, 
1995, p. 8. 
"■"This is best exemplified in a common Thai joke: "If a 
Thai finds himself driving through a forest, he should turn 
back: he has probably entered another country." Anon, "Wet 
and Dry," The Economist. April 10, 1993, p. 36.  Cambodian 
forests, destroyed through the efforts of the Khmer Rouge 
(as well as the government), are headed in the same 
direction.  One logger from Thailand showed Thai government 
officials where he and two other firms "cut a 70-kilometre 
road through rugged jungle terrain to reach their 200-300 
square kilometre logging tracts."  His company took out 
1,158 logs in under two months before rains interrupted 
operations. Stier, "Log Rolling," p. 16.  A UN Development 
Program (UNDP) report explains Cambodia has one of the 
world's highest deforestation rates and concludes: "Forest 
destruction threatens the productivity of agriculture and 
fisheries--in short, the very sustainability of economic 
development in Cambodia. ..." The UNDP report is quoted in 
Stier, "Log Rolling," pp. 15,16.  The report does not 
differentiate between the Cambodian government and KR 
concessions.   An important corollary problem to lack of 
forest stands, is that top soil is eroded and the land will 
not hold water.  Thailand has so denuded its countryside of 
trees that serious water shortages have plagued the 
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SELLING ANGKOR FOR SUPPORT 
The Khmer Rouge also exploit their relationship with 
Thailand through the black-market trade of Khmer antiquities, 
another form of external support. As The New Yorker put it: 
"One of the ironies of the Khmer Rouge's position is that even 
as they hype their claim to be the rightful heirs to the 
monuments of Angkor, there is evidence that they are actively 
selling their cultural legacy down the river."353 Thirty-four 
pieces of sculpture were looted in 1992.354 Since October 
1993, twenty-two priceless antiquities have been stolen from 
the Angkor Conservatory in Siem Reap provincial town.355 
population.  When combined with poor water management such 
as inefficient irrigation and cheap rates, the Thais are 
seriously considering diverting water from the Mekong river 
into two Thai tributaries. See Anon, "Wet and Dry," p. 37. 
Scarce water resources are another potential conflict 
looming over Cambodia since it shares the Mekong river with 
its western neighbor.  Environmental degradation by the 
Khmer Rouge and conflicts with the Thai over shared 
renewable resources can become what a 1984 Earthscan paper 
predicted: "'an important cause of violent conflict.1" See 
Environment and Conflict, a 1984 Earthscan paper, quoted in 
Joseph J. Romm, Defining National Security: The Nonmilitarv 
Aspects. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 
1993), p. 27. 
353Robert Bingham, "Political Ruins," The New Yorker, 
Vol 69, Iss 34, October 18, 1993, p. 58. 
354Anon, "Catalogue Crooks," ThP Economist. March 6, 
1993, p. 41. 
355Bingham, p. 58.  Siem Reap is the provincial capital 
city and home of Angkor Wat.  The thefts are suspected to be 
carried out by or with the collusion of the Khmer Rouge due 
to their military precision and unique coincidences.  On one 
occasion the thieves came into Siem Reap town riding 
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GOVERNMENT COLLUSION FOR  SUPPORT 
Collusion takes place not just between the Thais and the 
Khmer Rouge. Cambodian government soldiers and the Khmer 
Rouge cooperate when the heist is oversized as one Cambodian 
art expert explained. "'When they are carrying heavy objects, 
they need a car, and it must be a vehicle that can pass 
through checkpoints on the way to the border. For this, they 
pay members of the national Army.1"356 Bribing government 
soldiers is inconsequential, especially when pieces stolen in 
February 1993 claimed a market value of $30,000 to $50,000.357 
THAILAND FOR  SUPPORT 
Rituals with Thailand remain an important source of 
external support. "Democratic Kampuchea," the leadership 
explained, "needs friends and all kinds of relationship with 
motorcycles and carrying automatic weapons and rocket - 
propelled grenades.  Approximately fifty men attacked the 
conservatory, fired a rocket through the front gate and used 
covering fire to keep away bystanders.  Three people were 
killed and twelve wounded as the culprits carried away art 
that had not been previously documented or photographed. 
See Anon, "Catalogue Crooks," p. 41.  (Interpol requires 
strict documentation to track down stolen artifacts).  Slow 
cataloguing is typical in Cambodia and made more difficult 
by few qualified art historians: most of the archaeologists 
were killed during the reign of the Khmer Rouge.  A similar 
coordinated event saw thieves in military garb hold guards 
at gunpoint and then make each guard carry one Buddha head 
into the countryside before releasing their newly acquired 
coolies. See, Bingham, p. 58. 
356Bingham, p. 60. 
357Anon, "Catalogue Crooks," p. 41. 
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the world, but it still can protect its independent character- 
istic."^ Cadres are reminded "it is imperative to pay- 
attention to building up an ever increasing number of big and 
small contact routes," so that the population can "have the 
means by which to sell and barter."339 These routes to 
external support have two important functions: keeping popular 
support and arming the state. 
The PDK leaders express fears that if they have no 
external links to Thailand, the people in their liberated 
areas will go elsewhere to promote their livelihoods. The 
Party explained if there are no outlets, 
the people who are long-time residents in such a 
location won't want to stay there any more, and no 
matter what appeals we make to them to go and take 
up resident [sic] there, newcomers won't go, ei- 
ther.360 
Outside links would eliminate fears in places like the 
Cardamom Mountains and the Northeast territories of becoming, 
in the words of the leadership, "places of hushed asylum."361 
The leadership emphasized "routes of communication with the 
outside world," would be thought of in "simple terms for now." 
358Virtue, p. 4. 
359Current, p. 42. 
Jb'J Ibid., p. 42 
,61Ibid., p. 43 
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The priority, however, went to areas "nearby and contiguous" 
with PDK territory and "whose policy it is to maintain good 
relations with us: ie, Thailand. "Jo~ 
Historically, Thailand served as a source of covert 
support for the Khmer Rouge after the Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia; and Thai antipathy for Vietnamese remains deep. It 
used the insurgents as an effective buffer to protect Thai 
border areas and has continued to do so in light of the Khmer 
Rouge being "the best sort of business partner--reliable and 
publicity-shy. "3o3 
Arms and supplies were funneled to the insurgency through 
a clandestine Thai border group known as Unit 878.364 The task 
force dealt with the factions fighting the Vietnamese as well 
as collecting intelligence on the Khmer Rouge. Over the course 
of 15 years, Unit 878 developed numerous business contacts 
with the insurgents. According to the Thai government, Unit 
878 has been disbanded and ties to the Khmer Rouge cut. 
Thailand's army commander, General Wimol Wongwanich, ex- 
plained: "'We do not support the Khmer Rouge.  It is not the 
362 Ibid., p. 42 
363Philip Shenon, "Pol Pot, the Mass Murderer Who Is 
Still Alive and Well," The New York Times. February 6, 1994, 
p. 4. 
364Rodney Tasker, "Comrades Adrift," Far East Economic 
Review. Vol 156, Iss 41, October 14, 1993, p. 20. 
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policy of the Government and the army. ' ";c~ Cambodian Foreign 
Minister Prince Sirivudh disagrees. "'Thailand continues to 
support the Khmer Rouge,'" he asserts. "'The Thais have not 
changed their attitudes at all. Thailand's activities are not 
just an insult to Cambodia, they are a scandal.'"Jcc 
?c5Philip Shenon, "In Big Threat to Cambodia, Thais 
Still Aid Khmer Rouge," The New York Times, December 19, 
1993, p. 16. 
?coShenon, "In Big Threat," p. 16. On January 13, 1994, 
an attempt to sooth the relationship between Thailand and 
Cambodia was attempted by their respective heads of state 
during a ceremony to open a new Cambodian highway built by 
Thai army engineers.  Thai Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai made 
his first official visit to Cambodia, where he was met by 
First and Second Prime Ministers of Cambodia, Prince Norodom 
Ranariddh and Hun Sen respectively.  Although Thai military 
involvement with the Khmer Rouge was not addressed directly, 
the meeting did produce a joint communique that reaffirmed 
Thailand's "'firm and continuing support for the peace 
process,'" and noted both parties interest in "'criminal and 
illegal activities by armed individuals and groups on and 
along the Thai-Cambodian border.1" See Gordon Fairclough, 
"Uneasy Friendship: Thai Premier Mends Fences with 
Cambodia," Far Eastern Economic Review. Vol 157, Iss 4, 
January 27, 1994, p. 19.  The Thai prime minister also took 
the occasion to admonish fifty business representatives 
traveling with him not to exploit Cambodia.  Collusion 
continues according to the Far Eastern Economic Review. The 
journal reported Thai police stopped a 10 wheeled truck 
carrying 5 tons of arms on its way to the Cambodian border. 
The police followed up the 7 December 1993 seizure with a 
raid on a nearby farm in eastern Chantaburi province. 
Officers found not only 1,500 tons of Chinese manufactured 
arms, but 13 howitzers, many mortars and "small arms and 
enough ammunition to supply a small army." The Thai army 
immediately thanked the police for its efficiency but 
explained the truck was stolen from an arms cache that had 
been in place for eight years.  The Chinese had supplied the 
arsenal for Khmer Rouge use before the Paris Peace Accords 
froze them in place.  Calls for an explanation why 
Cambodians (possibly Khmer Rouge) were in the truck and at 
the farm house were brushed aside by the Thai military.  The 
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E.   DEFEATING ADVERSARIAL RESPONSE 
THE MYTH OF INVINCIBILITY 
External support helps the PDK encourage the myth of 
invincibility. The population is offered little evidence to 
the contrary. The failed Pailin offensive in 1994 brought 
home to Cambodians just how poorly the government's effective- 
ness is against the PDK.'°7 As of 1995, the first prime 
minister fears the Khmer Rouge will capture Phnom Penh in 
their current spring offensive. Military prowess is just one 
of many invincibility rituals to defeat all adversarial 
responses. 
DEFEATING NATIONAL ELECTIONS 
National elections are an important popular ritual for 
lending legitimacy to the victor. On October 23, 1991, 
nineteen nations forged the Cambodian peace accords in Paris 
as a means of sponsoring United Nations supervised elections. 
The Vietnamese-installed government of Cambodia, the Khmer 
Rouge, and two noncommunist factions signed the accords. 
During the transitional period, the Supreme National Council 
explanation offered: they were civilian guards and staff. 
See Rodney Tasker, "Caught in the Act," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, vol 156, Iss 51, December 23, 1993, pp. 12, 13. 
367Pailin is the insurgent capital.  Government forces 
took the capital and then lost it in April 1994. 
368Reported by VOA correspondent David Butler from 
Bangkok on 10 May 1995. 
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with Prince Norodom Sihanouk at its head, acted as the 
"legitimate body and source of authority" for Cambodia until 
the May 1993 national elections.""-' Importantly, the peace 
accords provided protection to the Khmer Rouge with "freedom 
to move within Cambodia, and freedom to promote their cause on 
radio and television."3" 
The Khmer Rouge initially accepted the elections and 
vowed to observe the peace accords.3'1 By May 199 3, the 
political atmosphere had changed. The Khmer Rouge feared 
political repudiation at the polls and decided the UN super- 
vised elections were no longer compatible with their goals. 
The Khmer Rouge began a concerted effort to take land in both 
north and central Cambodia as they saw themselves "being edged 
out of power politically."372 "The Khmer Rouge," Jeane 
Kirkpatrick observed, "has used a painstakingly negotiated 
international agreement for disarmament, resettlement and 
elections as an opportunity for its troops to re-enter areas 
3o9Anon, "Security Council Approves 'Largest, Most 
Complex' Peace-Keeping Operation in UN History, vol 29, IM 
Chronicle. June 1992, p. 11. 
370Stan Sesser, "Report from Cambodia," The New Yorker, 
vol 68, 18 May 1992, p. 47. 
371,,Khieu Samphan Vows to Observe Peace Accord," FBIS- 
EAS-91, 24 Oct 1991, p. 30. 
372R. Moreau, "The Perilous Road Home," Newsweek, vol 
119, 13 April 1992, p. 36. 
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of Cambodia from which they had been driven by force."' 3 Not 
only did the insurgency break the peace accords and refuse to 
disarm, the outcome of UN elections were rejected. "The Party 
of Democratic Kampuchea, like the entire Cambodian nation and 
people," a clandestine radio explained through its spokesman 
Khieu Samphan, "rejects this theatrical farce to destroy the 
Cambodian nation and also categorically rejects the predeter- 
mined result of this election."374 
DEFEATING THE «TWO-HEADED- GOVERNMENT 
The elections established a coalition government of the 
King's party and the former regime. For the Khmer Rouge this 
was a "two-headed" government, a symbol of the immoral mix of 
Khmer blood with the hated Vietnamese imposed government. 
Clandestine radio broadcasts continually remind the population 
of this national tragedy through the "two-headed" symbol. A 
February 1995 broadcast contains these representative themes 
of the "two-headed elements, communist Vietnam, and the 
33Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Means to Counter Aggression 
Exist," The Daily Oklahomanr 3 August 1992, p. 6. 
374
"Khieu Samphan Issues Statement on Election," FBIS- 
EAS-93-092, 14 May 93, p. 42. The Khmer Rouge stepped up 
military operations with limited attacks and attempted to 
discourage voting in the national elections.  However the 
Supreme National Council, the acting authority in Cambodia, 
responded with calls for negotiation.  Prince Sihanouk 
called the communist guerrillas to an emergency meeting in 
Beijing in May 1993 before the elections occurred, but their 
boycott could not be reconciled.  See "Khmer Rouge Agree to 
Emergency Talks in PRC," FBIS-EAS-93-083, 3 May 1993, p. 39. 
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warmongering alliance" being fought by the Khmer Rouge to 
"prevent the communist Vietnamese enemy from wolfing down and 
exterminating the Cambodian nation and race. . . .',3'5 
DEFEATING  THE CAMBODIAN ARMY 
Following the elections, military operations into Khmer 
Rouge areas attempted to break the strangle hold the insur- 
gents have over Cambodian territory, the majority of which is 
along the Thai border.376  The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces 
(RCAF) put together a spectacular assault in March 1994 that 
surprised the PDK and captured an important symbol of insur- 
gency: the PDK capital city Pailin.  Outflanking the guerril- 
las, the RCAF bypassed the most heavily mined areas of Pailin 
(with the help of captured Khmer Rouge guides tied to govern- 
ment tanks) and seized the insurgent stronghold.377 However, 
the victory did not endure.  Operating from sanctuaries in 
Thailand, the Khmer Rouge retook their capital within a month. 
Most ominous, however, was not the tactical loss but the 
underlying  military  problems  the  withdrawal  revealed. 
Soldiers retreating to the rear complained of lack of food, 
375
"Khmer Rouge 'Cabinet' on Government 'Defeats'," 
FBIS-EAS-95-030, 13 February 1995, on line.  The majority of 
Khmer Rouge broadcasts always contain the "two-headed" 
symbol. 
n6Anon, "A Smile on the Face of the Tiger," p. 13. 
377Anon, "Teenaged Deserter Vows to Fight Again," Ehnojfl 
ppnh Post. Vol 3, No 6, March 25-April 7, 1994, p. 3. 
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water, salary, and that the wounded were simply left behind. 
Pailin had also been subject to massive looting during the 
campaign, "with the worst offenders being high ranking 
officers."' 
With the recapture of this PDK symbol, the insurgents 
pushed on to threaten a government symbol, the second largest 
city in Cambodia, Battambang.3'9 Coming within miles of this 
provincial capital, the Khmer Rouge forces occupied areas 
never before under their control. In what must have been 
perceived as an invincible effort, Sihanouk stepped in and 
called for negotiations. His fear at the time was expressed 
in a Western interview. "'It is a necessity,'" said the king. 
"'The reality is not good for us or our future. Cambodia 
could be a destroyed nation.  A dead state. ' "380 
DEFEATING  THE STATE THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS 
Public negotiations are an important ritual the Khmer 
Rouge use to further the myth of invincibility. Negotiations 
are rituals rooted in Cambodian history. Centuries ago, Khmer 
princes practiced palace intrigue against the ruling court by 
negotiating separate agreements with neighboring powers. 
378Anugraha Palan, "MPs Urge Inquiry Into Pailin," PJanojn 
Penh Post. Vol 3, No 9, May 6-19, 1994, p. 3. 
379This 1994 operation is now being repeated in 1995. 
See VOA broadcast for 10 May 1995 by David Butler. 
380Nate Thayer, "One Way Out," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, vol 157, no 22, 2 June 1994 , p. 14. 
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Divided leadership encouraged those same neighboring powers to 
gobble up land and enslave the Khmer population. From the 
fall of the Angkor Empire in the 15th century to the conquest 
by the Vietnamese in 1979, rituals of intrigue in negotiations 
continue to plague Cambodia. 
For the government in 1994, no other option may have 
appeared open to deal with the insurgency after the failure at 
Pailin.381 The Cambodian government had previously demanded 
three goals be met before negotiating with the insurgents: "an 
immediate cease-fire; the dismantling of their armed forces; 
and the relinquishing of their territory to the national 
government."382 Yet, the Khmer Rouge have shaped perceptions of 
the insurgency to make negotiations a part of government 
policy. Importantly, the insurgents understand that divisive- 
ness plagues the government in any arbitration and will be 
exploited. To understand the government's problem with 
negotiations, one must first look at the organization of both 
the national leadership contrasted with that of the Khmer 
Rouge, bearing in mind an important point: "there is no 
-
181The Phnom Penh Post indicates that secret 
negotiations were attempted before Sihanouk's announcement 
but had no success.  See Ker Munthit, "PM Claims Upper Hand 
on KR," Phnom Penh Post. April 8-21, 1994, p. 3.  The 
government may have in fact been surprised by the king's 
attempt to call for public negotiations. 
382Nate Thayer, "Test of Strength, " Far Eastern Economic 
Review. Vol 157, Iss 4, January 27, 1994, p. 19. 
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history of power-sharing in the Cambodian political culture," 
explains journalist Nate Thayer, "which may explain why the 
members of the coalition government spend more effort on 
consolidating their own power than on building a unified 
political foundation for the state. "3d3 
Norodom Sihanouk, proclaimed king in September 1993, was 
named titular head of state but with no constitutional 
authority. King Sihanouk is basically a symbolic head of 
government or as he put it: "' number one guarantor of the 
popular will.'"384 Nonetheless, Sihanouk has virtually ruled 
Cambodia since 1941 when the French installed him on the 
throne at age 18. Now in his 70s, the king has at one time or 
another negotiated with all factions in his desire to lead a 
free Cambodia, including supporting the Khmer Rouge liberation 
of the country after he was deposed in a 1970 coup. "He was 
never bound by ideology," journalist Stan Sesser remarked, 
"but rather, motivated by a desire somehow to insure Cambo- 
i 385 dia's survival . . . ." 
Cambodia is presently constitutionally "ruled" by two 
coequal prime ministers.   First Prime Minister is Prince 
383Nate Thayer and Nayan Chanda, "Things Fall Apart . . 
.» Far Eastern Economic Review, vol 157, no 20, 19 May 1994, 
p. 17. 
384William Branigan, "It's King Sihanouk Now--And 
Again," TJas Washington Post. September 25, 1993, p. A15. 
385Sesser, p. 52. 
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Norodom Ranariddh, head of the National United Front for an 
Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia 
(FUNCINPEC) party which won a narrow victory in the May 1993 
elections. As Sihanouk's son, Ranariddh comes under constant 
pressure to balance many prevailing interests. Loyalty to his 
father certainly. But as leader of FUNCINPEC, Ranariddh must 
also take into account the party's former alliance with the 
Khmer Rouge to oust the Vietnamese during the civil war. Most 
important, Ranariddh must consider his new coalition partner 
Hun Sen, the former leader of Cambodia during the Vietnamese 
occupation, the very man his party attempted to depose. 
Hun Sen, the Second Prime Minister, heads the Cambodian 
People's Party (CPP). A former regimental deputy commander in 
the Khmer Rouge with ten years service, Hun Sen broke with Pol 
Pot's regime in 1977 and joined the Vietnamese.386 Hanoi 
installed Hun Sen as governing head of Cambodia in 1979, "to 
present a more compassionate, liberal face to Cambodia to the 
outside world . . . ."387 Although the CPP lost the national 
elections to FUNCINPEC, the party continues to control the 
military, administrative, and security apparatus throughout 





The Khmer Rouge, on the other hand, have no public 
problems with divided leadership. Although Pol Pot is 
publicly retired, he retains control according to defectors 
and has appointed Khieu Samphan to act as the sole spokesman 
in negotiations. Khieu has held the title of the President of 
Democratic Kampuchea since 1976. A founding member of the 
Khmer Rouge organization, his studies in France before the 
19 75 victory "provided the intellectual framework for the 
Khmer Rouge's decision to evacuate the inhabitants of Cambo- 
dia's cities to the countryside . . . ."388 Obviously, Khieu 
was chosen for his faithful loyalty to the regime's mandate. 
"His duties in the late seventies . . . included acting as 
host at macabre 'last suppers' for Khmer Rouge officials who 
were about to be purged and executed."389 When Khieu was 
invited to Phnom Penh to negotiate the national elections on 
27 November 1991, a mob of angry students attempted to take 
his life.  Khieu is not worried: "'Our position, he explained 
390 patiently, "is to let bygones be bygones.'" 
The government was forced to negotiate outside Cambodia 
in 1994 when the Khmer Rouge complained that Phnom Penh was 
not safe, probably using incidents like the November 1991 
388Ibid., p. 48. 
389Ibid. 
39CRobert Sam Anson, "Crazy in Cambodia, " Esquire. 
August 1992, p. 134. 
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attack as foundation. Sihanouk therefore called for 
"roundtable" talks in Pyongyang, North Korea, to be held 27-28 
May 1994. The government was represented by Sihanouk and both 
prime ministers. The king called for national reconciliation 
and the inclusion of the Khmer Rouge into the Royal Government 
as well as the incorporation of the National Army of Demo- 
cratic Kampuchea (NADK, the Khmer Rouge army) into the Royal 
Cambodian Armed Forces.391 Ranariddh and Hun Sen, the legal 
representatives of the state, came with their own agendas. In 
fact, Sihanouk himself explained to a reporter a month before 
the talks that "the co-premiers both appeared reluctant to 
talk peace with the KR [Khmer Rouge] . "392 
Since the press did not attend the talks, one can only 
discern the atmosphere of the discussions from the interviews 
that followed. From the king came a message delivered on 1 
June: "we will always be loyal to the sacred principle that 
the country must be free from partition or secession; it must 
not be divided into three, four, or more parts. We must 
preserve the territorial unity and territorial integrity of 
Cambodia forever."393 Sihanouk reaffirmed his commitment to 
391
 "Sihanouk Vows Outcome of Roundtable Talks, FBIS-EAS- 
94-106, 2 June 1994, p. 57. 
'
9:Jon Ogden, "King Bids to Broker Peace Talks," PJbnojn 
Penh Post. April 8-21, 1994, p. 1. 
393 
"Sihanouk Vows Outcome of Roundtable Talks," p. 56. 
154 
include the insurgents in the government. "[P]ower should be 
given to them [Khmer Rouge] equally," proclaimed the king, 
"though they did not take part in the elections. "394 Sihanouk 
added, Hun Sen "disagreed with that."395 In fact, Ranariddh and 
Hun Sen probably privately disagreed with the talks as a 
whole. Publicly, both complied with the king's proposal, yet 
neither seemed bent on accommodating the inclusion of the 
insurgents in the government. 
Sihanouk offered a cease-fire to the insurgents, which 
would be monitored by Cambodian observers. The Khmer Rouge, 
however, demanded foreigners to monitor the cease-fire and 
gave the king a list of ten countries out of which five could 
be chosen.395 Sihanouk went on to explain in his broadcast 
this would not work because it was already tried during the UN 
sponsored elections. "Somehow when foreigners came during the 
time of UNTAC [United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia] the Khmer Rouge did not allow them to do any 
overseeing," the king explained. "It might take months or 
even a year to solve the problem of cease-fire supervision. 
Our people will continue to suffer endlessly. "397 





The Khmer Rouge response to the government's initiative 
is described in an interview with Khieu on 2 June 1994 over a 
clandestine radio broadcast. "I proposed that consultations 
be held ... to formulate a minimal policy program according 
to which all parties would agree to setup a national govern- 
ment and national army of which all Cambodian parties would be 
members."3"" He went on to denounce Hun Sen's role. "He [Hun 
Sen] talked about a cease-fire. He did not say anything about 
national reconciliation or how to bring about lasting peace . 
. . . [H] e put forth three points which were conditions set 
by the communist Vietnamese and the alliance to do away with 
the PDK [Party of Democratic Kampuchea] and block national 
reconciliation and peace."399 The three points were not 
mentioned in this radio interview, however, on 17 June the 
Khmer Rouge radio carried a discussion of three conditions 
given to the insurgents in a later meeting which probably 
contain the germ of Hun Sen's demands: 
1. Getting Democratic Kampuchea to implement a 
cease-fire. 
2. Getting Democratic Kampuchea to hand over all 
its zones to the former State of Cambodia of the 
communist Vietnamese, and now to the two-headed 
government; and 
3. Getting Democratic Kampuchea to demobilize all 
398
"Khieu Samphan Interviewed," FBIS-EAS-94-106, 2 June 
1994, p. 58. 
399Ibid., p. 59. 
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its troops.40" 
Khieu would not agree to any loss of territory nor a disarma- 
ment, just as these demands were rejected after the 1991 Peace 
Accords. As for the cease-fire, the guerrilla leader did 
accept this point on one condition, international arbitration. 
Yet, as was already pointed out, Sihanouk could not justify 
further delay to arrange foreign monitors. 
Most significantly, the PDK also called for dissolution 
of the present national government. In its place the Khmer 
Rouge radio broadcast demanded "power be given to King Norodom 
Sihanouk for a few years so that he can settle national 
problems by forming a national salvation government with the 
king as the prime minister and four deputy prime ministers . 
. . . "
401
 Khieu Samphan would be among the four. Unfortu- 
nately, the duly elected leaders of Cambodia had no plans to 
dissolve their government. 
The underlining difference between the two sides is 
summed up by Sihanouk in his 1 June broadcast. "They [Khmer 
Rouge] will continue to fight; they will agree to stop only if 
the existing government dissolves itself, contrary to the 
400
"Khmer Rouge Issues Statement on Cease-Fire," FBIS- 
EAS-94-117, 17 June 1994, p. 46. 
401
"Editorial Views Diplomats Statement on Reform," 
FBIS-EAS-94-121, 23 June 1994, p. 37. 
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Constitution."40- Since the parties did not agree to end the 
war, Sihanouk asked that the talks be resumed on 15 and 16 
June 1994 in Phnom Penh. 
Sihanouk's call for a second "roundtable" in Phnom Penh 
appeared to have little hope of success since even he did not 
attend. Khieu was the only principal negotiator to arrive. 
The king sent a representative, Samdech Nhoek Chulong, to act 
in his stead while the two co-prime ministers also sent 
representatives as well.403 The talks achieved neither a 
permanent cease-fire nor further negotiations. Both Sihanouk 
and Hun Sen had previously announced that no further negations 
would follow this second "roundtable." Following the failed 
talks, the Khmer Rouge office in Phnom Penh was closed and all 
Khmer Rouge representatives were ordered out of the city by 19 
June 1994.404 
Sihanouk, obviously upset that both "roundtable" talks 
had failed to bring about national reconciliation, made 
another surprise announcement. In a 16 June 1994 interview, 
Sihanouk proposed a plan whereby he would take absolute power. 
The "'current government,'" the king explained, "'has shown it 
402
"Sihanouk Vows Outcome of Roundtable Talks," FBIS- 
EAS-94-106, 2 June 1994, p. 57. 
403
"DK Official Chan Youran Reviews Roundtable," FBIS- 
EAS-94-122, 24 June 1994, p. 46. 
404
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is not capable of stopping the process of deterioration of the 
situation . ' "4iJD On 23 June, the king become more 
explicit. "'In case the situation becomes anarchic and 
desperate, I would have to take power for one or two years, ' " 
Sihanouk explained.4vt Acting not as head of state, but head 
of government, Sihanouk also proposed four vice-presidents to 
include the Khmer Rouge in a new governing body.40' The goal 
he explains, is "'the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the 
country .... The only difference is ... no war with the 
Khmer Rouge and the Khmer Rouge in my government.'"408 Hun 
Sen's response was also predictable. The Second Prime 
Minister rejected it as a "'legal coup to dissolve the 
constitution . . . . • "409 
For the Khmer Rouge the failed talks had little impact. 
Khieu remained philosophical for his supporters. Speaking 
over a clandestine radio on 28 June he justified continued 
negotiations: 
Achieving national reconciliation, as an important 
405Nate Thayer, "Standing Up to Father," Far Eastern 
Economic Review, vol 157, no 26, 30 June 1994, p. 15. 
406. Nate Thayer,   "Last Act,"   Far Eastern Economic Review, 
vol   157,   no  25,   23   June   1994,   p.   16. 
4CPIbid. 
408 Ibid. 
409Nate Thayer,   "Standing Up to Father,"  p.   15. 
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personality in Phnom Penh said, is like boring a 
hole in a piece of wood. You cannot make the hole 
just by merely placing the drill on the wood; you 
must drill it little by little until the drill is 
through. This means that just a couple of rounds 
of talks or negotiations will not make national 
reconciliation. We need more meetings and consul- 
tations 
Why would the Khmer Rouge want further negotiations? The 
insurgency sees a divided government and a king that has 
championed their cause as well as proclaimed an interest in 
rejuvenating dictatorship which all but destroys the demo- 
cratic state. By pressing the ritual of negotiations, the 
insurgency fuels internal divisiveness-» which has historically 
brought the Cambodian nation to its knees for centuries. 
DEFEATING AMNESTY PROGRAMS AND DEFECTIONS 
Unable to crack the PDK's invincibility myth through 
military action or negotiations led the government to try 
other means; namely amnesty programs and encouraging defec- 
tions. Following the May elections of 1993, the government 
attempted a general amnesty program that would avoid the Khmer 
Rouge leadership and appeal directly to the common soldiers. 
Out of a force of some 10,000 guerrillas, Far Eastern Economic 
Review calculates more than 1,000 have defected since August 
1993, while the Washington Post put the number at 1,500.411 
■1G"Khieu Samphan on Hun Sen's 'Lese Majeste, ' FBIS-EAS- 
94-124, 28 June 1994, p. 56. 
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The government claims 2,000.4'" Insurgents interviewed by the 
Post gave many reasons for leaving the movement: "war-weari- 
ness, loss of purpose, distrust of leaders and generally 
declining morale" not to mention, "disease, particularly 
malaria, and shortages of ammunition and medicine."413 One 
expert on the Khmer Rouge, Christophe Peschoux, feels the 
guerrillas are severely weakened. "'The Khmer Rouge are 
facing their worst political and ideological crisis since 
1979,'" the French analyst explained. "'Their propaganda mill 
is totally exhausted. They're finding it more and more 
difficult to keep their forces mobilized."414 
But government ineptitude in handling the defectors 
rejuvenates the insurgency. Former Khmer Rouge soldiers are 
presently taken to reeducation camps and indoctrinated in the 
rituals of the new regime. But there are problems with how 
the new inductees are treated. "At least five cases of 
maltreatment including beatings, whippings and other forms of 
4UNate Thayer, "Defectors' Dilemma," Far Eastern 
Economic Review, Vol 157, Iss 1, December 30, 1993 - January 
6, 1994, p. 16 and William Branigan, "Defections Weakening 
Ranks of Cambodian Rebels," The Washington Post. September 
25, 1993, p. A15. 
412James Pringle, "Thai Army Keeps Khmer Rouge Equipped 
for War," The Times. December 27, 1993, p. 8a. 
4:3William Branigan, "Defections Weakening Ranks of 
Cambodian Rebels," The Washington Post. September 25, 1993, 
p. A15. 
-r.-; Branigan, "Defections," p. A15. 
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punishment have been recorded by human-rights activists. . . 
. »
4l
-   Adjustment to the new regime remains a challenge. 
Attempts are made to retrain the insurgents, give them 
uniforms and succor, and then send them back to the field to 
fight their former comrades. 
Unfortunately, the insurgents may have been better off in 
their prior circumstances. The state has little to offer the 
insurgents since the present serving government soldiers have 
not been paid, have little food, and are always short of 
supplies. Yet another problem is false defectors. Civilians 
and other former warring factions also seek '-the amnesty 
program as a source of employment. Re-defection now plagues 
the program. "Given the poor conditions, broken promises, 
beatings, summary executions, political indoctrination classes 
and fake defectors which have haunted amnesty efforts so far," 
Far Eastern Economic Review concludes, "it is not surprising 
that voluntary surrenders have petered out and that many 
defectors have escaped back to the Khmer Rouge."416 
DEFEATING  THE STATE THROUGH PERCEPTIONS OF INSURGENCY 
In many ways the Cambodian government is its own worst 
enemy in trying to defeat the insurgency. The Khmer Rouge 
exploit this fact by encouraging different perceptions of the 
415Thayer, "Defectors' Dilemma," p. 16. 
416 Ibid. 
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insurgency through the use of the myths, symbols, and rituals 
described in this study. In sum, the governing troika have 
come to different understandings of the insurgency. As 
already noted, King Sihanouk called for reconciliation with 
the Khmer Rouge; his two prime ministers attempted to force 
capitulation on the battlefield. Some in the king's ruling 
FUNCINPEC party see the insurgents as a "power card," to be 
played discreetly against the actual power of the CPP since 
Hun Sen's party essentially controls the government and 
provincial bureaucracy, internal security, and the national 
army. The CPP in turn fears the former alliance of FUNCINPEC 
and Khmer Rouge maintained during the Vietnamese occupation. 
Members of the CPP remain convinced the royal party is 
sympathetic if not completely penetrated by Khmer Rouge 
officials. King Sihanouk's ties to the Khmer Rouge go back to 
his alliance with the insurgency after he was pushed aside in 
a coup in 1970. Although each of the three heads of govern- 
ment use success by the Khmer Rouge insurgency to solicit 
international support and financing for their respective 
platform, none have learned a lesson of Khmer history: rituals 
of national division invite conquest. 
DEFEATING THE STATE THROUGH CORRUPTION RITUALS 
Government division encourages selfish interests and 
corruption.  And corruption it seems, has become a ritual, 
faithfully reproduced between both the Cambodian civilian and 
163 
military leadership. Unable to support their families on poor 
government salaries, civilian leaders in government seek 
compensation at the expense of the national infrastructure 
through bribery and nepotism. With the country's needs now 
pushed from civilian leaders' priorities, nothing gets done. 
As Asian historian, Milton Osborne observed, "'everything 
seems to be on hold. It is as if everyone is waiting for 
something to happen.'"417 Writing from Phnom Penh, journalist 
John Brown noted: "No press law has been accepted, no penal 
code, no criminal procedure code, no immigration law, no 
citizenship law, and no property law. "418 
Military leadership mirrors this corruption. According 
to the London Financial Times. Cambodian military officers 
have enacted "secret trade agreements" with the Khmer Rouge so 
that lucrative trade routes and logging roads remain free of 
mines.419 RCAF collusion raises not only the myth of PDK 
invincibility but lowers RCAF legitimacy. Results on the 
battlefield see the same corruption. During the assault of 
the Khmer Rouge stronghold of Pailin, government foot soldiers 
417John C. Brown, "FUNCINPEC's Evaporating Mandate," 
Phnom Penh Post, Vol 3, No 6, March 25 - April 7, 1994, p. 
6. 
418Ibid. 
419Victor Mallet, "UN Winds Up in Cambodia, But the War 
Is Far From Over," London Financial Times. March 17, 1994, 
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complained that they had not received any salary for four 
months. A'J After the RCAF took Pail in and then lost it, even 
worse corruption became clear. The corruption and resulting 
defeat have become so acute that members of the Cambodian 
National Assembly have taken the unprecedented step of calling 
for the Co-Defense Ministers to explain the military 
failures.42" 
THE   "VOICE"  OF THE KHMER ROUGE 
The Khmer Rouge clandestine radio station, Voice of the 
Great National Union Front of Cambodia, is a powerful tool for 
invoking symbolic discourse to encourage national divisive- 
ness. Probably located in Thailand, it serves as conduit to 
rural supporters and internationalizes the Cambodian conflict 
on behalf of the Khmer Rouge.422 Negotiations with the 
government are always framed within the popular appeal of 
"national reconciliation." But by harping on government 
corruption the insurgency undermines state legitimacy. 
The Vietnamese presence both in government and society 
are continually invoked with the symbolic reminder of a "two- 
headed" government, thus playing on a deep seated racial 
prejudice formed over centuries of conflict with their eastern 
420Anon, "Teenaged Deserter Vows to Fight Again," p. 3. 
421Anugraha Palan, "MPs Urge Inquiry Into Pailin," p. 3. 
422Anon, "Cambodia's Nightmare," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, vol, 157, no 23, 9 June 1994, p. 5. 
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neighbor. 
Military assaults by the government on insurgent con- 
trolled areas are simply exploited over the radio as attacks 
on the suffering population. "[I]f the enemies of the nation 
attacked Democratic Kampuchea," a clandestine station an- 
nounced, "it was the same thing as if they attacked the entire 
Cambodian nation and people, especially the nearly 7 million 
peasants."423 All this symbolic discourse is backed by 
symbolic violence. 
SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE 
The insurgency uses both military force and symbolic 
terror to promote their quest for power. Far Eastern Economic 
Review claims the Khmer Rouge see a vulnerable government and 
have switched their strategy to exploit new opportunities. 
"Instead of seeking a share of power in the government and 
army through negotiations," says the journal, "it has decided 
to launch a protracted military and political offensive to 
force the collapse of the government."424 Symbolic political 
violence to increase government instability is certainly 
prevalent. For example, in April 1994, an American aid worker 
taken hostage by the insurgents for months was finally freed 
on ransom, however, three other foreigners were killed when 
423
"Article on Composition of Democratic Kampuchea, 
FBIS-EAS-94-111, 9 June 1994, p. 43. 
424Nate Thayer, "One Way Out," p. 14. 
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their $50,000.00 ransom was not met."121 Both events held 
evidence of collusion between the insurgency and state 
officials further promoting a sense of government illegiti- 
macy. On a higher scale of violence, a Cambodian daily 
reported 11 clashes between guerrillas and the royal army in 
northwest Cambodia in one month alone.426 All these forms of 
violence foster the image of a weak governing power and an 
invincible insurgency. 
OUTLAWS OR SAVIORS? 
To regain the initiative, the government attempted 
symbolic warfare of its own through legislative discourse. 
Following the failed second "roundtable" on 15 and 16 June 
1994, Chea Sim, the Cambodian National Assembly chairman, 
proposed a draft law to outlaw the Khmer Rouge. On 7 July, 
the Cambodian National Assembly adopted the law outlawing the 
insurgents and on 28 July the law was ratified.427 Ironically, 
one anonymous senior CPP member said the law was proposed in 
April 1994 by King Sihanouk himself. "Then three days later, 
the king issued a call for round-table peace talks with the 
425
"Khmer Rouge Demand $50,000 for Kidnapped 
Westerners," FBIS-JPRS-TOT-94-033-L, 1 August 1994, on line. 
426
"Military Activities Against Khmer Rouge Reported, " 
FBIS-EAS-94-167, 28 August 1994, on line. 
427
"Law Outlawing Khmer Rouge Ratified," FBIS-EAS-94- 
145, 28 July 1994, p. 87. 
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radical faction," alleged the anonymous source.4'8 If this 
were the case, Cambodia is truly groping for the proper legal 
response to the insurgency. 
Popular opinion supported the law according to a poll 
conducted by the newspaper Kaoh Santepheap. The daily 
explained, "the common people are happy to see the Khmer Rouge 
declared outlaw rebels because the Khmer Rouge have been 
rebels since 1979. There should not be any difficulty 
declaring them as such one more time."429 As for those still 
in sympathy with the insurgents, the paper offered this 
advice: "It would be better for those who are not happy with 
the move to outlaw the Khmer Rouge and go live with them in 
the jungle."430 
The Khmer Rouge response to being outlawed came on 5 July 
423Thayer, "Things Fall Apart . . ."p. 18. 
429
"Paper on FUNCINPEC's Khmer Rouge Situation," FBIS- 
EAS-94-124, 28 June 1994, p. 57. 
430Ibid.  The advice from the newspaper was probably 
aimed at two leading government advocates of the king's 
negotiating position, Finance Minister Sam Rangsi, who also 
acts as the vice-chairman of the FUNCINPEC party and Foreign 
Minister Prince Norodom Sirivut, Sihanouk's half brother. 
Both men support the king's call for not outlawing the 
guerrillas and threatened to resign from the government. 
Although this dissent is expected in a democratic polity, it 
only adds to the tension in an already shaky coalition 
government.  For on 2 July 1994, another of the king's sons, 
Norodom Chakrapong, was implicated in a coup to bring down 
the government and sent into exile.  See Nate Thayer, 
"Shadow Play," Far Eastern Economic Review. Vol 157, No 28, 
14 July 1994, p. 15. 
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1994. The insurgency promoted themselves as symbolic saviors 
of the nation. "Communist Vietnam," proclaimed the clandes- 
tine radio, 
the communist Vietnamese puppets, and their unscru- 
pulous alliance have enforced dictatorial and 
fascist laws and are currently forging a law to 
impose a monopoly, dictatorship, and fascism with 
the aim of attacking and destroying Democratic 
Kampuchea.4Ji 
On 11 July, Khieu announced the formation of a new insurgent 
government, the Provisional Government of National Union and 
National Salvation of Cambodia (PGNUNS) .432 Khieu appointed 
himself Prime Minister, with an agenda of "national reconcili- 
ation" and called for the "muster" of all national forces to 
end the war. The broadcast continued with these chilling 
words: "It will also solve the problem of the four million 
ethnic Vietnamese [who live in Cambodia] , who pose the 
greatest danger to the survival of our Cambodian nation, 
people, and race."433 How the "problem" will be solved is not 
described in the transmission, but considering the organiza- 
tion's considerable experience with "killing fields," it 
431
 "PDK Statement Condemns Law to Ban Khmer Rouge," 
FBIS-EAS-94-129, 5 July 1994, on line. 
432
"Khmer Rouge Leader Announces New Government," FBIS 
EAS-94-133, 11 July 1994, on line. 
433Ibid. 
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warrants little explanation.^ 
F.   CONCLUSIONS 
The long term strategy of the Khmer Rouge surely includes 
encouraging the collapse of the state through infighting 
between the governing factions and feeding the corruption that 
permeates both civilian and military leadership. As Asian 
expert Frederick Brown of the Johns Hopkins University School 
of Advanced International Studies explained: "'The strength of 
the Khmer Rouge lies with the weakness of the rest of Cambo- 
dia. Until those weakness are remedied, the Khmer Rouge will 
have the ability to come back. ' "435 
If the Khmer Rouge have a "come back" plan, its basis is 
reconstructing five myths that give viability to the insur- 
gency. By utilizing the myth of a new public image, the Khmer 
Rouge attempt to gain both international and domestic legiti- 
macy. A democratic language and symbols have replaced the 
communist images of the 1970s to maintain this myth. 
4
'
4An Associated Press report dated 21 January 1995 
relates the massacres of hundreds of people in Northwest 
Cambodia based on defectors' reports.  One defector, who had 
served with the NADK since 1973 expressed, "'They are 
continuing with new massacres and I must quit them.'" 
Importantly, the same defector noted that the KR also killed 
those who worshipped ancient spirits.  "'Angkar (the 
collective Khmer Rouge leadership) said they don't believe 
in it and they ordered those who believe in forest spirits 
to be executed....'" 
4i5Robert S. Greenberger, "U.N. Risks Tarnishing Evident 
Success of Peacekeeping Operation in Cambodia," The Wall 
Street Journal. November 1, 1993, p. A12. 
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Promoting the myth of popularity relies on embracing 
symbols once anathema to the insurgency to include private 
ownership of land, capitalism, and materialism. Although all 
invariably produce individualism, the Khmer Rouge accept this 
to keep popular support for their long term collective effort. 
Organizing myths attempt to keep the population focused 
on the group agenda. Perceiving themselves as the only force 
capable of preventing the Vietnamese from "swallowing" their 
areas as well as the country provides a means of organizing 
the movement behind the myth of enemy incursion. This myth 
unifies the forces of both nationalism and racism to the 
insurgency. Playing on the historic fears of Vietnamese 
attempts to exterminate the Khmer race gives an excuse to 
continue the fight for both a stronger "core" element within 
the organization and the "core" element's role as leaders of 
the nation. 
Fighting to protect the state as the heirs of the 
country's resources is a myth to cover the financing of the 
insurgency now that allies are few and external support 
limited. The insurgency sells important natural resources to 
Thailand and government officials that cannot be reclaimed. 
These acts serve to maintain the population and lend viability 
to the insurgency. The boundary with Thailand also serves as 
the main source of external support. The boundary is unse- 
cured and open to continuous dialogue and dalliance between 
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Thai financiers and Khmer insurgents. The rituals on the 
border lend viability to the movement through continued 
financing and arms sales. 
In one respect, arms and sanctuary afforded by the Thais 
helps promote the myth of invincibility as means of defeating 
adversarial response. The government effort to neutralize the 
Khmer Rouge remains inadequate and will remain so as long as 
the insurgents can escape across the border. The invincibil- 
ity myth contributes to calls for continued negotiations with 
the insurgency as a means to reconcile the country. However, 
failed negotiations due to divisive political agendas within 
the government exacerbates the myth. Government failures, 
both civilian and military, help the Khmer Rouge convince the 
population of their invincibility and assert their legitimate 
role as the nation's true defenders. 
All five myths weaken the elected ruling authority of 
Cambodia and promote the viability of the insurgency through 
rituals that strengthen legitimacy, encourage popular support, 
further organizational cohesion, maintain external support, 
and defeat adversarial response. 
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VII. THE HEIRS: THE KHMER ROUGE EPILOGUE 
The mythology surrounding the "Heirs of Angkor" is used 
to describe not only other insurgent groups from South America 
to North Africa,4'0 their myths are the progenitors of other 
ferocious faiths.4'' All these references to the Khmer Rouge 
indicate the myths, rituals, and symbols of the Cambodian 
insurgency not only lend viability as this study concludes, 
but continue to capture the world's imagination. 
Unfortunately, the myths of the Khmer Rouge have also 
captured the hapless country of Cambodia. The new government 
is at a distinct disadvantage in preparing proper legal and 
military responses to the insurgency. Cambodia has no history 
of democracy nor of sharing power. In some respects, simply 
outlawing the organization may be the best response available 
until the political environment improves. However, as a new 
democratic experiment, the government is its own worst enemy. 
Government initiatives ranging from amnesty programs to 
military action all suffer from lack of effective direction 
and coordination as well as conflicting national objectives. 
436See William Rosenau, "Is the Shining Path the 'New 
Khmer Rouge,1", Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. Vol 17, 
1994,  and the "Green Khmer," described in Algeria's war 
against the Islamic extremists in FBIS-NES-94-078-A, 6 April 
1994 and FBIS-NES-94-213, 2 November 1994. 
4J7Besides the above groups, see the Ukrainian radical 
group "Pryama Diya" which explained it will use the 
"'experience of the Khmer Rouge...'" for its actions.  See 
FBIS-SOV-94-206, 24 October 1994. 
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To win the war against the Khmer Rouge will require effective 
leadership, national will, and unified political and military- 
strategy. The Cambodian government must translate all these 
to its legal and military responses to the Khmer Rouge or see 
its efforts fail. Yet an important aspect the government must 
not overlook is the "cognitive dimension." 
Pol Pot understands what kind of fight insurgency is: "It 
is a deep-rooted fight," he explains to cadres, "because it is 
the fight of ideology, of mind, of brain."438 Pol Pot and his 
cadre are the dreamers J. Bowyer Bell described in the 
introduction to this analysis. The Khmer Rouge through an 
understanding of what their leader describes as the "ideologi- 
cal battlefield," shape their dreams to validate one of the 
foremost desires of Brother Number One: the "'perenniality of 
the Kampuchean race.'"'139 Their goal is to infect the many in 
this psychological contagion. The virus is carried in many 
forms of discourse, but certainly in the myths, rituals, and 
symbols of the insurgency. 
The Khmer Rouge should never be underestimated as simply 
a symptom of a weak international state. The insurgency has 
suffered forty-four years in the crucible of struggle and 
438A document attributed from Pol Pot to his cadres 
entitled, "What is the Virtue, the Quality, the Reality and 
the Responsibility of Democratic Kampuchea in the Past, 
Present, and Future?", dated 2 December 1986, p. 10. 
•13 9 Pol Pot as quoted in Becker, p. 4. 
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remains determined to protect its perceived interests: 
We have a firm concept. We stand by Democratic 
Kampuchea, which is our natural interest, because 
we really believe that there is no other alterna- 
tive than Democratic Kampuchea which can protect 
your interest.44" 
The committed among its ranks remain confident in ultimate 
victory as described in one Khmer Rouge soldier's comment on 
the government attack of the insurgent capital city: "'We will 
lose some areas, including maybe . . . Pail in. . . ., ' " he 
explained. "'But by the end of the fighting, we will have more 
territory than we have now. We will attempt to hold our areas 
but not at any cost. If they want it, they can have it. But 
they can't keep it for long.'"441 
To retain this commitment, the Khmer Rouge leadership 
understands that their struggle is not only on the corporeal 
plane but the incorporeal plane as well. The symbolic actions 
of the Khmer Rouge act as links to these beliefs giving them 
"concrete expression" in the insurgent's quest for power and 
viability. These symbolic ideas draw inspiration from the 
geography and history of the region and incorporate the 
essential elements of Khmer culture. This study demonstrates 
440Virtue, p. 5, 
441Nate Thayer and Ken Munthit, "Govt Soldiers Take 
Shaky Hold on Pailin," Phnom Penh Post. Vol 3, No 6, March 
25 - April 7, 1994, pp. 1,2. 
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how these symbols are translated into action through five 
areas critical to insurgent viability: legitimacy, popular 
support, organization, external support, and defeating 
adversarial response. This method has applicability to any 
insurgency. Each area saw important aspects of Khmer culture 
emphasized through symbols to give the insurgency a greater 
chance of success against the overwhelming power of the state. 
For the Khmer Rouge, symbolic actions promote strength 
where there is weakness and provide unity where there is 
faction. Symbolic actions that promoted ethnic discrimination 
myths, nationalist rituals, and symbolic alliances with the 
monarchy and Vietnam are a means to help explain how the 
insurgency survived in the 1950s and 60s without a majority of 
popular support as well as how their rural based victory could 
be achieved in 1975. Not to be overlooked is the power of 
these symbols to work as a two-edged sword however. The Khmer 
Rouge became engrossed in the common blood ties and racial 
purity myths they created during their 1975-1979 reign which 
was an important factor in their demise after only forty-four 
months. Symbolic actions have also helped reconstruct the 
movement following defeat. Through five important myths that 
promote a new public image, popularity, enemy incursion, heirs 
to national resources, and invincibility the Khmer Rouge 
continue to enhance their viability against the prevailing 
government. 
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Without the benefit of superior physical resources 
insurgents utilize and manipulate the symbolic resources 
available. By effectively tapping into cultural images, the 
Khmer Rouge are better prepared to dominate the battle of 
perceptions, overcome their inherent fears, and remain a 
viable insurgency in the years to come. Only by better 
understanding the insurgent's "self-definitions,"--their 
perception of themselves, their cause, and their future--can 
the Khmer Rouge be dealt with in light of their perceived 
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